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Over the last few decades the Arctic Ocean has 
experienced a rapid reduction in both the extent and 
volume of sea ice. These changes, caused by the global 
temperature increases, have opened up previously 
inaccessible shipping lanes and made possible the 
extraction of major natural reserves of fossil fuels. 
Following these changes in the Arctic environment, the 
last decade has seen an influx of maritime activities in the 
segments of liquid bulk shipping, offshoring and cruise 
tourism. The Arctic is one of the last frontiers on our 
planet and consequently the need to shed light on marine 
activities in and around the Arctic Ocean has arisen. The 
aim of this study is to address and analyze some of these 
challenges and opportunities in the spheres of both the 
private and public sector.  
On the industry level previous and ongoing projects are 
mapped out for each of the four major maritime sectors. 
This involves liner shipping, bulk shipping, offshoring and 
cruise tourism. Additionally the possibilities and 
challenges are analyzed qualitatively, with a particular 
focus on the future prospects for each of these four sectors, 
from a combination of past literature and economic theory.  
As a part of the chapter on the opportunities for the liner 
shipping sector in the Arctic a quantitative economic 
analysis is performed. The aim of the quantitative analysis 
is to examine the economic feasibility of transporting 
containerized goods using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
between Northern Europe and East Asia as an alternative 
to the Suez Canal Route (SCR). More specifically the 
study will aim to determine when (if ever) the investment 
in an ice-reinforced container ship operating along the 
NSR would be preferable to an investment in an open 
water vessel solely navigating the SCR.  
 
Finally this report presents a descriptive analysis of the 
political and regulative environment is executed, with an 
emphasis on how the regulatory environment is created. 
The aim is to facilitate how these political and regulative 
institutions impact the future prospects for maritime 
activities in the Arctic. The analysis will investigate 
international cooperation and unilateral standards, focusing 
on how each of these scenarios affects regional stability. 
This is performed in a theoretical framework incorporating 
the past, present and future. This provides a holistic 
overview of how the Arctic regimes are interlinked and 
thus creates the regulatory space, which companies operate 
within.  
 
The findings of the report conclude that major 
opportunities for the maritime sector exist if the ice cover 
on the Arctic Ocean continues to decline. The sector of dry 
bulk and offshoring are currently the sectors with the 
largest potential as the Arctic hosts and abundance of the 
natural resource.  The results from the quantitative study 
on the feasibility of liner shipping across the NSR indicate 
that Arctic liner shipping may become economically 
feasible around 2040, if the ice cover continues to diminish 
at the present rate. The possibility of a major expansion of 
the maritime activities within the sectors of bulk, 
offshoring and liner shipping before midcentury rests upon 
several crucial assumptions which are all subject to major 
uncertainties. These uncertainties include the hazardous 
environmental conditions, port and infrastructure 
availability and high costs of operation compared to the 
southern shipping lanes. Additionally the Arctic Ocean 
lacks an international governmental and regulative 
framework in combination with high entry costs creates 
uncertainty for the maritime industry seeking to operate in 
and around the Arctic Ocean.    
 
The calculations presented in the liner shipping 
quantitative study, are based on a calculation tool 
specifically designed to support the conclusions of the case 
study. This calculation tool, available for download along 
with the report, allows researchers and industry 
professionals to insert the specifications of a given vessel, 
along with environmental and economic parameters in 
order to obtain information on the feasibility of 
transporting containerized cargo along the NSR. 
Specifically, the model allows the user to determine the 
year when the investment in an ice reinforced 
containership operating along the NSR during the 
navigation (and the SCR at other times), will become 
favorable compared to an ordinary container ship solely 
operating on the SCR. 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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This report forms part of the ambitious CBS Maritime 
research initiative entitled “Competitive Challenges and 
Strategic Development Potential in Global Maritime 
Industries” which was launched with the generous support 
of the Danish Maritime Fund. The competitiveness 
initiative targets specific maritime industries (including 
shipping, offshore energy, ports, and maritime service and 
equipment suppliers) as well as addresses topics that cut 
across maritime industries (regulation and 
competitiveness). The topics and narrower research 
questions addressed in the initiative were developed in 
close dialogue between CBS Maritime and the maritime 
industries in Denmark. 
 
CBS Maritime is a Business in Society (BiS) Platform at 
Copenhagen Business School committed to the big 
question of how to achieve economic and social progress 
in the maritime industries. CBS Maritime aims to 
strengthen a maritime focus at CBS and create the 
foundation for CBS as a stronger partner for the maritime 
industries, as well as for other universities and business 
school with a devotion to maritime economics research. 
The competitiveness initiative comprises a number of PhD 
projects and five short term mapping projects, the latter 
aiming at developing key concepts and building up a basic 
industry knowledge base for further development of CBS 
Maritime research and teaching.  
 
This report attempts to map the opportunities and 
challenges for the maritime industry in an increasingly 
accessible Arctic Ocean. 
 
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS: 1.1
 
1. What are the major challenges to an increase in 
maritime activity in the Arctic? 
2. What are the major opportunities for the maritime 
industry segments of liner shipping, bulk, 
offshoring and cruise ship tourism? 
3. Will the Northern Sea Route become competitive 
compared to the Suez Canal Route on the Europe 
to East Asia trade? 
4. How will current and future regulative regimes 
impact the maritime industry operating in the 
Arctic? 
5. What are the underlying intentions of the Arctic 
governmental bodies? 
6. Are the Arctic governmental bodies heading 
towards more cooperation? 
7. How will the governmental bodies impact the 
maritime industry operating in the Arctic?  
8. What are the opportunities for Danish maritime 
companies and sub suppliers in the Arctic?   
 READERS GUIDE 1.2
The report is divided into nine parts with the first part 
containing the summary, acknowledgements and research 
questions. The second part introduces the shipping lanes of 
the Arctic Ocean and the maritime challenges as well as 
possibilities created by climate changes in the region. Part 
three presents the newest research on the impact of climate 
change in the Arctic Ocean and aims to give an estimate 
on the pace at which the Arctic sea ice is melting. In part 
four, the possibilities and challenges for liner shipping in 
the Arctic are presented. Chapter five continues in the 
subject of liner shipping by presenting a quantitative study 
aiming to determine when shipping along the Northern Sea 
Route may become feasible compared to the Suez Canal 
Route on the Europe to Asia trade.  
Part six analyses the possibilities and challenges for the 
dry and liquid bulk sector and presents current and future 
resource extraction activities in the Arctic of relevance to 
the maritime industry. The seventh part analyses the 
possibilities and challenges for the cruise shipping sector 
in the Arctic while the seventh part gives a brief 
presentation of the opportunities for the Danish maritime 
industry in an increasing accessible Arctic Ocean. Finally 
the ninth and last part presents the political environment of 
the Arctic, mapping the relevant institutions and their 
regulatory power, to understand future trajectories. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
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 ABBREVIATIONS 1.3
 
NSR:  Northern Sea Route 
SCR:  Suez Canal Route 
NWP:  North West Passage 
TSR:  Transpolar Sea Route 
PCR:  Panama Canal Route 
IMO:  International Maritime Organization 
CCG:  Canadian Coast Guard  
NSRA:  Northern Sea Route Administration 
TEU:  Twenty Foot Equivalent 
NM:  Nautical Miles 
SAR:  Search and Rescue 
IPCC:  International Panel on Climate Change 
DWT:  Dead Weight Ton 
GCM: General Circulation Model 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris  
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The Arctic Ocean‘s sea ice is melting at a rapid pace, 
leaving an ever larger section of the polar seas ice-free 
each summer. The six years with the lowest observed 
summer sea ice extent have all occurred within the last 
decade (Smith & Stephenson, 2013). And new forecast 
models are continuously bringing forward expectations of 
ice-free summers in the Arctic (Flake, 2013) creating a 
significant potential for previously impossible maritime 
activities. The diminishing ice cover has not only allowed 
for the utilization of the Arctic shipping lanes for 
intercontinental transport, but has also resulted in vast 
quantities of natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals 
to be extractible. This creates opportunities for various 
sectors of the maritime industry within: transport, 
offshoring, servicing, emergency response, surveillance, 
maritime equipment, new build and retrofitting vessels. 
The vast and remote Arctic Ocean entails significant 
challenges and hazards to companies seeking to operate in 
this environment. These challenges include first and 
foremost the cyclical ice cover and the drift ice this 
creates. However, the lack of population centers, suitable 
ports and the lack of developed infrastructure for search 
and rescue (SAR), poses even larger operational and 
environmental risks. Further, the need for ice reinforced 
vessels and specialized equipment impose significant 
investment costs needed to maintain maritime activities in 
the high Arctic. Currently only a limited number of 
companies are operating in the region, of which the 
majority of these are present in the Northern part of the 
Eurasian landmass.      
Although accessibility for maritime activities has increased 
in the Arctic, the central part of the Arctic Ocean is still 
covered in ice throughout most of the year. The 
possibilities for the maritime industry are mainly divided 
into the two coastal regions of Arctic: Eurasia and arctic 
North America, although the waters of Greenland also 
provide significant possibilities for the sector. The 
Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs along the Russian 
Arctic coast, is currently the most well developed, and has 
consequently seen the most extensive utilization. The 
North West Passage (NWP) in the Arctic Canada has seen 
limited development and maritime traffic. The next two 
chapters will present the opportunities, infrastructure and 
geography of both shipping routes along with their 
surrounding areas while. The last chapter will focus on the 
numerous challenges facing maritime operations in the 
remote Arctic. 
 
 THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE 2.1
The NSR is the shipping route connecting Europe and 
Asia, north of the Eurasian landmass. The NSR has the 
potential to reduce the distance between Europe and Asia 
by up to 40 per cent, compared to the contemporary Suez 
Canal Route (SCR). The NSR is not a specific route but a 
multitude of passageways along the Russian Arctic and 
therefore covers a vast segment of the Arctic Ocean 
(Kronbak & Liu, 2010). The coastal versions of the NSR 
are currently the most trafficked, running along the 
Russian Arctic coast. From west to east, the route traverses 
the five marginal seas of the Barents Sea, the Kara Sea, the 
Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea, 
until reaching the Behring Strait between Siberia and 
Alaska. Although the opening of the NSR has mainly been 
connected to the shipment of goods between Europe and 
East Asia, vast quantities of proven oil, gas and mineral 
reserves are situated along the route. This creates a diverse 
range of opportunities for both the offshore, bulk and 
tanker sectors. The combination of  
2 THE ARCTIC – A NEW REGION FOR 
MARITIME EXPANSION? 
GLOBAL WARMING HAS OPENED UP NEW SHIPPING ROUTES IN THE ARCTIC PRESENTING A 
NEW FRONTIER FOR MARITIME ACTIVITIES. ESPECIALLY THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE AND 
THE NORTH WEST PASSAGE HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO SERVE AS MARITIME SHORTCUTS 
BETWEEN THE WORLDS ECONOMIC CENTERS. UNDERDEVELOPED AND REMOTE THESE 
ROUTES PRESENTS MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR TRANSITING VESSELS AND ICE CONDITIONS 
STILL POSE A THREAT TO EVEN THE STRONGEST ICEBREAKERS.   
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transport and resource extraction opportunities has sparked 
an influx of maritime activities in the waters of the NSR.  
In 2012 a total of 46 vessels operated along the route 
carrying a total cargo volume of almost 4 million tons of 
cargo. The number of commercial vessels operating on the 
route in 2013 increased to 71 vessels, with close to 30 of 
them transiting the entire route between Europe and the 
Pacific and some of the vessels yielding 60,000 gross tons 
or more. In 2014, however, the traffic declined to 53 
transits, and data concerning the fraction of these vessels 
that navigated between Europe and Asia are currently 
unavailable (NSRA, 2015). 
 
The coastal waters are generally shallow at a depth of less 
than 100 meters and the different marginal seas are 
separated by narrow straits, which are occasionally 
blocked by pack ice. Some of these straits also present 
draft restrictions on vessels navigating, the most severe 
being the Kara Gate, the Sannikov Strait and the De Long 
Strait. The Kara Gate, separating Novaya Zemlya from the 
Russian mainland, has a minimum depth of 21 meters 
while the De Long Strait, south of Wrangel Island, has a 
20 meter restriction. The most severe draft restriction is 
encountered in the Sannikov Strait, between the New 
Siberian Islands archipelago, being only 13 meters deep. 
Navigating the Sannikov Strait therefore limits passing 
vessels to only 100,000 DWT or 4,500 Twenty-foot 
Equivalent Units (TEU) which is significantly less than a 
large section of the merchant vessels traversing the Suez 
Canal (Humpert, 2014). In order to bypass the shallow 
straits along the Russian Arctic coast it is possible to 
navigate along a more northern route passing over Novaya 
Zemlya, The New Siberian Islands and Wrangel Island. 
While allowing for vessels of far greater sizes, the more 
northern routes run periphery to the Arctic Basin. These 
routes are therefore subject to more severe ice conditions 
but reduce the distance between Europe and Asia. Even 
though a vessel may aim at predetermined course of the 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Arctic Shipping Routes 
Source: Humpert & Raspotnik (2012) 
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coastal or northern route, the ice conditions in the Arctic 
may force the shippers to alternate the route several times 
and the length of the Northern Sea Route therefore varies 
between 2,200 and 2,900 nautical miles (Østreng, et al., 
2013, p. 13). The waters along the NSR between the Kara 
Gate to Cape Dezhnev is administered by the Russian 
Federal institution “Administration of the Northern Sea 
Route” (NSRA) with  the main targets of “…ensuring safe 
navigation and protection of marine environment from the 
pollution in the water area of the Northern sea route” 
(NSRA, 2015). 
 
The NSRA manages the Russian icebreaker fleet, which is 
currently the largest in the world
1
, and evaluates if 
icebreaker escort is needed and also administers fees 
related to icebreaker escort service for vessels traversing 
the NSR. The NSRA provides short and long term ice 
                                                          
1
 The fleet includes seven nuclear powered and multiple 
conventional ice breakers. 
cover forecasts, and from this determines the necessity for 
icebreaker assistance along the planned route, given the ice 
classification of the vessel traversing the NSR. The NSRA 
has established requirements of the ice strengthening 
capabilities of vessels navigation the NSR given the 
navigation season and general ice conditions at the time. 
To illustrate, it is allowed for a light ice reinforced vessel, 
class ICE3, to independently navigate the entire NSR in 
mild ice conditions during the period August to November 
1
st
. However, in case of medium ice conditions, a 
minimum of class polar class 6 (Arc6) is required for 
vessels. Further, the Russian Federal Tariff Service 
recently announced an updated icebreaker tariff scheme 
for foreign vessels navigating the NSR coming into effect 
by 21 April 2014. Compared to the previous system this 
new tariff scheme presents an increased transparency of 
the system, lowering of the official price level, which 
makes cost projections of navigating the NSR more 
accurate for operators. This updated icebreaker escort tariff  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Search and rescue coordination areas in the eastern section of the NSR 
Source: Gosmorspassluzhba (2013) 
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is determined based on the following four voyage 
specifications: 
 
 Total gross ton of the vessel seeking passage 
 The ice classification of the vessel 
 The season where the passage is to occur 
 The areas where icebreaker assistance is needed 
The base fee increases with the number of zones where 
icebreaker assistance is provided but is not directly 
affected by the lengths or time of the received escort 
service. This implies that the icebreaker assistance fee will 
remain the same regardless of receiving icebreaker 
assistance for 10 or 500 nautical miles within the of the 
zone along the NSR. Additionally the tariff fee only 
applies when actually receiving icebreaker escort, creating 
the potential for ice-reinforced merchant vessels to 
completely avoid transit fees in mild ice conditions. 
Previously the tariff was mandatory regardless of receiving 
icebreaker assistance or not, and it remains to be seen 
whether such a mandatory fee still applies. Russia has the 
most developed coastline infrastructures in the high Arctic, 
although the average distance between ports and SAR 
centers measures about 2000 kilometers. By far the largest 
port in the Russian Arctic is the port of Murmansk located 
on the Kola Peninsula, accessible throughout the entire 
year due to the Atlantic thermohaline current. Other 
smaller settlements with a moderate level of port facilities 
include Sabetta on the Yamal Peninsula, Tiksi at the Kara 
Sea and Pevek located near the New Siberian Islands. The 
infrastructure for SAR along the NSR has expanded in the 
last few years with two marine rescue operations 
headquarters located in Murmansk and Vladivostok. The 
operations headquarters in Murmansk is based on the 
federal state enterprise RosAtomflot, while the 
headquarters in Vladivostok is based on the Far Eastern 
Shipping Company. The SAR and the oil spill response 
assets along the NSR are managed in collaboration by with 
the headquarters by two marine rescue coordination 
centers and several marine rescue sub centers. The two 
marine rescue coordination centers are located in 
Murmansk and Dikson, while the sub centers are located in 
Archangelsk, Tiksi, Pevek and Port Provideniya. However, 
these centers are still separated by vast distances and the 
response time may easily be inadequate to prevent 
fatalities in case of an emergency. Although the 
infrastructure and traffic is scarce, the Russian Federation 
authorities have continuously emphasized that the NSR 
holds a great potential as a major international shipping 
lane, initiating several programs to further improve upon 
the current infrastructure and port facilities (Arctic 
Council, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Global shipping choke points 
Source: The Arctic Institute 
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 THE NORTH WEST PASSAGE 2.2
The NWP is defined as the combination of shipping lanes 
connecting the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean 
through the North American Arctic waterways. From east 
to west, the NWP passes through the Davies Strait, Baffin 
Bay and through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago to the 
Beaufort Sea. This then leads to the Chukchi Sea, finally 
opening up to the Pacific Ocean through the Behring 
Strait. In addition to holding vast reserves of minerals and 
petrochemicals, the waterways of the NWP has the 
potential to function both as an alternative to the Suez 
Canal and the Panama Canal. Potentially the distance 
between Northwestern Europe and Asia can be reduced by 
up to 30 per cent, as well as up to 20 percent between East 
Coast USA and East Asia. This Archipelago is a complex 
geographic area consisting of 36.000 islands spanning an 
area of 2.1 million square kilometers (Arctic Council, 
2009). In similarity to the NSR, is not a specific route but a 
combination of several routes due to the multitude of 
different straits and waterways. Overall these routes follow 
a northern path through the Parry Channel, or a southern 
path passing south of Victoria Island. The northern route is 
relatively deep allowing for navigation of large sized 
vessels. These routes are subject to severe ice conditions, 
even during the summer, posing a navigational risk. The 
southern route can be used to mitigate this risk, as the 
Coronation Strait South of Victoria Island is better 
shielded from drift ice. On the other hand, this strait is 
extremely shallow and only allows for the passing of 
vessels with a draft of less than 10 meters.     
The ice conditions in the Canadian Arctic are generally 
more severe than those along the NSR, and the straits 
remains frozen for a longer period throughout the year. 
Global warming has caused a reduction in the ice cover in 
the Canadian Arctic, the extent of summer sea-ice is 
volatile and several of the straits may still experience 
severe ice conditions even during summer. This was 
evident in 2007 most of the NWP waterways were 
completely ice free, while ice conditions in the following 
year were far more severe. In 2008 several of the Straits 
were covered in ice during most of the navigation season. 
During the summer months the Arctic Ocean current 
forces multiyear ice from the North Pole to drift into the 
NWP straits. This frequently clogs the straits, presenting a 
risk to all but the strongest icebreaking vessels operating 
along the NWP (Arctic Council, 2009). Because of the 
North Pole being covered in ice throughout the entire year 
- and will remain so in a foreseeable future - such flows of 
multiyear ice will continue to drift into the straits of the 
NWP, causing the navigation season to be less stable than 
that of the NSR. 
Shipping in the Canadian Arctic is governed by the 
Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), which monitors vessel 
movements and provides radio services. Importantly ice 
and weather information is provided for vessels operating 
along the NWP through the NORDREG system. The CCG 
has divided the Canadian Arctic into various zones, where 
navigation is allowed depending on sufficient ice 
strengthening capabilities of vessels. (CCG, 2012). 
Compared to the Russian Arctic the areas along the NWP 
are extremely underdeveloped – especially around the 
waterways of the Canadian Arctic. The largest and only 
well-developed port in the Canadian Arctic is Churchill, 
located in Hudson Bay close to the interior of the North 
American continent. The Hudson Bay shipping season 
lasts from mid-July to the beginning of November but the 
season could be lengthened significantly with the use of 
icebreaker support (Arctic Council, 2009).  
 
Directly along the NWP lies Port Resolute, situated in the 
middle of the Archipelago on the banks of Cornwallis 
Island near the Barrow Strait. The Canadian Army has 
recently expanded the facilities at Resolute to enable the 
base to serve as a command post for SAR and disaster 
response operations (CAF, 2013). The port of Resolute is 
unsuited to accommodate vessels with a draft of more than 
6 meters, but the Canadian Navy is currently constructing 
a deep water naval facility at Nanisivik, near the eastern 
entrance of the NWP, projected to become operational by 
2018 (Sun, 2015). 
Port facilities along the North American Arctic coast west 
of the passages are equally negligible. The closest well 
developed infrastructure is the west coast of Greenland, 
Nuuk being the largest and most significant port. The CCG 
currently maintains and icebreaker fleet of 17 vessels, six 
assigned to the Canadian North during the summer 
months. During the navigation season the CCG states it 
has an average response time along the NWP of 10 hours, 
under average ice conditions (CCG, 2013). Even though 
the CCG icebreaker fleet hosts a significant number of 
vessels, it is ageing with several of the vessels nearing 
retirement age. The Canadian Government has recently 
announced the investment of $CAD 720 million to replace 
the aging icebreaker flagship CCGS Louis S. St. Laurent 
but more funding is needed to maintain a significantly 
large fleet of icebreakers in the future (Arctic Council, 
2009). Lastly, further development of maritime activities 
in the Canadian Arctic is hampered by Canadian 
legislation, as it provides an inadequate framework for 
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transiting vessels. This results in uncertainties for the 
maritime sector investing in the NWP (NIRAS, 2014). 
 
 ARCTIC SHIPPING CHALLENGES 2.3
Although the opening of the Arctic Ocean has created a 
vast number of opportunities for the maritime industry, the 
remote and hostile Arctic Ocean still presents several 
major challenges for the industry. Some of these 
challenges include hazardous ice conditions, sub-zero 
temperatures and the lack of general maritime 
infrastructure. Further, an increase in maritime activities in 
the Arctic may adversely affect the sensitive environment, 
with oil spills being a major threat to the biodiversity of 
the Arctic Ocean.        
There is a general consensus amongst researchers that the 
continuing reduction in the sea ice cover volume and area 
will continue to diminish in the future and that an ice free 
Ocean during September will appear somewhere within 
this century
2
. This dramatic decline in the ice cover 
provides the basis for an increase in maritime activities in 
the Arctic, as seasonal ice cover variations creates a 
fluctuating amount of possible navigation days and 
                                                          
2
 For more information regarding the future decline of ice 
cover see chapter 3 
minimizes the risk of getting trapped in a sudden freeze 
during autumn. In the future, an ice free September Ocean 
will remove the presence of the thick multiyear ice; 
reducing risks even further (Arctic Council, 2009). The 
winter season ice cover is not expected to disappear in a 
foreseeable future, and navigation during the winter 
months will therefore not be possible. Summer weather in 
the Arctic is generally characterized by mild currents and 
wind conditions yet the weather patterns change during the 
autumn and winter with more severe conditions. More 
severe virulent wind systems appear
3
 and temperatures 
often descending to -50 degrees, causing sea sprays to 
instantly freeze on vessels (Arctic Council, 2009). The 
Arctic Ocean is a hazardous operational environment for 
vessels and crews alike due to shallow unmapped seas 
along the continental coasts, low Arctic temperature, risks 
of encountering drift ice formations and the shrouded in 
darkness of the ocean for close to six months of the year. 
There is therefore a particular need for an expansion of 
shore side infrastructure for SAR operations as well as 
deep water ports, providing repair and refueling services 
(Arctic Council, 2009). At present, infrastructure for SAR 
                                                          
3
 These powerful weather systems are known as Arctic 
Lows. 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris 
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is severely underdeveloped in large regions of the Arctic 
Ocean and the nearest assets may easily be located more 
than a thousand kilometers away from potential 
emergencies. The combination of slow speed of ships and 
the vast distances between facilities, results in a non-
sufficient coverage to reach a distressed vessel. On top of 
this there is a general the lack of equipment: aircrafts, 
icebreakers and patrol vessels. In order to accommodate 
SAR operations as well as general escort operations 
through ice infested waters, the fleet of ships with a strong 
ice breaking classification needs to be expanded. Adding 
to the expansion, both the Canadian and Russian fleet are 
aging, requiring a general renewal of the fleets.  
Technological infrastructure development is likewise also 
in need of heavy investment, for understanding local 
conditions and satellite communication. Given the sparse 
SAR capabilities better mapping of the ocean floor will 
provide safer transit of vessels, reducing the risk of 
groundings. To further reduce risk of ice and groundings, 
it is necessary to obtain better tools for forecasting ice 
movement, weather conditions and ocean currents. In 
providing this information, satellite communication 
systems are also inadequate. This is used for vessels 
maintaining contact with the relevant authorities and vice 
versa, but is however unavailable in large parts of the high 
Arctic. As the number of vessels operating in the Arctic 
increases, so does the risk of accidents and places pressure 
on the limited amount of infrastructure. Therefore the high 
Arctic coastal states have to carry out heavy investments, 
to provide a safer operational environment for its 
stakeholders.  
The increase in maritime activities in the Arctic Ocean 
also provides a challenge to preserve the pristine and 
previously touched Arctic environment. Emissions from 
the engines of shipping, adversely affecting the 
environment, include carbon dioxide (CO2,) Nitrogen 
oxide (NOx), Sulphur Oxide (SOx) and black carbon. 
Although these emissions are a product of shipping in all 
the World’s oceans, black carbon darkens the surface of 
the ice-cover in the Arctic Ocean reducing the amount of 
sunlight reflected by the ice. Such a reduction in the 
reflection of the sun light (albedo) further increases 
melting and therefore enhances the already significant 
effects of global warming in the Arctic. Major oil pollution 
also has the potential to destroy Arctic environment. The 
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince Williams Sound 
Alaska, inflicted major damage to the environment with an 
estimated quarter of a million bird deaths. Fourteen years 
after the Exxon Valdez accident, oil was still found around 
Price Williams Sound. Due to the hostile climate and the 
lack of infrastructure, cleaning up oil spills poses a major 
operational risk (ACIA, 2004).  
With the changing environmental conditions, and the 
challenges facing maximizing utilization of the Arctic, it is 
paramount to recognize the emergence of relevant 
legislation regulating the Arctic waterways and resources. 
National legislation regulates many aspects, as states 
themselves create standards for operations given the local 
conditions and priorities. This is an encumbrance for 
stakeholders in the Arctic, as they potentially operate 
within several national jurisdictions, thus making 
compliance with different national standards complex. Due 
to this complexity, the report seeks to provide an 
investigation into the multi-national governance structures 
in the Arctic (see part 8). These structures are important to 
understand, as these forums are potentially able to 
harmonize practices and create the best conditions for 
Arctic stakeholders. Findings by Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment in 2009 indicate that multilateral-governance 
will provide the best regulatory framework as this allows 
coordination between national entities. This coordination 
allows for the best protection of environmental concerns, 
because economic resources are better allocated (Arctic 
Council, 2009).  
As with the emergence of landmasses, as the ice retreats, 
these multi-national organizations obtain certain broker 
positions within the Arctic community. In this framework 
the Arctic Council is important as the dominant state level 
forum for policy development and coordination. Based on 
a notion of applying the best science, the forum aims to 
create harmonized operational standards, optimal 
conditions for the development of local populations and to 
ensure environmental protection. Focusing on the political 
tensions, the United Nations Law of the Sea is similarly 
important being the only internationally recognized 
mechanism for defining the territorial boundaries. 
Growing economic interest in the regions natural 
resources, and the derived potential for benefits to the 
Arctic states, has increased the importance on how natural 
subsea structures define territorial boundaries. The 
overlaying and conflicting claims between states, have led 
to some tensions in the political positioning. The disputes 
will however not present a substantial challenge for the 
Arctic cooperation; as there is a high level of 
interdependency between the states in the long run. 
 
2.3.1 Past studies on Arctic Shipping 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the 
subsequent opening of the Russian Arctic to foreign 
traffic. This produced a multitude of studies on the 
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possibilities of commercial activities in the Arctic. The 
rapid decline of the ice cover observed during the last 
decade, has increased the frequency of such studies as the 
probability of large scale maritime activities became more 
realistic.   
These studies range from academic papers, books and 
commercial reports to large multilateral research programs 
aiming to assess the feasibility of maritime traffic in the 
increasingly ice free Arctic Ocean. These large research 
programs, listed in table 2.1, mainly explore the technical, 
environmental, infrastructure and political aspects, and do 
not have a focus on economic analyses and are therefore 
not further reviewed in this chapter.  
 
In recent years, the focus of papers on Arctic shipping has 
changed to a micro economic foundation of quantitative 
studies on the feasibility of specific operations. The 
framework behind these studies varies between liner and 
bulk shipping, with both the feasibility of using NWP and 
the NSR as alternatives to the southern shipping lanes of 
the SCR and Panama Canal Route (PCR).  
A brief review of recent studies on the economic 
feasibility of utilizing the Arctic shipping routes for 
commercial transport along with the methodology, 
framework and their assumptions behind is presented in 
table 2.2 below. These studies only include articles and 
studies published within the last decade. This is due to the 
unanticipated pace at which the Arctic sea ice is melting 
and the subsequent changes in the underlying assumptions 
of papers published prior to the change of the millennium
4
.    
 
                                                          
4
 For a more extensive review of recent literature on the 
feasibility of Arctic shipping routes see Lasserre (2014). 
Project Time Span Research Area Participants 
INSROP  1993-1999 The Northern Sea Route Japan, Norway and Russia 
Ice Routes – The Application of 
Advanced Technologies to the Routing 
of Ships through Sea Ice  1997-1998 
Ship efficiency in ice 
covered waters European Union 
ARCDEV – Arctic Demonstration and 
Exploratory Voyages (1997-1999)  1997-1999 Western Arctic Seas European Union 
ARCOP – Arctic Operational Platform 
(2002-2006)  2002-2006 The Northern Sea Route Russia and Norway 
Northern Maritime Corridor (2000-2005)  2000-2005 
Barents, Kara and North 
Seas 
European Union, Norway and 
Russia 
JANSROP (2002-2005)  2002-2005 The Northern Sea Route Japan 
Canadian Arctic Shipping Assessment 
(2005-2007) 2005-2007 Canadian Arctic Waters Canada 
AMSA – Arctic Maritime Shipping 
Assessment (2009) 2006-2008 The Whole Arctic The Arctic Council 
Table 2.1: National and multinational reasearch projects on Arctic shipping  
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Table 2.2: Review of economic studies on the feasibility of Arctic transport 
 
Year Authors Objective Routes 
analyzed 
Origin and 
destination 
Ship types Navigation 
Season 
Analysis Results Weaknesses 
2011 Xi, et al. 
 
To estimate the economic advantage 
of operating along the NSR during 
the navigation season (SCR the rest 
of the year) by calculating the cost 
savings compared to all year round 
SCR shipping. 
 
NSR vs. 
SCR 
Several 
combinations of 
port visits 
between North 
Western Europe 
and East Asia 
are examined. 
The vessel calls 
at four ports in 
both Europe and 
Asia regardless 
of the route 
Conventional 
10,000 TEU 
containership using 
both routes 
One voyage 
equaling 
four weeks. 
The results indicate that the annual fuel costs 
of a container fleet may be reduced by 3 – 5 
percent by using the NSR during the summer 
navigation season. 
The vessels examined in the 
analysis are not ice reinforced 
and may therefore not be 
allowed to operate in the 
Arctic. Further the analysis 
only includes the fuel cost 
savings leaving out the other 
critical cost components 
incurred by Arctic shipping.  
2008 Somanathan, 
Flynn and 
Szymanski 
To estimate the required freight rate 
of a transit of an ice-class ship from 
St. Johns, Newfoundland and New 
York to the port of Yokohama using 
the North West Passage compared 
to an ordinary vessel of the same 
size using the PCR.  
NWP vs. 
the PCR 
New – York to 
Yokohama and 
St. Johns, 
Canada to 
Yokohama 
Unspecified 
Canadian Arctic 
Class 3 
containership vs 
open water 
container ship of 
the same size. 
All year 
round 
From the simulations, they find that the route 
from St. Johns to Yokohama has a lower 
required freight rate relative to the PCR, 
although with a small margin. The authors 
conclude that further thinning of the ice cover 
on the North West Passage will reduce the 
costs relative to the Panama Canal Route and 
thereby make transit between New York and 
Yokohama via the Arctic economically 
feasible. 
All year around shipping 
along the NWP is highly 
unlikely in the near future due 
to severe ice conditions. 
The market for new York – 
Yokohama alone may not be 
compatible to multiport visit 
routes. 
Far too few icebreakers in the 
Canadian Arctic to establish 
regular transits. 
 
2009 Verny and 
Grigentin 
To Establish the economic feasibility 
of regular container transport 
between North Europe and Asia by 
calculating cost per TEU. 
NSR vs 
SCR vs 
Trans-
Siberian 
Railway 
vs. air 
freight. 
Hamburg to 
Shanghai 
4000 TEU ice-class 
(undefined class) 
containership vs. 
4000 TEU open-
water containership 
as well as train and 
airplane 
All year 
round 
They find the cost per TEU using the NSR and 
Trans-Siberian railway to be roughly equal 
but both having significantly higher costs 
compared to the SCR. As the costs of freight by 
air are considerably higher than all of the 
above transport routes.  
All year around shipping 
along the NSR is highly 
unlikely in the near future.  
The market for Hamburg to 
shanghai may not be 
compatible with no multiple 
port visits along the routes. 
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Table 2.2 Continued: 
 
Year Authors Objective Routes 
analyzed 
Origin and 
destination 
Ship types Navigation 
Season 
Analysis Results Weaknesses 
2010 Kronbak 
and Liu 
To calculate and compare the 
yearly costs per TEU of 
transporting containers from 
North Western Europe to East 
Asia using the NSR during the 
navigation season (SCR the rest 
of the year) and the SCR given 
different scenarios of fuel price, 
navigation days and NSR transit 
fee. 
NSR vs 
SCR 
Rotterdam to 
Yokohama 
4300 TEU ice-
class 1B 
containership vs 
4300 TEU open-
water 
containership  
Three scenarios 
analyzing 90, 
180 and 270 
days 
respectively 
Firstly, a reduction in the icebreaker fee of 50 
percent causes the NSR to be unprofitable compared 
to the SCR for all fuel price and navigation day 
scenarios. Secondly, a reduction in the icebreaker fee 
of 85 percent and a bunker fuel price of 700 and 900 
USD per ton cause the NSR to become advantageous 
when the NSR is open for more than 91 days. Lastly, 
if the icebreaker escort is free of charge the NSR 
yields a higher profit for all bunker fuel prices and all 
navigation day scenarios. 
The amount of TEU’s 
transported per voyage may 
be over-estimated due to 
only one port visit per 
voyage. 
 
2013 Furuichi 
and Otsuka 
To calculate and compare the 
costs per TEU of transporting 
containers from North Western 
Europe to East Asia using the 
NSR and SCR given different fuel 
price, navigation days and ship 
sizes. 
NSR vs. 
SCR 
Hamburg to 
Yokohama 
4300 TEU ice 
reinforced 
containership vs. 
4000, 6000, 8000 
and 15000 TEU 
ordinary 
container ships 
respectively. 
Five scenarios 
analyzing 105, 
135, 165, 195 
and 225 days 
respectively. 
Finds that an amount of five NSR trips per year (with 
eight SCR trips when the NSR is closed) makes the 
4000 TEU ice-strengthened vessel advantageous to a 
6000 TEU ordinary vessel for all levels of bunker fuel 
price examined. Additionally, the results suggest that 
a price of a ton of bunker fuel of 300 USD and 650 
USD causes the NSR to be compatible to an 8000 
TEU ordinary vessel. 
 
The amount of TEU’s 
transported per voyage may 
be over-estimated due to 
only one port visit per 
voyage.  
Additionally the NSR transit 
fee is based on old 
reporting’s and therefore 
does not reflect the current 
pricing scheme.  
 
2014 F. Lasserre To calculate and compare the 
seasonal and annual costs per 
TEU of transporting containers 
from North Western Europe to 
East Asia using the SCR and 
either the NWP or NSR.  
 
 
 
NSR and 
NWP vs 
SCR 
Rotterdam to 
either 
Yokohama or 
Shanghai and 
additionally 
calling at 
Malta, 
Mumbai and 
Singapore 
when using 
the SCR. 
4500 TEU 1AS ice 
classed container 
ship vs. a similar 
sized ordinary 
container ship.  
6 months 
shipping season 
along both the 
NSR and NWP.  
Cost per TEU is lower using the NSR between 
Rotterdam and Yokohama if the icebreaker tariff is 
reduced. The NSR will not be advantageous for cargo 
between Rotterdam and Shanghai unless the load 
factor is the same for both routes and the icebreaker 
fee is reduced considerably. 
 
Similarly, the NWP is advantageous compared to the 
SCR between Rotterdam and Yokohama but not 
between Rotterdam and Shanghai.  
 
 
 
The NSR transit fee is based 
on old reporting’s and 
therefore does not reflect the 
current pricing scheme. 
The cost comparison only 
runs for six months during 
the navigation season. The 
analysis does therefore not 
take the off season into 
account where the ice 
strengthened vessel sails at a 
large disadvantage. 
  
20 
AR
CT
IC
 S
HI
PP
IN
G 
– C
OM
M
ER
CI
AL
 O
PP
OR
TU
NI
TIE
S 
AN
D 
CH
AL
LE
NG
ES
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Continued: 
 
Year Authors Objective Routes 
analyzed 
Origin and 
destination 
Ship types Navigation Season Analysis Results Weaknesses 
2011 Schøyen 
and 
Bråthen 
To calculate and compare 
the costs per megaton of 
nitrogen fertilizer and iron 
ore transported from North 
Western Europe to East Asia 
using the NSR, SCR and 
Cape Route 
Fertilizer: NSR 
vs. SCR vs. 
Cape of Good 
Hope Iron Ore: 
NSR vs. SCR for 
iron ore 
Fertilizer: 
Porsgrunn, 
Norway to 
Shekou, China 
Iron Ore: Narvik, 
Norway to 
Qingdao, China 
Fertilizer: 
Ice reinforced 
Handymax carrier with 
40000 mt cargo capacity 
vs. open water 
Handymax carrier of the 
same size  
Iron Ore: 
Ice reinforced bulk 
carrier with 50,000 mt 
cargo capacity vs. an 
open water 68,000 mt 
cargo capacity Panamax 
bulk carrier  
 
Single voyage 
examined. 
They find that the cost of transporting one metric 
ton of fertilizer are higher on the NSR compared 
to the SCR, but is advantageous to the Cape of 
Good Hope Route. For the iron ore transport, 
however, they find the cost per metric ton to be 
advantageous on the NSR compared to the SCR, 
although at a small margin.  
 
2010 Det Norske 
Veritas 
(DNV) 
To calculate the total costs of 
operating along the NSR 
compared to the SCR in 2030 
and 2050 using projections 
on future ice distributions.  
NSR vs. SCR Rotterdam to 
Tokyo, Hong 
Kong or 
Singapore. 
SCR: 6500 TEU 
conventional container 
ship 
NSR :  5000 TEU and 
double-acting container 
vessel with ice breaking 
capabilities and 6500 
PC4 ice classed 
container vessel in 
scenario one and two 
respectively. 
First scenario: 
All year navigation 
Second scenario: 
100 days in 2030, 
increasing to 120 days 
in 2050. 
Finds that seasonal transport between 
Rotterdam and Tokyo using the NSR may 
become economically attractive already in 2030 
given the first scenario. In the second scenario, 
the NSR will not become favorable before 2050 
unless the fuel price reaches an extremely high 
level.    
The data and 
method is not 
published.  
2009 Laujainen Discussion of physical 
settings, traffic potential, 
route options and political 
issues of the Arctic Sea 
Routes 
Both NSR and 
NWP vs. the 
SCR and PCR 
N/A N/A N/A Concludes that a reduced ice cover in the Arctic 
presents several opportunities of resource 
extraction and reduced transport times but 
argues that ship owners and ship builders may 
face managerial problems with diminishing 
route distances. 
The paper 
discusses the 
topic but 
includes no 
quantitative 
analysis. 
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Global warming is causing the Arctic environment to 
change at a rapid pace. During the last few decades the 
Artic surface temperature has increased, at a rate almost 
twice that of the rest of the world, resulting in a thawing of 
glaciers and a drastic reduction in both sea-ice cover 
extend and volume. Consequently, the average sea ice 
extent, between 1979 and 2012, has seen a reduction of 3.8 
percent per decade (IPCC, 2014). The most significant 
reduction of the sea ice extend has been observed during 
the September month with the 2012 September sea ice 
cover showing a reduction of 49 percent relative to the 
1979 – 2000 average extend of 7 million square kilometers 
(Overland & Wang, 2013). Between 1979 and 2001, the 
September sea ice cover saw a reduction of 6.5 percent per 
decade. In 2005 this reduction increased to 8.5 percent per 
decade with a rise to 10.2 percent by 2007 and a further 
increase to a 12 percent by 2011 (Maslowski, et al., 2012). 
These observations have led to the consensus that an 
accelerating decline of ice cover on the Arctic Ocean will 
continue in the near future (IPCC, 2014). While there is a 
general agreement that these climatic changes, and the 
subsequent increasing decline in the Arctic ice cover, is 
caused by anthropogenic forcing’s such as greenhouse gas 
emissions to the atmosphere, other factors may also 
contribute to these changes. As a consequence of the 
reduced ice cover on the Arctic Ocean, an increased 
amount of the solar radiation is absorbed into the ocean 
due to the considerable darker surface of the ocean, known 
as the positive feedback phenomenon (Walsh, 2013). This 
increased absorption of the solar radiation, during the 
summer season, further raises the surface temperature of 
the ocean contributing to the disappearance of the ice 
cover. As the summer sea ice cover, in the last few 
decades, has been rapidly receding north, the winter sea 
ice cover is not projected to disappear during the next 
century (Arctic Council, 2009). The cold climate of the 
Arctic winter will continue and during the last years the 
March Arctic ice cover has only receded by a few percent 
per decade. Although the Arctic sea ice will continue to 
cover the Arctic Ocean during winter, the average sea ice 
cover thickness has been reduced by 1.8 meters between 
1978 and 2008 resulting in a drastic reduction in sea ice 
volume (IPCC, 2013) The figures 3.1 and 3.2 (next page) 
illustrates the Arctic ice cover during March and 
September for the years 1987 and 2012, respectively. 
While the March sea ice cover is almost identical during 
the 25 year span, the figures show the dramatic difference 
in the September sea ice cover during the same period. The 
September 2012 sea ice extent clearly shows the 
possibility of unhindered passage along the NSR and even 
the generally ice filled straits along the NWP are 
accessible. At present the Arctic Ocean is however 
covered in ice throughout most of the year. For Arctic 
shipping to become a serious contender, compared to the 
well-established shipping lanes, an additional reduction in 
the Arctic ice cover is needed. With the current level of 
human caused greenhouse gas emissions, a continuous 
warming of the Arctic is inevitable, but the resulting 
temperature increases and rate of declining ice cover is 
subject to debate. Several studies and projections of the 
future extend of the sea ice cover has been published with 
the most extensive being recently published fifth 
Assessment report, by the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).   
3 ARCTIC SEA ICE – EXTENSION AND 
DECLINE 
GLOBAL WARMING IS CAUSING THE ARCTIC SEA ICE TO RAPIDLY MELT, THEREBY 
INCREASING THE POTENTIAL FOR MARITIME TRAFFIC IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN. THE 
CRYOSPHERE IS, HOWEVER, A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT AND SCHOLARS DISAGREE ON 
WHEN THE ARCTIC OCEAN MAY BECOME FREE OF ICE. THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER WILL 
REVIEW RECENT LITTERATURE ON THE SUBJECT IN ORDER TO PRESENT CURRENT 
PREDICTIONS ON HOW GLOBAL WARMING WILL AFFECT THE ARCTIC SEA ICE.     
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Figure 3.1: September sea ice concentration in 1987 and 2012 
Left and right hand side image illustrates sea ice concentration in September 1987 and 2012 respectively. Darker colors 
indicate greater sea ice concentration. 
Courtesy University of Illinois – The Cryosphere Today 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: March sea ice concentration in 1987 and 2012. 
Left and right hand side image illustrates sea ice concentration in March 1987 and 2012 respectively. Darker colors 
indicate greater sea ice concentration. 
Courtesy of University of Illinois – The Cryosphere Today 
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This fifth IPCC report (AR5) provides the largest scientific 
study of the impacts of global warming comprising of 
contributions from hundreds of the world’s leading 
scientists on the topic. According to the AR5 the 
temperatures in the Arctic may increase by up to 10 
degrees Celsius at the end of the century relatively to that 
of the 1986-2005 level if human greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to increase (IPCC, 2014). The authors therefore 
conclude that the Arctic Sea ice cover is very likely to 
continue to diminish in the course of the 21st century as 
the global surface temperatures rise. The AR5 projects a 
reduction between 8 and 34 percent in the February sea ice 
extend in 2081 – 2100 compared to the 1986 – 2005 
average and between 43 – 94 percent reduction in the 
September sea ice cover in the same period  corresponding 
to a near ice free Ocean approximately midcentury given a 
high emission scenario. Figure 3.3 illustrate the February 
and September sea ice extend projections from a sampling 
of global climate models for medium and high emission 
scenarios, respectively.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Projected Arctic sea ice concentration in 
2080-2100 
The top figures show a sea ice concentration given a 
medium future emission scenario (RCP 4.5) while the 
bottom two figures show the same for the high emission 
scenario (RCP 8.5). Light colors indicate a higher sea ice 
concentration.  
Source: IPCC (2013), figure 12.29 pp. 1089     
 
Climate projections by the IPCC are performed using a 
compilation of various global circulation models criticized 
for being far too conservative in their estimations of the 
reduction in the Arctic sea ice cover and volume (Wang & 
Overland, 2009); (Arctic Council, 2009); (Maslowski, et 
al., 2012). For example, the observed sea-ice extend 
reached a record low of 4.3 million km
2
 in September 
2007, a scenario which was not expected to reappear 
during the next 30 years according to IPCC estimates 
(Wang & Overland, 2009). By updating the IPCC models 
with these new observations, Wang and Overland (2009) 
approximates the time it takes to reach a September ice 
free Arctic Ocean and finds that such a scenario may be 
reached already by September 2037 with the first quartile 
being in 2028. Additionally the global climate models 
estimate the majority of the March sea ice to have a 
thickness of 2.5 meters when the September ices extend 
was 4.6 million km
2
, which is reduced to only 1.2 meters 
when the September is ice free. It is important to note that 
since a completely ice free Ocean is not achievable within 
the next few decades, due to ice formations between the 
northern part of Greenland and the Canadian Archipelago. 
Most sources therefore define an ice free Arctic Ocean as 
an ice-cover of less than one million km
2
, which will still 
leave the far majority of the Ocean navigable (Overland & 
Wang, 2013) (Wang & Overland, 2009). Regardless, an 
almost ice-free ocean just once a year will have profound 
implications for Arctic shipping. The disappearance of the 
hazardous multiyear ice and subsequent prevalence of only 
first year ice will make navigation in the Arctic easier for 
vessels with only moderate icebreaking capabilities, 
reduce the need for icebreaker escort and therefore 
lengthen the navigation overall navigation season. 
Maslowski, et al., (2012) argues that the modelled 
evolution of Arctic Sea ice volume is strongly correlated 
with the observed changes in the ice thickness after 1995, 
and estimates an annual reduction of the volume of sea ice 
of -1,120 km
3
, which will result in an ice free September 
ocean as soon as 2016 although associated with a large 
uncertainty (standard deviation of 2.235 km
3
). In a recent 
study, Smith and Stephenson (2013) use updated ice cover, 
climate and navigation models to simulate the optimal 
sailing routes for merchant vessels in the Arctic Ocean 
during the years from 2040 to 2059. They conclude that by 
midcentury the ice volume has been dramatically reduced 
such that ice reinforced vessels of polar class six will be 
able to navigate directly over the North pole using the 
Transpolar Sea Route during September, while ordinary 
open water vessels, without icebreaker assistance, will be 
able to navigate the NSR and NWP as well (See figure 
3.4). As mentioned earlier the benefits of using the 
transpolar seaway, if the ice cover disappears, are 
significant, reducing the sailing distance through the Arctic 
Ocean and staying out of the currently defined Russian 
exclusive economic zone. Although scholars disagree on 
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the pace at which the ice cover disappears and large scale 
maritime traffic in the Arctic may become feasible, all of 
the above mentioned research papers and reports agree that 
global warming is causing the ice cover to disappear at an 
alarming rate. It is therefore not a question of if the ice 
cover will disappear but how soon the world will 
experience an ice free Arctic Ocean, creating the 
possibilities for a continued increase in maritime activities 
north of the Arctic Circle.     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Projected Arctic shipping lanes from 2040 to 2059 
Red and blue lines indicate the fastest route possible for a vessel of polar class 6 and ordinary open water vessels 
respectively.  
Source: Smith and Stephenson (2013). 
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The Liner shipping industry is the largest segment of the 
global shipping industry contributing an estimated 436.6 
billion USD to the world economy and providing an 
estimated 13.5 million jobs worldwide (WSC, 2015). The 
dramatic increases in the price of oil over the last decade, 
has led to the liner shipping industry increasingly seeking 
new ways of reducing fuel consumption. This includes 
methods like utilizing the economics of scale by acquiring 
ever larger vessels, slow steaming to improve fuel 
consumption or improved hull designs. The rapid decline 
of the Arctic Ocean ice cover has increasingly created the 
opportunity of using the Arctic Ocean as transport corridor 
between the North Atlantic and East Asia. These passages 
reduce the distances by a significant amount compared to 
the contemporary shipping routes potentially lowering 
both fuel consumption and voyage time. 
 
This chapter aims to inform the reader of the opportunities 
and challenges faced by the international liner shipping 
industry in Arctic operations. Liner traffic in both the 
NWP and the NSR will be investigated, the first section 
facilitating the opportunities and challenges. The second 
part aims to give a quantitative case study on the feasibility 
of utilizing the Northern Sea Route as an alternative to the 
Suez Canal Route.  
 
 TRANS-ARCTIC OPPORTUNITIES 4.1
The liner shipping industry mainly transports general 
cargo between ports located near the world’s population 
centers. The opportunities and challenges of Arctic liner 
shipping presented in this study are therefore mainly 
concerned with trans-Arctic shipping. The Arctic routes of 
importance to the sector are the NSR the NWP and the 
Trans Polar Route (TSR)
5
. Both the NSR and NWP are 
considered as potential alternatives to the SCR reducing 
the voyage distance between Northwestern Europe and 
East Asia by up to 40 percent and 30 percent, respectively. 
Additionally the NWP also has the potential to save up to 
20 percent of the distance compared to the PCR, for routes 
transporting goods between Eastern USA to East Asia.  
The NSR is mainly a viable alternative to the SCR, a route 
with tremendous volumes of containerized goods. Along 
the SCR one can observe that the majority of the world’s 
largest containerships are operating. In 2013, the amount 
the total containerized seaborne trade between Northern 
Europe and Asia amounted to 13.7 million TEU (WSC, 
2015). Table 4.1 (next page) shows the potential distance 
savings, revealing the massive savings achievable by using 
the NSR compared to the SCR. This is especially when 
covering the areas in the north Eastern part of China, 
South Korea and Japan. It may even be viable for the NSR 
to cover the large ports of the southern China, with close to 
a 14 percent reduction in the distance between North 
Western Europe and Hong Kong. However, using the NSR 
for Singapore is not a viable option, as the route is 17 
percent longer than the SCR. Solely measuring from 
distance this implies a breakeven point between the SCR 
and NSR, located somewhere along the southern coast of 
Vietnam. The economic breakeven point of the alternatives 
may however be located at significantly higher latitude 
depending on the costs of the NSR transit. 
                                                          
5
 The TSR is the most direct route through the Arctic 
Ocean, thus allowing for further distance and fuel savings 
(see Humpert and Raspotnik, (2012)). The ice conditions 
around the North Pole will, however, not allow regular 
transport in a foreseeable future and the rest of this chapter 
is therefore only concerned with the NSR and NWP.  
4 LINER SHIPPING IN THE ARCTIC – A 
A POSSIBLE FUTURE? 
USING ARCTIC SHIPPING ROUTES AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE SUEZ CANAL ROUTE WILL 
RESULT IN MAJOR DISTANCE AND COST SAVINGS. SEVERAL FACTORS SUCH AS A SHORT 
NAVIGATION SEASON AND SUDDEN CHANGES IN THE ICE CONDITIONS INHIBIT THE 
MAINTENANCE OF FIXED SCHEDULING AND TIMELY CARGO DELIVERANCE. ALTHOUGH 
MAINLY FOCUSING ON LINER SHIPPING, THE POSSIBILITIES AND CHALLENGES PRESENTED 
IN THIS CHAPTER MAY ALSO PROVIDE USEFUL INSIGHTS FOR THE BULK SECTOR.  
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This implies that containerships servicing the North 
Western Europe (NWEU) to East Asia route may be able 
to cover a large fraction of the major ports located in 
China if the additional costs of transiting the Arctic Ocean 
are relatively modest. 
 
In addition to the NSR, the NWP is also well suited to 
serve as a seasonal alternative for the Europe to Asia trade. 
Table 4.2 shows the potential distance savings of 
transporting goods between North Western Europe and 
East Asia using the NWP as an alternative to the 
contemporary SCR. It captures that in similarity with the 
NSR, the NWP has the largest potential for the 
Northwestern Europe to East Asia routes for the ports 
located in Japan, South Korea and the northern part of 
China. Respectively there is close to 31 and 25 percent 
saving in distance to the ports of Tokyo and Busan. The 
world’s largest port of Shanghai achieves a distance saved 
above 18 percent. These savings diminishes to less than 5 
percent for the port of Hong Kong, thus the SCR remains 
significantly more competitive for the ports located in the 
South China Sea. Although not being as competitive as the 
NSR for Europe to Asia transits, the NWP still has the 
potential to reduce the travel distances to several of the 
large East Asian ports compared to the SCR. 
 
Travel along the NWP does not only form an alternative to 
the SCR on the Europe to East Asia trade. Navigating the 
NWP may also lower the voyage distance on the East coast 
USA to East Asia trade by functioning as an alternative to 
the PCR. In 2013, the containerized trade between North 
America and East Asia amounted to over 23 million TEU - 
this is almost double that of the trade between Northern 
Europe and East Asia in the same year although a large 
fraction of the cargo is shipped from the North American 
west coast and therefore not relevant in the context of the 
NWP (WSC, 2015). Table 4.3 (next page) illustrates the 
distance reductions achieved by using the NWP compared 
to the PCR for the New York – New Jersey – Baltimore 
area to East Asian ports. The distance savings achieved by 
navigating the NWP as an alternative to the PCR are close 
to 20 percent for most of the large ports located in North 
Eastern Asia. 
  
Departure Destination Distance SCR (nm) Distance NSR (nm) NSR Distance 
Reduction (%) 
North Western Europe 
 
Tokyo 11,292 6,905 38.85 
Busan 10,827 7,248 33.06 
Shanghai 10,532 7,688 27.00 
Hong Kong 9,753 8,399 13.88 
Singapore 8,343 9,731 -16.64 
Table 4.1: Distance savings of the NSR as an alternative to the SCR between North Western Europe and Asian ports 
Source: Own calculations using Google maps and Sea-distances.org 
Departure Destination Distance SCR (nm) distance NWP (nm) NWP Distance 
Reduction (%) 
North Western Europe 
 
Tokyo 11292 7798 30,94 
Busan 10827 8141 24,81 
Shanghai 10532 8581 18,52 
Hong Kong 9753 9292 4,73 
Singapore 8343 10624 -27,34 
Table 4.2: Distance savings of the NWP as an alternative to the SCR between North Western Europe and Asian ports 
Source: Own calculations using Google maps and Sea-distances.org 
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The distance savings are therefore not as dramatic as those 
observed on the Europe to Asia trade, but interestingly, the 
NWP remains a viable option for reducing the total voyage 
distance to major South Asian ports relative to the PCR. 
For ports, such as Singapore for example, there is close to 
a 15 percent reduction in distance when using the NWP 
versus using the PCR.  
From the above tables it is clear that utilizing the Arctic 
routes, between the coastal states of the North Atlantic and 
East Asia, allows for dramatic savings in distances 
compared to the established international shipping lanes. 
The dramatic reduction in distance between Western 
Europe and East Asia has not only the potential to improve 
fuel savings but may also allow better asset utilization. 
This can be achieved by increasing the amount of voyages 
possible for a vessel each year, thus leading to an increase 
in revenue during seasons of high market demand.  
The feasibility of utilizing Arctic shipping lanes is not only 
determined by voyage distances. Other than the factors 
discussed in the previous chapter, also time scheduling and 
accessibility of the routes are highly important for 
containerized goods. The opportunities for liner shipping 
in the Arctic are therefore critically dependent on the 
future level of ice cover in the Arctic Ocean.  
Sea ice will continue to be an integrated part of the Arctic 
Ocean for decades to come and the shipping lanes will be 
covered in ice throughout most of the year (see section 3). 
Only for a limited season each year are these shipping 
lanes sufficiently ice free. Presently, the annual amount of 
navigational days for the Northern Sea Route is limited to 
a few months and the volatile nature of drift ice in the 
Canadian Arctic results in an even shorter season. Such 
instabilities in the navigation season are especially 
apparent along the NWP, where the ice conditions vary 
dramatically, with some years being impossible to traverse 
even at the height of the navigation season.      
Most liner shipping companies operate according to a strict 
time scheduling, with the potential for large compensations 
to the shippers in case of late deliveries of the cargo. Fixed 
time scheduling is easier to maintain for open water routes, 
along established shipping lanes, due to fewer fixed 
transport natural hindrances. The hostile natural conditions 
of the Arctic present challenges for this, as a fixed 
schedule may be impossible to follow. The highly volatile 
ice and weather conditions may cause a series of delays for 
transiting vessels. This can range from being temporarily 
stuck in the ice or needing the assistance of an icebreaker 
to cross a particular challenging section of the route. 
Although the NSRA assigns icebreakers along the NSR to 
assist vessels through ice infested waters, a transiting 
vessel may have to wait several hours or days for 
assistance in passage. This is due to icebreakers not 
assisting individual vessels but preferable whole convoys. 
Thus not only the environmental conditions of the Arctic 
pose a challenge, but also the actual assistance operations 
restrict vessel mobility compared to the SCR. Finally, the 
seasonal changes of the Arctic navigation season may 
complicate the stable time and route scheduling on which 
shippers of general goods rely. Common to all sectors of 
maritime industry operating in remote Arctic waters are 
the serious safety concerns of the crew, cargo and vessel. 
Parts of the Arctic shipping lanes are poorly charted, SAR 
infrastructure is severely lacking and moving drift ice may 
damage and in extreme cases cause the vessel to become 
stuck in the moving ice for several days. 
Departure Destination Distance PCR (nm) distance NWP (nm) NWP Distance 
Reduction (%) 
NY - NJ – Baltimore 
 
Tokyo 9,623 7,764 19.32 
Busan 10,056 8,107 19.38 
Shanghai 10,577 8,547 19.19 
Hong Kong 11,148 9,258 16.95 
Singapore 12,421 10,590 14.74 
Table 4.3: Distance savings of the NWP as an alternative to the PCR between East Coast USA and Asian ports 
Source: Own calculations using Google maps and Sea-distances.org 
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This is especially apparent along the NWP where drift ice 
enters the narrow straits and where developed 
infrastructure and SAR facilities are underdeveloped. In 
order to secure safe navigation in the ice infested Arctic 
waters, several modifications to the vessel are required 
such as installments to prevent icing and a sufficient ice 
strengthened hull. The requirement of an ice reinforced 
hull has major implications for the feasibility of liner 
shipping operations in the Arctic, due to the increased 
building costs of the vessel and increased fuel 
consumption due to hull modifications (Kronbak & Liu, 
2010). This implies that a sufficient amount of operational 
days must be spend in ice filled waters in order to 
compensate for the fuel consumption disadvantage when 
operating in open waters. Additionally, the operator must 
ensure that the vessel can be relocated to alternative 
markets during the winter in order to utilize vessels when 
the Arctic routes become inaccessible (NIRAS, 2014).  
Another major barrier is the lack of population centers 
around the Arctic Ocean. The shipping lanes in the Arctic 
are lacking major ports along the route. The current large 
liner shipping routes between the Atlantic coastal states 
and Asia passes regions with large population centers and 
frequently stops at ports along the route to exchange cargo. 
This results in a vessel navigating the SCR being able to 
utilize their assets better by offering several transits, thus 
increasing the revenue of the liner shipping firm. Of the 
world’s 50 largest container ports measured by the annual 
handling of containers, only 11 of these are located in the 
vicinity of the entrances to the NSR. Conversely, a 
containership operating along the SCR will pass 24 of the 
world’s 50 largest container ports (Containerization 
International, 2013). For example, it will not be 
economically feasible for a vessel arriving through the 
Behring Strait, to call at Singapore, Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen, as these ports are situated too far to the south. 
Thus for a vessel on an eastbound voyage and designated 
to call at these ports, the SCR would be the rational choice. 
However, several significant ports with high growth rates 
are situated on Northern latitudes favorable for 
containerships arriving in the Pacific from the NSR. These 
include Shanghai, Busan, Ningbo and Qingdao, which are 
all amongst the ten largest ports in the world measured in 
annual container handling (Ibid.).  
On the East Coast USA to East Asia trade, the PCR does 
not hold a significant advantage compared to the NWP 
when measuring the number of major container ports that 
the vessels pass along the voyage. Only the ports of 
Balboa, Panama and Savannah are amongst the 50 largest 
container ports located along the PCR between North 
Eastern USA and East Asia, and the NWP can therefore be 
seen as a viable option for trans-pacific voyages when 
taking into account the possibilities of cargo transfers in 
large ports along the route. 
 
4.1.1 The NSR and China 
In 2013, the Chinese 19,000 ton multi-purpose 
containership “Yong Sheng“ became the first vessel in 
history to transit the NSR carrying containerized cargo 
(BO, 2013). The project was initiated by the Chinese state 
owned enterprise COSCO and departed from Dalian on 8 
August and, after visiting Shanghai and Busan, continued 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Major container ports in East Asia that are within reach of the Arctic Routes  
Source: The Arctic Institute 
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on to navigate the Northern Sea Route. The “Yong Sheng” 
successfully entered the European port of Rotterdam on 
the 11
th
 of September, using only 35 days to complete the 
voyage. Chinese interests in the region have increased in 
the last years, with the Chinese icebreaker “Xue Long” 
becoming the first Chinese vessels to complete a voyage 
over the NSR in 2012. High dependence on foreign trade 
has caused China to seek a diversification of trading routes 
to Europe in case of high political instability along 
established shipping lanes. This was exemplified by the 
sister ship of the “Yong Sheng” being attacked by pirates 
in the Gulf of Aden, while the “Yong Sheng” was 
transiting the Northern Sea Route (FT, 2013).  
In response to the rapid melting of the ice cover in the 
Russian Arctic, the Polar Research Institute of China 
Maritime Transport has stated that the NSR will in the 
future play a major role in Chinese trade. It is suggested 
that between 5 and 15 percent of Chinas trade value 
(approximately $bn. 500) could pass through the Arctic 
already by 2020 (Guardian, 2014). The recent gas and 
trade deal signed between China and Russia further 
strengthens Chinese commitments to developing the NSR. 
The agreement covered an extended cooperation between 
Russia and China, to develop Russian transport 
infrastructure. This was agreed for the Chinese to ensure 
passage over the NSR, by partaking in the establishment of 
the needed infrastructure (CD, 2014). 
Although such statements imply a strong Chinese interest 
in the Arctic region, several projects initiated by the 
Chinese government casts doubt on the future level of 
commitment to developing the NSR. For example, the 
Chinese government continues to invest in major 
expansions of logistics and port infrastructure along the 
SCR. Similarly, a majority of Chinese imports of raw 
materials is projected to come from suppliers located in the 
Southern hemisphere, and Chinese exports may 
increasingly target non-European countries (Humpert, 
2013). Additionally, the Chinese premier Xi Jinping 
recently announced plans to develop an international 
railway, energy and logistics hub for a “Silk Road 
Economic Belt”, seeking to establish new trade and 
transport links between China and Europe (WSJ, 2014a). 
In December 2014 a Chinese cargo train arrived in Madrid 
after completing a 13 thousand miles journey, departing 
from Yuwi in eastern China only 21 days prior the arriving 
in the Spanish Capital (CNN, 2014). The voyage lasted 6 
days less than the 27 days spent by the “Yong Sheng”. 
Such infrastructure projects could severely challenge the 
prospects and development of shipping along the NSR 
(Bennet, 2014). The above indicate that Chinese 
government officials are planning on further developments 
along the contemporary southern trade routes and 
alternatives. Such developments question the commitment 
by China to future shipping in the Polar region as Chinese 
traffic on the NSR may be reduced to a level solely 
reflecting the import of resources extracted from the 
Russian Arctic (Humpert, 2013). 
4.1.2 Uncertain Horizons 
Arctic liner shipping holds great potential, offering huge 
distance and fuel cost savings to ship-owners, transporting 
containerized goods between the Atlantic coastal states 
and East Asia. A further reduction in the sea ice extend is, 
however, required for these routes to be viable as major 
liner shipping corridors with the NSR currently holding a 
far greater potential than that of the NWP. This is caused 
by the more advantageous ice conditions along the Russian 
Arctic coast, compared to the waterways of the Canadian 
Arctic. The NSR also has a relatively well developed 
infrastructure for search and rescue, along with a well-
established icebreaker escort service. Both these services 
are severely lacking along the NWP. Common to both 
routes is that the Arctic navigation season is currently too 
short, and ice conditions are too unpredictable, for liner 
shipping to be feasible. Arctic liner shipping therefore only 
remains a viable alternative to the contemporary shipping 
lanes if global warming continues to melt the ice cover 
along the NWP and the NSR. In the next chapter this this 
report will aim to quantify when the ice conditions will 
allow for liner shipping along the NSR to become a viable 
alternative to the SCR.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Scanpix / Iris 
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 ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK 5.1
The aim of this case study is to examine the economic 
feasibility of transporting containerized goods using the 
NSR between Northern Europe and East Asia as an 
alternative to the contemporary SCR. More specifically 
this study will aim to determine when (if ever) the 
investment in an ice reinforced containership for operation 
along the NSR becomes favorable to an open water vessel 
solely navigating the SCR. In this study the vessel 
operating on the NSR has a capacity of 8000 TEU and is 
compared to three open water containerships operating on 
the Suez Canal Route with a container capacity of 8000 
TEU, 10000 TEU and 15000 TEU, respectively. The ice 
reinforced vessel is assumed to operate along the NSR 
during the navigation season and the SCR when ice blocks 
entrance to the Arctic waters.   
 
The feasibility of investing in an ice reinforced vessel for 
operation along the NSR is determined by comparing the 
total costs of the two types of ships. These costs include 
the capital costs of acquiring the vessel along with the 
fixed and variable costs encountered by operating the 
vessel until terminated. The analysis is calculated in 
discrete time with yearly intervals, such that each period 
denoting a year from 2016 until the vessel is either resold 
or scrapped. Thus period 0 equals the year 2016 such that t 
= 1 for 2017, t = 2 for 2018 while the last operational year of 
the vessel is denoted as year n equalling 2016 + n.  
 
- Assumption I: Variables changing value through time 
use the denotation t such that t = 0 is year 2016, t = 1 is 
2017 and 𝑡 = 𝑛 is year 2016 + n 
 
This allows for gradual alterations in the annual navigation 
days and fuel price variables, thus creating the possibility  
 
 
of determining not only what conditions are required for 
navigation along the NSR to become advantageous, but 
also when such a scenario might occur. Such a critical 
point where the expected return on the investment in an ice 
reinforced vessel surpasses that of an ordinary vessel is 
investigated under two Arctic warming scenarios and three 
oil price scenarios. Such a scenario with a gradual increase 
in the annual amount of navigation days contrasts the 
framework of recent studies on the feasibility of 
transporting goods through the NSR where different 
scenarios are set up using static levels of fuel prices and 
navigation days (Kronbak & Liu, 2010; Verny & 
Grigentin, 2009; Furuichi & Otsuka, 2013). 
 
The vessels examined in this study are of different 
container capacity and solely comparing the costs is 
therefore not sufficient to estimate the feasibility of the 
vessel relative to that of another. Further, it is reasonable 
to assume that the large amount of ports located in 
southern Asia, will result in an increased amount of cargo 
when the vessels are navigating the SCR. In order to take 
into account this difference in the container capacity and 
load factor, the total costs for each vessels is therefore 
divided by the total amount of TEU transported. This 
allows for a common denominator without the impossible 
task of projecting and incorporating the extremely volatile 
freight rate decades into the future. In order to exclude the 
freight rate from the calculations, the freight rate is 
assumed to be independent on the route used. Product 
differentiation opportunities are therefore excluded from 
the study, such as freight rate premiums for faster delivery 
rates using the shorter Arctic routes. In order to determine 
not only if the costs per TEU for the ice reinforced vessel 
are lower, but also when this scenario may occur, the value 
5 FROM THEORY TO APPLICATION: A 
QUANTITATIVE OUTLOOK FOR THE 
NORTHERN SEA ROUTE 
GIVEN THE DISADVANTAGEOUS CONDITIONS MENTIONED IN THE PREVIOUS SECTION, IT IS 
HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT LARGE SCALE CONTAINERIZED CARGO TRANSPORTS WILL APPEAR 
IN A FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION THEN ARISES; WHEN, IF EVER, THE 
ICE CONDITIONS WILL ALLOW FOR CONTINUOUS AND ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE 
CONTAINER TRANSPORT ALONG THE NSR? 
  
32 
AR
CT
IC
 S
HI
PP
IN
G 
– C
OM
M
ER
CI
AL
 O
PP
OR
TU
NI
TIE
S 
AN
D 
CH
AL
LE
NG
ES
 
 
of the total costs per TEU for the investment in an ice 
reinforced vessel is compared to that of the open water 
vessels. This creates a feasibility ratio as a function of the 
investment year and the consecutive number of operational 
years, presented in equation 1.1. The ratio takes into 
account the differences in both container deliveries and 
cost components of both types of vessel under the 
assumption of a similar investment year and duration.  
 
𝑅𝑠 =
𝑇𝐶𝑠
𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑇𝐸𝑈𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑇𝐶𝑠
𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑇𝐸𝑈𝑁𝑆𝑅
               (1.1)    
 
𝑅𝑠 = 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝐸𝑈 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑠 
𝑇𝐸𝑈 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝐸𝑈 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
 
In an attempt to illustrate the complexity of the cost 
structure and environmental constraints behind such a 
pioneering investment decision, a multitude of variables 
needs to be included and consequently investigated in the 
analysis. In the following section, the routes and scenarios 
are further examined and explained. This includes studying 
the pace at which the Arctic sea ice is receding, which can 
be translated into the annual amount of navigation days 
possible along the NSR. Additionally, the section will 
describe and quantify the various costs encountered when 
operating a vessel. The five major cost components of 
running a ship are divided into the operating costs, 
periodic maintenance, voyage costs, cargo-handling costs 
and capital costs, described as follows by Stopford (2008):   
 
 Operating costs consists of crew costs, stores and 
lubricants, repairs and maintenance, insurance 
and general costs.  
 Periodic maintenance consists of dry-docking of 
the ship every two years and a special survey 
every four years in order to verify the sea 
worthiness of the vessel. 
 Voyage cost consists of the price for bunker fuel, 
oil, port dues and canal dues. 
 Cargo handling costs consists of the loading and 
discharging of containers when visiting a port. 
 Capital cost is the repayment of the debt incurred 
from financing the purchase of the ship as well 
as the interest payments of the debt. 
 
Due to the scope of this analysis, some of the less 
significant operating costs are excluded. These consist of 
stores, lubricants, crew supplies and dry docking 
maintenance
6
. This leaves the cost components such as 
capital costs, all the voyage costs, cargo handling costs as 
well as the repairs and the following fixed costs of 
maintenance, insurance costs and crew salary. Several of 
these cost components diverge in value for ice reinforced 
vessels compared to normal open water vessels, which will 
be further elaborated later in the analysis. While these cost 
components may be subject to nominal price increases due 
to inflation, all cost included in this analysis are measured 
in constant 2014 USD and all price changes are therefore 
measured in real terms. 
 
- Assumption II: All prices are measured in 2014 
USD such that price changes indicate real price 
changes and not changes caused by inflation. 
 
This analysis is divided into 3 parts. The first part outlies 
and quantifies the different environmental constraints, as 
well as the cost components (chapter 6.1.). The second part 
combines these constraints and variables to form the 
mathematical framework, needed to facilitate the analysis 
of the economic feasibility of operating along the NSR 
(chapter 6.2). The third and last part presents the results 
achieved from the mathematical model presented in part 
two. It will also provide a conclusion to the opportunities 
and challenges of Arctic liner shipping (chapter 6.3). 
 
5.1.1 Theoretical Framework 
In order to take into account the time value of the future 
costs the discounted cash flow method is selected
7
. By 
using this method, cost components located in future time 
periods are discounted to their present value in order to 
compensate for both inflation and the real rate of return of 
investments. This makes it possible to evaluate and 
compare the feasibility of alternative investment decisions.  
 
The discounted cash flow method is used for evaluating an 
investment running over several future periods, where 
these future values are discounted for the opportunity costs 
of initiating the investment. The NPV of an investment is 
set to run over duration of n years, with year zero as the 
point of investment, illustrated in equation 1.2 below. 
 
𝐷𝐶 = ∑
𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
                    (1.2)
𝑛
𝑡=0
 
 
                                                          
6
 The exclusion of these cost components may not alter the 
outcome of the analysis significantly as they all take 
moderate values and are present on voyages along both the 
NSR and SCR.   
7
 This method is also known as the net present value 
method. 
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𝐶𝐹𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡  
𝑟 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡   
𝑛 = 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠) 
 
The annual depreciation rate consists of a nominal 
depreciation rate, as well as a fixed depreciation rate. 
Because of inflation, the value of 100 US dollars in one 
year is rarely worth the same as 100 US dollars in the 
present. Therefore the annual nominal depreciation rate is 
equal to the annual rate of inflation
8
. The real depreciation 
rate, meaning discounted for inflation, equals the 
opportunity cost of initiating the investment, which is 
denoted by 𝛿. The opportunity cost is defined as the rate of 
return yielded by investing the capital alternatively. 
Denoting the yearly depreciation rate as 𝑟 = 𝜋 + 𝛿 and 
inserting into equation 1.2 yields equation 1.3, used in the 
analysis section of this paper. 
 
𝐷𝐶 = ∑
𝐶𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝜋 + 𝛿)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=0
                    (1.3) 
 
𝜋 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
𝛿 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) 
 
In a normal scenario, the investment is deemed favourable 
if present value of the cash flows takes on a positive value. 
In this study, however, only the cost side of the cash flows 
is taken into account as the total amount of transported 
TEU serves as a proxy for the revenue (positive cash 
flow). The most favourable option is therefore determined 
by the lowest present value as this indicates the investment 
decision yielding lowest total cost per TEU. 
 
Several other investment theories used for evaluating the 
feasibility of investments currently exists such as the 
annuity, internal rate of return and payback methods. Both 
the internal rate of return and the payback method are 
undesirable when comparing alternative investments and 
therefore not relevant given the framework of this study. 
The annuity method is a viable alternative to the 
discounted cash flow method for comparing investments, 
but requires more calculations without significantly 
changing the outcome of the investment feasibility.
9
 
 
                                                          
8
 It is important to note that inflation is not incorporated 
into the model and the nominal depreciation therefore 
takes the value of zero. 
9
 For more on investment evaluation methods see 
(Hedegaard & Hedegaard, 2011).  
5.1.2 Route and Vessel Descriptions 
In this section, the route used to transport containerized 
goods between North Western Europe and north Eastern 
Asia is specified. The SCR departs eastbound from 
Northwestern Europe and into the Mediterranean Sea, the 
Suez Canal, the Red Sea, crossing the Indian Ocean before 
crossing into the Pacific Ocean through the Strait of 
Malacca. The NSR is affirmed as consisting of several 
routes around the numerous islands and ice formations 
found in the Russian Arctic. Whether the vessel traverses 
the numerous islands in a north or southbound direction 
therefore significantly changes the voyage distance along 
the Russian Arctic Coast. A majority of previous studies 
on the economic feasibility of transporting containerized 
goods using the Northern Sea route have all examined a 
southerly route navigating south of the numerous Islands 
situated in the Russian Arctic, increasing the possible 
amount of annual navigation days due to less severe ice 
conditions of the coastal waters (Liu & Kronbak, 2010; 
Furuichi & Otsuka, 2013; Verny & Grigentin, 2010). The 
version of the NSR examined in this study, diverges from 
the southern route by navigating north of the Novaya 
Zemlya Peninsula and north of the New Siberian Islands. 
Thereby the vessel avoids the shallow and treacherous 
straits of the Kara Gate and Sannikov Strait. At the same 
time the route crosses south of the extremely northern and 
ice infested Severnaya Zemlya Islands. The northerly route 
chosen results in a lower navigation season, but avoids the 
severe draft limitations of 13 meters and consequently 
allows for the transit of larger vessels. Although receiving 
considerably less focus in literature, transits of larger 
vessels was achieved using this northerly route, including 
the “Stena Polaris” transit in the fall of 2013 (Stena, 2013) 
and the Dynagas LNG carrier “Ob River” in 2012 
(Dynagas, 2015). 
 
For calculative purposes the NSR is divided into three 
segments, similar to the method used in Xi, et. al (2011). 
The route and the different leg stretches of the route is 
presented in figure 4.2. The first leg stretches from the 
ports in northeast Europe to the Vilkitskiy Strait south of 
the Novaya Zemlya Islands (Green line). The second leg 
lies between the Vilkitskiy Strait and the De long Strait, 
south of Wrangel Island, on the border between the East 
Siberian Sea and the Chukchi Sea (red line). The third leg 
continues from there on to the final destination of the port 
cities in northeastern Asia (teal line). The icy waters of the 
second leg of the Northern Sea route covers a distance of 
1214 nautical miles while the length of the first and third 
leg depends on the ports on which the vessel will call. 
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On average, a containership servicing the Europe to East 
Asia trade, calls at between three and five ports in both the 
European and Asian segments of the voyage (Xu, et al., 
2011). For simplification, the number of port calls per trip 
is reduced to three in both the Northwestern European 
segment and the north East Asian segment. The three ports 
visited in the North Western European cluster are the ports 
of Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp while the three ports 
visited in the North East Asian cluster are the ports of 
Shanghai, Qingdao and Busan. The Suez Canal Route 
allows for additional ports visits along the way, as it 
transits more populous areas and will therefore call at 
Singapore and Hong Kong along the way. This increases 
the potential load factor, and consequently company 
revenue.  
It is assumed that the vessel will call at each of the three 
ports just once when the vessel is operating in one of the 
clusters. This means that the vessel will discharge the 
cargo destined for that port while also loading new cargo 
for the destination ports on the other side of the Eurasian 
landmass. The vessel arriving at the Northern European 
cluster from East Asia, using either route, will 
consequently only call Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg 
once.  
During the winter the ice-reinforced vessel will transit 
along the SCR, and the distance is therefore the distance 
between Hamburg in Europe and Busan in Asia (via the 
six ports called at in between). The round voyage distance 
for the SCR is set to 22,826 nautical miles with a total of 
10 port calls. During the summer navigation season, the 
ice reinforced vessel is solely operating on the NSR. In 
this period the voyage distance is therefore between 
Antwerp in Europe to Shanghai (via the four port called at 
in between). A round trip using the NSR calls six ports, 
with a total voyage distance of 15,762 nautical miles. The 
routes, distances and port calls are illustrated in figure 5.2.  
 
This analysis denotes a voyage as a single east or west 
bound trip between North Western Europe and East Asia. 
Voyage distances and port visits are therefore calculated 
by taking the average of a west – and eastbound voyage 
for each of the two routes, respectively. This is due to the 
differences in the distance sailed, depending on the voyage 
destination and number of port visits. Although this will 
result in differences between the actual voyage distances 
and port visits, it is reasonable to assume that the total 
amount of both east – and westward voyages will converge 
in the long run, thus significantly reducing deviations. 
Further, such a measure of voyage distance and port visits 
results in complexities in estimating the exact distances for 
the ice reinforced vessel due to the two annual alterations 
in the route during the annual opening and closure of the 
NSR. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The version of the Northern Sea Route examined in this study 
The green, red and teal line illustrates the route leg one, two and three respectively. 
 Source: Own calculations using Google Earth 
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These two transition phases, deriving from the opening 
and the closure of the NSR, results in a distance saving of 
either 432 or 826 nautical miles depending on whether the 
vessel initiates the next voyage from the European or 
Asian cluster. These small distance distortions are 
disregarded for simplicity, although these distances may 
cause the results of the analysis to be slightly biased 
towards the ice reinforced vessel. 
 
5.1.3 Vessel Specifications and Acquisition 
The requirement of being equipped with a reinforced 
double hull of sufficient ice classification along with 
numerous other technical requirements in order to get 
permission to enter the NSR are one of the major 
challenges for a ship-owner planning to operate in the 
Russian Arctic waters (see chapter 2.1). This part seeks to 
explain the size and dimensions of the case study container 
vessel, including the new build costs and finance aspects.  
Previous studies on the economic feasibility of utilizing 
the NSR as an international container transport lane have 
investigated the most southern version of the NSR, 
effectively limiting the capacity of the container ship to 
4300 TEU (Arcticmax). A containership of such a limited 
size is not able to leverage the same economics of scale as 
the ultra large containerships being added to the world’s 
liner fleet, leading to higher costs per TEU. The positive 
economics of scale linked to the increases in containership 
sizes have contributed to an increase in the size of the 
world’s liner shipping fleet with the largest containerships 
in 1980 of 3,000 TEU to the introduction of vessels larger 
than 18,000 TEU in 2013 with expectations of further 
increases in size in the coming decades (Kremer, 2013)
10
. 
Although huge distance savings are possible by using the 
NSR, an Arcticmax class containership is not 
economically competitive compared to an ultra large 
vessels operating on the Europe to East Asia trade 
(Furuichi & Otsuka, 2013). In order for liner shipping 
through the Arctic to become more than a niche market, 
conditions must allow larger vessels to operate along the 
NSR. Since the examined version of the NSR used for 
transiting goods between Europe and Asia lies on the more 
northern latitudes of the Russian Arctic, an ice-reinforced 
container ship with a capacity of 8000 TEU is selected for  
                                                          
10
 GMA GCN Recently launched the 18,900 TEU “Marco 
Polo”, currently holding the title as the largest container 
ship in the World.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Voyage distances and port visits along the Northern Sea Route and Suez Canal Route 
While only calling at each of the ports located in Europe and East Asia once, the vessel will call at both the port of 
Shanghai and Hong Kong on each voyage along the Suez Canal Route. The voyage distances are calculated as the 
averages of entire roundtrips. 
 
Hamburg to Busan distance via the 
Suez Canal Route: 11,784 nm 
 
Antwerp to Shanghai via the 
Northern Sea Route: 8,366 nm 
 
Ice filled water distance: 1,214 nm 
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the purpose of this study. This consequently makes it 
possible to better compare the economic feasibility, 
comparing the NSR to the larger vessels operating along 
the standard SCR. Ultra large carriers are not able to 
operate in the Russian Arctic, due to the necessity of 
seasonal icebreaker escorting along the route. This is 
caused by the limitations of the icebreaker escorts, which 
have a limited breadth restricting the breath of the 
transiting vessel. The largest of the Russian icebreakers 
currently operating along the NSR have a beam of 30 
meters, while that of the new generation of icebreakers, 
projected to enter service within the next decade, are 
increased to 34 meters (NSRA, 2015). According to Liu & 
Kronbak (2010) the maximum beam of the transiting 
vessel are not to exceed the beam of the icebreaker escorts 
while Furuichi & Otsuka (2013) argue that the maximum 
breadth possible is between 33 – 49 meters. The NSRA, 
however, does not list any beam restrictions and it 
therefore remains unclear if such restrictions exists.  
Transits of vessels with a beam far greater than that of the 
Russian icebreakers has been reported numerous times; 
“Arctic Aurora”, “Zaliv Amurskiy”, “Propontis” and 
“Zaliv Baikal” with a beam of 44.23, 42, 44.06 and 42.02 
meters respectively (NSRA, 2015). For the sake of this 
study, it is assumed that an 8000 TEU vessels can navigate 
the Northern Sea Route given a calculate breadth of 42.91 
meters (DSA, 2014). This lies within the bounds of the 
previously largest vessels transiting the Northern Sea 
Route. The open water vessels operating solely along the 
Suez Canal Route, used to compare the economic 
feasibility, are in this study set to be of a container 
capacity of 8000 TEU, 10000 TEU and 15000 TEU. 
Despite the thicker hull of the ice-strengthened vessels, the 
assumption is that the vessels operating solely using the 
SCR are subject to the same dimensions as the NSR 
vessels. Table 5.1 lists the dimensions of the containers 
ships used in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Size comparison of Arcticmax and large open water vessels   
Source: The Arctic Institute 
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5.1.4 Capital Costs 
The capital costs of acquiring the vessels, used to operate 
along the different routes, is a major cost component in 
this study due to the debt service spanning several years. 
Especially the large cost increase in new build ice 
reinforcing the vessels compared to ordinary open water 
vessels, results in the need for significant reduction in the 
operational costs to be economically feasible. The 
containership used to operate the Northern Sea Route is 
assumed to have an ice classification of polar class 6, 
being a reasonably strong classification to reduce the time 
spent receiving icebreaker assistance. Vessels of the Polar 
Class six classifications are able to sail through first year 
ice of up to 120 cm without an icebreaker escort (Smith & 
Stephenson, 2013). The new building cost is between 20 – 
30 percent higher than compared to open water vessel 
depending on the level ice reinforcement (Kronbak & Liu, 
2010). 20 percent is assumed for the purpose of this study, 
given the vessel examined only being able to penetrate 
moderately strong first year ice, thus still dependent on ice 
breaker assistance in more harsh conditions.  
The newbuilding price adopted in this study are compiled 
from Furuichi & Otsuka (2013), as it provides new-
building prices for container ships of several sizes. They 
estimate that an 8000 TEU container ship costs 87.9 
million USD, while the price for a 15000 TEU container 
ship is 159.4 million USD. Given the volatility of ship 
prices, such figures may easily be subject to large 
fluctuations, but are assumed to be constant for the 
purpose of this study. Table 5.1 presents the new building  
 
 
 
prices for the different containerships forming the 
framework of this study. 
 
- Assumption III: Throughout this paper, demand and 
supply of ship building services are assumed constant 
and the prices encountered are therefore not subject 
to shipping cycle fluctuations. 
 
The acquisition of container ships is assumed to be 
financed by 70 percent debt and 30 percent of the capital 
cost to be covered by the investor’s reserves (Kronbak & 
Liu, 2010). The debt is amortized over 15 years, with a 7 
percent annual interest rate, calculating the annual debt 
service using equation 1.4 below. 
 
𝐶 = 𝐵 ∙
𝑟
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−𝑛
                    (1.4) 
 
𝐶 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
𝐵 = 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
𝑟 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝑛 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑 
 
According to Stopford (2008) the average lifetime of a 
transport ship is 25 years. A building time of one year is 
assumed, with an initial shipbuilding payment to be 
transferred at the end of the first year of the investment. 
Therefore an investment is assumed to run for a span of 26 
years, building the vessel in year 1, with 25 years 
operational years, before the vessel is sold as scrap. The 
 8000 TEU Open Water 8000 TEU Ice-reinforced 10000 TEU Open Water 15000 TEU Open Water 
DWT  95.782 95.782 95,782 168,000 
Draft (m) 14.33 14.33 14.73 15.73 
Breadth (m) 42.91 42.91 45.51 52.01 
Length (m) 325.5 325.5 349.39 399.6 
Total volume  (m3)  264.157 264.157 338,594 499,149 
Gross Tonnage 81.476 81.476 105.165 156.715 
New Building Price 
(Mill. USD.) 
87.9 105.48 122.5 159.4 
Table 5.1: Vessel dimensions and building costs 
Source: Calculations based on ship specifications spreadsheet from Danish Ship Owners Association and Furuichi & 
Otsuka (2013) 
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demolition of transport ships is usually carried out in India, 
Bangladesh or Pakistan with the scrap metal used in local 
markets (ibid). With a negligible scrap-value of 425 USD 
per ton in 2012, the total scrapping revenue is 
approximately 40.000 USD for an 8000 TEU container   
ship (Bloomberg, 2012). Due to the multimillion costs and 
revenues associated with an investment in a containership, 
the income of the sale to a scrap yard is disregarded.    
 
- Assumption IV: The investment is assumed to run for 
a duration of 26 years of which the first year is used 
for the acquisition of the containership, thus being 
operated for 25 years before demolition. 
 
- Assumption V: The vessel is assumed to be operated 
by the same company for the duration of the 
operational period and therefore not resold or time 
chartered forward. 
 
5.1.5 Navigation Days 
The continuous decline of ice cover in the Arctic Ocean is 
one of the deciding factors that determine whether it is 
economically viable to transport goods through the NSR. 
Even though several Arctic climate studies have been 
published with various results, the future extent of the ice 
cover along the different sections of the NSR is impossible 
to forecast in a precise manner. A critical assumption of 
this study is the continuous expansion of the yearly 
navigation season along the NSR due to the melting of ice 
cover. The exact amount of navigational days forecasted 
here is therefore loosely based on the underlying trends of 
the sophisticated global climate forecasts mentioned earlier 
in this paper.  
 
The annual navigation days along the Russian Arctic 
differs significantly between the marginal seas that form 
the NSR (Rodrigues, 2008). While the Barents and 
Chukchi Seas remained ice-free for more than 100 days in 
both 2006 and 2007, the Laptev Sea and East Siberian 
Seas proves the biggest barriers to maritime transport. The 
short season of these chokepoints can be mitigated by the 
use of icebreaker assistances and the Russian NSR 
administration generally allows for traffic on the NSR 
from the beginning of July to the middle of November 
given a sufficient level of ice-protection (NSRA, 2015). 
Significant variations in the ice cover results in difficulties 
when estimating the exact length, and for the purpose of 
this study, the navigation season of year 2016 is set to 120 
days which is a realistic assumption for an ice 
strengthened vessel given the official navigation season 
listed by the NSRA. As this study will take departure in a 
dynamic analysis of the feasibility of transport using the 
NSR, a projection of the annual navigation days is 
required. Global Circulation Models are currently not 
capable of precisely projecting the future navigation 
period, and continuously underestimate the observed 
decline of sea ice cover in the Arctic Ocean (Stroeve, et 
al., 2012). 
 
The only forecast in the hands of the authors are those of 
Khon, et al., (2010), who projects the annual amount of 
navigation days on the NSR based on the IPCC A1B 
global warming. They find the navigation season scenario 
to be approximately 90 days by midcentury (see figure 
5.4). In the study days where navigation is possible are 
defined as water with a maximum sea ice concentration of 
15 percent, although ships with a sufficient ice 
classification easily may be able to navigate in higher 
concentrations. The navigation season is further expanded 
with the aid of the Russian icebreakers as they allow for a 
significant increase in operational days along the NSR.   
 
Given the general uncertainty of the speed at which the 
navigation season is increasing, both a low and a high 
navigation scenario is examined in this study. In the low 
and high global warming scenario, the average annual 
increase in the amount of navigation days are set to be 1.5 
and 3 days, respectively (equation 1.5). These two 
Marginal Sea 1979 2006 Difference 2007 
Barents Sea 194 251 57 294 
Kara Sea 41 77 36 110 
Laptev Sea 22 51 29 75 
East Siberian Sea 7 46 39 103 
Chuckchi Sea 52 109 57 153 
 
Table 5.2: Past observations of the annual number of ice free days along the Marginal Seas of the Arctic Ocean 
Source: Rodrigues (2008)  
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scenarios will result in a navigation season expanding to 
approximately 170 and 220 days by the middle of the 
century. Consequently, the NSR will still be closed during 
the height of the winter period in both scenarios.  
 
𝜏𝑡,𝑗 = 120 + 𝜎𝑗 ∙ 𝑡            (1.5) 
 
𝜏𝑡 = 𝑁𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅  𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝜎𝑗 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗  
 
A crucial assumption of this analysis is that the yearly 
navigation time on the NSR covers a continuous time span 
each year, such that no sudden NSR closures affect the 
vessel transit time. Given the volatility of the Arctic 
weather systems even in the summer, such a continuous 
navigation season may not be realistic but is assumed for 
simplicity.  
 
- Assumption VI: In the low and high Arctic warming 
scenario the annual navigation season increase is 
assumed to be 1.5 and 3 days, respectively.   
 
- Assumption VII: The annual navigation time along 
the NSR covers a continuous time span from the 
opening of the route in spring/summer to the closure 
in autumn.  
  
Even during the navigation period in the Arctic Ocean, 
certain stretches along the NSR still experiences 
occasional pack ice, forcing vessels to operate at 
drastically reduced speeds despite ice-strengthening. 
Therefore, the need for icebreaker assistance will rise - 
especially around the late and early weeks of the yearly 
navigation period.  
For simplicity the amount of nautical miles of which the 
vessel is forced to operate at reduced speed, due to either 
severe ice conditions or icebreaker assistance, is divided 
equally on each passage of the NSR. Kronbak and Liu 
(2010) assume an average distance of 700 nm of ice water 
per trip, when the NSR is navigable for 91 days, and 100 
nm average when navigable for 274 days.  
Due to the increased length of the navigation season, the 
amount of nautical miles with reduced operation speed is 
set equal to 1214 nautical miles. This is the distance of the 
ice-filled waters of the second leg, presented in chapter 
4.2.3. This distance is assumed to be the average of the 
entire navigation season, despite fluctuates of ice cover, 
which reaches an annual low in September and high levels 
during the start and ending of the season. The assumption 
is therefore that a given vessel has to operate with slower 
speeds for 1214 nm one each voyage, regardless of the 
impact of the global warming.  
 
- Specific notations: Throughout the rest of this paper, 
variables with values that differ between types of 
Arctic warming scenarios are denoted with the letter 
j, such that 𝑋𝑗 is the variable X given Arctic warming 
scenario of type j. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Length of the navigation season along the NSR from the Kara Strait to the Behring Strait 
The black line illustrates past observations. The blue solid and dotted lines denote the mean and intermodal standard 
deviation of the selected best models using the A1B IPPC emission scenario while the orange line and the orange shading 
illustrate the same for all the models.       
Source: Khon, et al., (2010)  
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5.1.6 Travel Time and annual voyages 
The voyage duration depends on the speed of the transiting 
vessel. The SCR route allows the vessel to maintain a 
constant speed for the majority of the time, only 
interrupted by weather conditions or port calls. While 
operating along the NSR however, the shifting ice 
conditions does not allow for the same stability. Due to the 
scope of this study, it is not possible to realistically 
simulate the above-mentioned uncertainty and therefore 
two sailing speed aggregates are used instead. A multitude 
of different transit speeds are presented by scholars on the 
subject, with Verny and Grigentin (2009) using an average 
operating speed of 17 knots along the SCR and 15 knots 
along the NSR. Furuichi and Otsuka (2013) use an average 
speed of 20 knots in open water and a speed of 12-15 knots 
in ice water. Liu and Kronbak (2010) assume an average 
vessel speed of 18 knots in open water and an average 
speed of 10 knots in ice water, regardless of receiving 
icebreaker assistance or not. These voyage speeds are 
adopted as vessel speeds for this study. 
 
- Assumption VIII: While in open – and ice waters, 
the vessels are assumed to operate at constant speeds 
respectively, and are therefore not affected by 
changes in wind and ocean currents. 
 
After establishing the lengths of the routes and the average 
navigation speeds – both in open and ice covered waters - 
it is possible to estimate the average time needed for a 
voyage between the port cluster of Northwestern Europe 
and North East Asia for each of the routes examined.
11
 In 
addition to the time spent navigating the routes, the vessels 
spends time calling at each port visit (berthing) as well as 
waiting for permission to transit either the Suez Canal or 
receive icebreaker assistance in the ice covered waters in 
the Russian Arctic.   
The time spent for each port call is assumed to take an 
average of one day regardless of the size and traffic near 
the respective port. The average waiting time for the Suez 
Canal transits is assumed to be 4 days (Kronbak & Liu, 
2010). The average waiting time along the NSR is 
assumed to be eight days, for potential icebreaker 
assistance. This is reasonable at the present ice conditions, 
yet with the retreat of the Arctic ice cover it is expected to 
be reduced in the future. Therefore the average waiting 
time along the Northern Sea Route is set to decrease by 0.1 
day annually such that the average waiting time for a NSR 
trip is reduced to approximately 4 days at the middle of the 
                                                          
11
 A trip is set to be one transit between the two end ports 
regardless of the direction or route used. 
century. The linear relationship between average waiting 
days and time is illustrated by equation 1.6 below.  
 
𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑅,𝑡 = 8 − 0.1 ∙ 𝑡               (1.6) 
 
𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑅,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
 
When transporting goods between two points, the amount 
of trips is realistically measured in whole numbers. By 
solely considering whole numbers, in discrete time, risks 
the exclusion of a significant amount of revenue 
generating days from the analysis. Since it is always 
possible to sail along the SCR, the annual amount of trips 
is assumed as a fractional value. Due to the risk of sudden 
closures of the NSR while on voyage is not considered to 
be plausible in this scenario, the annual number of voyages 
along the NSR is assumed to only take whole numbers.   
The vessel transiting the SCR is assumed to operate 
between Hamburg and Busan. The operating speed is 
assumed to be 18 knots, with a voyage length of 11,784 
nautical miles, and an average of five port visits per 
voyage. The travel time is calculated using equation 1.7 
below
12
. 
 
𝜙𝑆𝐶𝑅 =
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑉𝑂𝑊 ∙ 24
+ 𝑊𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝑊𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡           (1.7) 
 
𝜙𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑧 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 (𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠) 
𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑧 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 (𝑛𝑚) 
𝑉𝑂𝑊 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 (𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑠) 
𝑊𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑧 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙  
𝑊𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡
= 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑛 𝑎 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑧 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒  
 
The total amount of annual voyages for a vessel solely 
operating along the Suez Canal route is therefore 
calculated using equation 1.8. 
 
𝑄𝑆𝐶𝑅 =
365
𝜙𝑆𝐶𝑅
                    (1.8) 
 
𝑄𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐶𝑅 
 
This gives an average travel time along of the SCR, 
regardless of the vessel size, of 36.27 days allowing 10.1 
annual voyages along the SCR. 
                                                          
12
 When calculating the average voyage time, only the time 
spent calling at five ports is included due to only calling at 
each of the ports in Europe and East Asia once.   
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The travel time using the NSR varies due to changes in the 
time spent waiting for icebreaker escort and is subject to 
periods of slow speed even when icebreaker assistance is 
not required. The length of a NSR voyage between 
Antwerp and Shanghai is calculated by modifying 
equation 1.7 to include the distance traveled in ice covered 
waters with reduced speed, presented by equation 1.9 
below.  
 
𝜙𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑅 =
(𝐷𝑁𝑆𝑅 − 𝜔𝑡)
𝑉𝑂𝑊 ∙ 24
+
𝜔𝑡
𝑉𝐼𝑊 ∙ 24
+ 𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑅 + 𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡      (1.9) 
 
𝜙𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅  𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 (𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠) 
𝐷𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 (𝑛𝑚) 
 
𝜔𝑡 = 𝐼𝑐𝑒 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 (𝑛𝑚) 
𝑉𝑂𝑊 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 (𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑠) 
𝑉𝐼𝑊 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 (𝑘𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑠) 
𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 (𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠) 
𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠) 
 
This yields a voyage time of 32.6 days in year 2016, while 
the annual reduction in the ice cover reduces the travel 
time to 29.1 days in year 2050.  
In addition to the ice water distance variable, the amount 
of voyages also depends on the number of days the Arctic 
Sea is open to navigation. The total number of voyages 
using the NSR in year t, conditional on the warming  
 
scenario j, is calculated by dividing the navigation period 
by average travel time per trip. In employing absolute 
numbers, this is rounded down to the lowest integer 
denoted by the equation 1.10 below. 
 
𝑄𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = ⌊
𝜏𝑡,𝑗
𝜙𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑅⌋                    (1.10) 
 
𝑄𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡  
 𝜏𝑡,𝑗 = 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
 
When the NSR is not open for navigation, the ice-
strengthened container ships will sail the SCR for the rest 
of the year. The amount of SCR trips is calculated using 
equation 1.8, substituting 365 days with the number of 
days not used navigating along the NSR. Days where 
Arctic navigation is allowed, but not spent sailing on the 
NSR, is calculated using Euclidian division witch finds the 
remainder of the whole number from a division. The 
annual amount of trips using the SCR conditional on the 
amount of NSR trips possible is calculated using equation 
1.11.   
 
𝑄𝑡,𝑗
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) =
365 + 𝜏𝑡,𝑗  𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝜙𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑅) − 𝜏𝑡,𝑗
𝜙𝑆𝐶𝑅
            (1.11) 
 
𝑄𝑡,𝑗
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
 
Figure 5.5: Annual number of successful voyages 
The solid (teal) line illustrates the annual amount of successful voyages for the vessels solely operating along the SCR. 
The striped (gray) and dotted (blue) lines illustrate the annual amount of successful voyages of both routes in the low and 
high warming scenario respectively. 
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  𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗  
𝜏𝑡,𝑗  𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝜙𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑅) = 𝐴𝑟𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑛𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑖𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
 
It is important to note that the annual amount of trips using 
the NSR may actually be higher than illustrated in figure 
5.5. By dividing the length of the navigation season with 
the total voyage time for the NSR, the total amount of 
nautical miles may be overestimated. This is due to the 
fact that the vessel only needs to travel two thirds of the 
distance before the closure of the NSR. This is exemplified 
by a vessel departing from Western Europe only having to 
reach the Behring Strait before the closure of the NSR and 
the results found in this analysis may therefore moderately 
underestimate the potential of Arctic shipping.   
 
5.1.7 Fuel Costs  
Being the single largest operational cost component, fuel 
costs have a large impact on the feasibility of transporting 
cargo through the Arctic. The total fuel cost per voyage 
depends on the price of bunker fuel, voyage distance and 
bunker consumption per nautical mile. The price of crude 
oil has shown a significant volatility during the last 
decade, translating into large fluctuations in the price of 
bunker fuel. Due to such fluctuations and the large time 
span investigated in this study, a projection of the future 
price of bunker fuel is therefore needed. This study will 
adopt the projected prices of residual fuel oil in the 
transportation sector until 2040 from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). The projections made 
by the EIA are divided into several scenarios dependent on 
various macroeconomic growth cases and given the major 
uncertainty attached to the future level of the price of oil.  
Of these alternatives, three different fuel oil price 
scenarios are incorporated in this study in order to 
investigate how different oil price scenarios will affect 
shipping along the NSR. These scenarios are low oil price, 
a reference case and a high oil price scenario. 
The low oil price scenario assumes a low demand for 
petroleum products in the non-OECD countries, due to low 
economic growth, and the world therefore experiences an 
excess supply of oil. This result in a moderate price 
increase of bunker fuel by 2040 compared to the present. 
In the high oil price scenario, a high economic growth in 
the non-OECD countries is assumed, and consequently a 
high demand for oil products. This creates a high demand 
for oil, resulting in drastic bunker fuel price increases. The 
reference case assumes the world’s real GDP to grow at an 
average annual rate of 2.4 percent until year 2040, causing 
moderate price increases of bunker fuel to approximately 
800 USD per barrel by 2040. The reference case is 
therefore situated between the low and high oil price 
scenario, and is used by the EIA as general case for all of 
its forecasts (EIA, 2015). The projected prices of residual 
fuel oil for the low, high and reference case scenario are 
illustrated in figure 5.6. From the illustration, it is evident 
that the residual fuel oil price projections in the three 
scenarios are widely different. The low fuel price scenario 
 
Figure 5.6: EIA residual fuel oil price projections 
Prices are measured in 2014 constant USD and converted from price per barrel to price per ton using a conversion 
factor of 7.33 barrel per ton.  
Source: EIA 
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remains approximately constant between the present time 
and 2040, and the high price scenario illustrating a vast 
increase in price during the same period
13
. Since the time 
period examined in this study continues to the year 2060, 
the price projections need to be extended. The annual price 
change between 2020 and 2040 is relatively constant for 
each of the three scenarios and uncovering this underlying 
price trend is possible by running an ordinary least squares 
regression on the projected price data in each of the three 
scenarios. From the calculations of each of the three 
scenarios, the annual real price increase for a barrel of 
residual fuel oil is found to be 2.7 USD in the low 
scenario, 12.4 USD in the reference case and 16.4 USD in 
the high demand case. 
As with all economic projections, one must take into 
account the large degree of uncertainty attached to such 
forecasts. A multitude of factors are determining the price 
of oil, and it is therefore impossible to accurately project 
the price for bunker fuel so far into the future. 
Additionally, the price of bunker fuel varies from port to 
port, resulting in even greater difficulties in projecting the 
fuel costs encountered by the vessels operator.  
However, the fuel costs examined in this study are 
estimated in order to illustrate the effect of different fuel 
prices on the feasibility of Arctic liner shipping. It seeks to 
provide a relative, and not absolute, quantification of the 
future. This is further elaborated in the analysis section. 
Having established the future level of bunker fuel prices, 
the fuel consumption of each vessel needs to be defined. 
The consumption of bunker fuel depends on several factors 
including ship size, speed, water currents and wind 
conditions. As previously mentioned the vessel aggregate 
speeds are set to be 18 knots in open water, and 10 knots 
when operating in ice filled waters or receiving ice breaker 
assistance along the NSR. The ship characteristics 
spreadsheet of the Danish Ship-owners’ Association 
provides information of standard ship types, given the 
container capacity of vessels. Table 5.3 (next page) lists 
the calculated fuel consumptions for each of the 
containerships used in the analysis section, given the two 
speeds examined. External variables, like weather and 
ocean currents, will cause fluctuations in speed and fuel 
consumption. This will have a high impact on fuel 
consumption. Thus, the speeds used are averages, given 
that they cannot be maintained in the real world, causing 
the calculated fuel consumption to also be aggregated. 
                                                          
13
 The recent drop in the price of oil is not incorporated 
into the EIA fuel price estimations. Regardless, the EIAs 
projects that the oil price will converge to the previously 
high level in the next few years.  
Although the vessel may still operate at the average speeds 
defined in this study, the fuel consumption correlates 
exponentially with speed and the total fuel consumption, 
may therefore be negatively biased. For simplicity it is 
therefore assumed that the vessels will not deviate from 
the above mentioned speed making the fuel consumption 
constant. 
 
- Assumption IX: The vessels will not deviate from the 
two sailing speeds making both levels of fuel 
consumption constant.     
 
Although the values of fuel consumption calculated in this 
study have the potential to be negatively biased, it is clear 
that this is the case for both the SCR and NSR vessels. 
Due to the comparative nature of this study, it is therefore 
of limited impact to the conclusion. Having established the 
values of the fuel prices and fuel consumption, it is 
possible to calculate the total fuel costs for a voyage using 
both routes. The fuel cost is calculated from multiplying 
the route distance with the fuel consumption of the vessel 
and then the price fuel. Equation1.12 and 1.13 illustrated 
the fuel costs for a SCR voyage using the ordinary and ice 
reinforced vessels, respectively.  
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑘,𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝐹 = 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝜗𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅(𝑉𝑂𝑊) ∙ 𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝐹                     (1.12) 
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑘,𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝐹
= 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑖 
𝜗𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = F𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘  
𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝐹 = 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝐹,𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝜗
𝑁𝑆𝑅(𝑉𝑂𝑊) ∙ 𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝐹                     (1.13) 
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝐹,𝑁𝑆𝑅
= 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡  𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎  𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑖 
𝜗𝑁𝑆𝑅(𝑉𝑂𝑊) = 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  
 
In order to calculate the fuel costs for a voyage using the 
NSR, the ice cover water distance and the corresponding 
reduction in speed and fuel consumption needs to be 
included. This is presented in equation 1.14    
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝐹 = ω ∙ 𝜗𝑁𝑆𝑅(𝑉𝐼𝑊) ∙ 𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝐹 + (𝐷𝑁𝑆𝑅 − ω) ∙ 𝜗
𝑁𝑆𝑅(𝑉𝑂𝑊)
∙ 𝑃𝑡,𝑖
𝐹                (1.14) 
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝐹
= 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑖 
ω = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝜗𝑁𝑆𝑅(𝑉𝐼𝑊) = Ice water 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
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- Specific notations: Throughout the rest of this paper, 
variables with values that differ depending on the 
fuel price scenarios are denoted with the letter i, such 
that 𝑋𝑖 is the variable X given the fuel price scenario 
of i. 
 
5.1.8 Port Dues 
As mentioned earlier, the vessel visits an average of six 
and eight ports during a round trip when navigating the 
Northern Sea Route and the Suez Canal Route 
respectively. Due to the vessel only visiting each port in 
both the North Western European and the East Asian 
cluster once per visit, the average number of ports per 
voyage is actually reduced to three and five port visits, 
respectively. The total cost of entering a port, including 
port entry, berthing and line-handling charges is assumed 
to be 0.428 US dollars per gross ton for each port entry. 
The cost for the handling of container is assumed to be 100 
USD per TEU, including both the discharge and loading of 
containers (Furuichi & Otsuka, 2013). The total port 
related costs per voyage along the NSR or the SCR are 
presented by equation 1.15 and 1.16, respectively. 
 
𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑃 = 𝑢𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 0.428 ∙ 𝐺𝑗 + 𝜖𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝐿𝑘 ∙ 100           (1.15) 
 
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑃 = 𝑢𝑁𝑆𝑅 ∙ 0.428 ∙ 𝐺 + 𝜖𝑁𝑆𝑅 ∙ 𝐿 ∙ 100          (1.16) 
 
𝐶𝑘,𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑃 = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐶𝑅 
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑃 = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 
𝐺𝑘 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
𝐿𝑘 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑘 
𝑢𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 
𝑢𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝 
𝜖𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐶𝑅 
𝜖𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 
 
5.1.9 NSR Transit Fee 
In April 2014, the NSRA released an updated tariff scheme 
for receiving icebreaker escorting along the Northern Sea 
Route. Compared to the previous tariff system, where the 
transit fee was negotiated between the vessels operator and 
Russian authorities, the updated version has increased the 
transparency. The new tariff system is based on a fixed 
pricing scheme with the fee varying depending on the size, 
ice classification and season of navigation. It also 
considers the amount of NSR zones in which the transiting 
vessels receives ice breaker escort (see chapter 2.1). For a 
vessel transiting the NSR during the navigation season, it 
is reasonable to assume that the ice conditions around the 
opening and closure of the navigation season are far more 
severe compared to the during the middle of the season. It 
is therefore assumed that on the first and last voyages on 
the NSR during the navigation season, icebreaker 
assistance is required along a majority of the second leg of 
the route. This stretch measuring 1214 nautical miles 
covers a total of four of the NSRA designated icebreaker 
escort zones thereby causing an increased cost associated 
with transiting the Northern Sea Route. For the remaining 
annual transits along the Northern Sea route, an average of 
icebreaker assistance through two zones is assumed. In this 
case study no transit will therefore be completed without 
the aid of icebreaker escorts. With the present state of ice 
Table 5.3: Vessel navigation speed and fuel consumption 
Source: Own calculations based on the ship specification spreadsheet from the Danish Ship-Owners Association, 
 
 
 
8000 TEU  
Open Water 
8000 TEU  
Ice Reinforced 
10000 TEU  
Open Water 
15000 TEU  
Open Water 
Speed in open water 
(knots) 
18 18 18 18 
Speed in ice water (knots) Na 10 Na Na 
Fuel consumption in open 
water (ton/nm) 
0.192 0.236 0.212 0.256 
Fuel consumption in ice 
water (ton/nm) 
Na 0.118 Na Na 
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conditions along the Northern Sea Route, such an 
assumption is reasonable, although future transits during 
September may be possible without the aid of icebreaker 
escort. This is contingent on vessels having a sufficient ice 
classification.  
From the NSRA homepage it is possible to extract tariffs 
for vessel between 40,000 and 100,000 gross ton of polar 
class of four. During the summer/autumn season the cost 
per gross ton is 357.47 Rubles, which provides icebreaker 
assistance in 4 zones. In comparison during the mid-
season, an operator can pay 268.11 rubles per gross ton for 
only 2 zones. The average exchange rate between for the 
last five years is 32.187 Russian Rubles for one USD. 
Using this rate to convert the tariff into dollars (and 
deflating into 2012 USD) results in the costs of icebreaker 
assistance to be approximately 904 and 677 thousand 
constant 2012 USD for the escort through 4 and 2 zone 
respectively. 
 
5.1.10 Suez Canal Fee 
The Suez Canal toll is based on the calculations of the 
Suez Canal net tonnage and the Special drawing rights, 
and it is not easily comparable to general cargo capacity 
measurements (Stopford, 2008). The toll is approximated 
by the gross ton of the vessel, according to Suez Canal 
Authorities, using the Leth Agencies Suez Canal toll 
calculator for a laden containership. This yield the Suez 
Canal tolls measured in constant 2014 USD for the four 
different vessels of this study are estimated to be 
approximately: 450.800, 547.300 and 682.400 for the 
8000, 10000 and 15000 TEU vessels, respectively. 
 
5.1.11 Fixed operation costs 
This section will introduce the annual operation costs 
included in this case study. These fixed costs include 
insurance, maintenance and crew wages. Contrary to the 
variable operation costs introduced in the previous section, 
these costs are not directly linked to the annual amount of 
voyages performed by the vessel. They can therefore, for 
the purpose of this study, be described as fixed cost 
components. As previously mentioned some of the minor 
fixed cost components are excluded from this study, like 
lubricants, crew supplies and administration costs. 
Additionally, the expenses and time span associated with 
the mandatory annual dry docking, required by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) are excluded 
although both the direct and opportunity costs of such 
operations may be significant.  
The annual repair and maintenance costs are set to be 
1.095 percent of the new building costs (Furuichi & 
Otsuka, 2013). It is reasonable to assume that maintenance 
and repairs of a vessel operating in the Arctic are 
significantly higher compared to a normal open water 
vessel. The higher new building price of an ice reinforced 
vessel will result in maintenance and repair costs being 20 
% higher than those of the normal open water vessel. It is 
further assumed that the amount of repairs and 
maintenance does not increase with the age of the vessel 
and therefore remains fixed during the entire operational 
time span of the vessel.  
 
- Assumption X: The annual repair costs remain 
constant throughout all the operational years of the 
vessel regardless of the investment year. 
 
The insurance cost of the vessels consists of the two forms 
of insurance required for operating the containership. The 
Hull and Machinery (H&M) insurance is obtained from a 
marine insurance party, which protects the owner from the 
physical loss or damage to the vessel. The second 
insurance covers damage to cargo, collision damage, 
pollution and general damage affecting third party 
liabilities. This is obtained from Protection and Indemnity 
(P&I) Clubs (Stopford, 2008). A high degree of 
uncertainty is linked to maritime activities in the Arctic 
and it is likely that insurers will hesitate to provide 
insurances to such endeavors, and if so a significant 
premium for ships operating along the NSR will be 
required. Despite these uncertainties, the numerous 
successful transits over the Northern Sea Route performed 
by non-Russian companies indicate that Arctic shipping is 
indeed insurable. Insurers are currently working on helping 
to improve safety and raising awareness of Arctic shipping 
routes (Emmerson & Lahn, 2012). The basic insurance 
premium is assumed to be 0.343 percent of the new 
building cost per year for both H&M and P&I insurance. 
An additional insurance premium surcharge of 10 USD per 
gross ton per year is charged for Arctic shipping (Furuichi 
& Otsuka, 2013). Similar to the maintenance and repair 
costs the annual insurance costs are assumed to be 
constant, although an increase in successful transits along 
the NSR and improvements in infrastructure may 
eventually cause a reduction in the Arctic insurance 
premium. 
    
- Assumption XI: The annual insurance premium is 
assumed to be constant throughout all the 
operational years of the vessel regardless of the 
investment year.  
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Lastly, the salary of the crew working on the vessel is 
assumed to be 1.2 million USD annually (Verny & 
Grigentin, 2009). Although the size of the crew varies 
depending on the regulatory policies of the flag state and 
the vessel type, this sum is assumed to be constant 
regardless of the size of the vessel. 
 
Combining the three above mentioned cost components 
yields the annual fixed operation costs presented in the 
equation 1.17 and 1.18 for the open water and ice 
reinforced vessels respectively.   
 
𝐹𝐶𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐼𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 + 𝑀𝑘                (1.17) 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑤 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
𝑀𝑘 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
𝐼𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 + 𝑀𝑁𝑆𝑅                (1.18) 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  
 
5.1.12 Load Factor 
The load factor is defined as the percentage of the 
container capacity of the vessel which is loaded. Major 
fluctuations in the load factor will seriously affect the cash 
flows of the investment and therefore the cost per TEU.  
The demand for the freight of containers is highly volatile 
and depends on several world macroeconomic factors 
(Stopford, 2008). Additionally, the demand for westbound 
cargo is considerably higher than that of eastbound cargo 
resulting in a difference load factor depending on the 
destination (Kronbak & Liu, 2010). Since the liner ship 
will complete an equal amount of east and westbound 
voyages in the long run, an average of the two load factors 
is used in this study. Furuichi & Otsuka (2013) use an 
average load factor of 70 percent while 
Kronbak & Liu (2010) define an average load factor of 60 
percent for a voyage between Rotterdam and Yokohama. 
When vessels operate on the Suez Canal Route they call at 
both the port of Singapore and Hong Kong, which are not 
called on the NSR. Therefore an increased amount of 
cargo is to be assumed for the SCR, thus increasing the 
load factor compared to that of the NSR. For the purpose 
of this study the average load factor, regardless of 
direction, is assumed to be 70 percent when voyaging 
along the SCR and 60 percent when on the NSR.    
 
- Assumption XII: The annual average load factor is 
assumed to be constant at 60 and 70 percent for the 
NSR and SCR respectively     
 
As mentioned above, the load factor is subject to large 
fluctuations following the developments of shipping cycles 
causing a constant load factor to be highly unlikely. 
Further, seasons of capacity shortages due to a high 
demand for freight may easily cause the load factor to 
reach 100 percent on both routes. This will positively 
affect the feasibility of the NSR and the results of this 
analysis may therefore be positively biased towards the 
SCR.  
The annual amount of TEU transported is calculated by 
multiplying the load factor with the annual number of 
voyages and the container capacity of the vessel. This is 
presented by equation 1.19 and 1.20 for the open water and 
ice reinforced vessels, respectively. 
 
𝑈𝑡,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 =  𝑄𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝜖𝑡
𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝐿𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅                    (1.19) 
 
𝑈𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = ( 𝑄𝑡,𝑗
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) ∙ 𝜖𝑡
𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝑄𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅 ∙ 𝜖𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑅) ∙ 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝑅     (1.20) 
 
𝑈𝑡,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑇𝐸𝑈 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝑈𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝑇𝐸𝑈 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝜖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝐿𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
 
 COMBINING THE COSTS 5.2
After having defined the variables and constraints, the 
different cost components are combined to form the basis 
for the economic feasibility study. The voyage costs are 
defined as the cost components associated directly with the 
annual amount of voyages. They are thus calculated as the 
sum of the fuel costs, berthing fee, container handling 
charges and route related fees.  The costs of one voyage 
along the SCR, using the open water vessel are calculated 
by combining equations 1.12 and 1.15 into equation 2.1 
below.  
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑘
𝐹 + 𝐶𝑘
𝑆 + 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑅,𝑘
𝑃                     (2.1) 
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝  𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑗
𝐹 = 𝑉𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝐶𝑘
𝑆 = 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑧 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑅,𝑘
𝑃 = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐶𝑅 
 
The costs of one voyage along the SCR, using the open ice 
reinforced vessel are calculated by combining equations 
1.13 and 1.15 into equation 2.2 below.  
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𝐶𝑡,𝑖
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) = 𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝐹,𝑁𝑆𝑅 + 𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑆 + 𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑃           (2.2) 
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝐹,𝑁𝑆𝑅
= 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎  𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑖 
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑆 = 𝑆𝑢𝑒𝑧 𝐶𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
𝐶𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝑃 = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐶𝑅 
 
The cost for one voyage using the NSR is calculated by 
substituting the Suez Canal fee and SCR fuel costs in 
equation 2.1 with the icebreaker fee and NSR fuel cost 
from equation 1.14 and 1.15. 
 
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐶𝑡,𝑖
𝐹 + 𝐶𝑁 + 𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑃                     (2.3) 
 
𝐶𝑡,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝐶𝑁 = 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑒𝑒   
𝐶𝑡,𝑖
𝐹 = 𝑉𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅
𝑃 = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑁𝑆𝑅 
 
The cost component breakdowns for the different vessels 
examined are illustrated in figure 5.7. Looking at the 
voyage costs for the 8000 TEU vessels, it is clear that the 
reduced distance of the NSR results in a major reduction of 
bunker fuel costs. Although the fuel costs of transiting the 
NSR are considerably lower, the ice strengthened hull 
causes the vessel to operate at a disadvantage when 
navigating the SCR. These fuel cost differences, prove the 
importance of the number of annual Arctic navigation 
days.  
An ice-reinforced vessel have to complete several NSR 
transits in order to offset the fuel cost disadvantage of 
operating along the SCR, in order to be economically 
competitive to the open water vessel in the long run. The 
other major cost component affecting the NSR transits are 
the icebreaker assistance costs taking up a significant part 
of the voyage costs compared to the Suez Canal fee. This 
is especially evident during the start and end season 
transits, where the icebreaker fee takes on close to one 
third of the total voyage costs. This makes the voyage 
costs almost as high as that of an open water vessel 
navigating the SCR. Additionally, figure 5.7 reveals the 
significant cost reductions achieved by operating larger 
vessels. It is evident that the NSR voyage costs per TEU is 
not competitive compared to the costs of the larger SCR 
vessels. This demonstrates the significant economies of 
scale incurred with increases in the container capacity. For 
 
Figure 5.7:Voyage cost component breakdown 
The Costs are based on a one voyage in 2016 in the reference case oil price scenario. NSR / SCR denotes the route used 
while mid – and end season denotes the amount of zones where icebreaker assistance are required.  
Source: Own Calculations  
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example the total fuel costs for the 15000 TEU vessel is 
only approximately 15 percent higher than that of the ice 
reinforced vessel using the SCR although the container 
capacity is almost twice as high.  
The total variable costs each year for each of the vessel 
type can be identified by multiplying the annual amount of 
trips with the voyage costs. Thus, multiplying equation 2.1 
and 2.2 with the annual amount of SCR and NSR trips 
respectively, given the ice-cover scenario, yields the 
variable costs in year t for the SCR and NSR vessels. 
These annual variable costs are presented in equation 2.4 
and 2.5 below.   
 
𝑉𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑄𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅                    (2.4) 
 
𝑉𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝑄𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐶𝑅 
 
 
𝑉𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝑄𝑡,𝑗
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) ∙ 𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) + 𝑄𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅 ∙ 𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅     (2.5) 
𝑉𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅
= 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝑄𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝑄𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
 
In addition to the variable operation costs of the vessels, 
both the annual fixed costs and the capital costs need to be 
taken into consideration. The annual fixed costs consist of 
the insurance premium, the maintenance costs and salaries 
to the crew, while the capital costs consist of the debt 
payment of the vessel. Equation 2.6 and 2.7 denote the 
yearly fixed costs of the container ship used for the SCR 
and NSR, respectively. 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐼𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 + 𝑀𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅               (2.6) 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑤 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
𝑀𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
𝐼𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris  
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Source:  Novatek.ru 
𝐹𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 + 𝑀𝑁𝑆𝑅             (2.7) 
 
𝐹𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝑀𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
 
Denoting the capital costs in year t, conditional on the 
investment year s, as 𝐴(𝑡|𝑠,𝑘), the total costs for an ice 
reinforced or open water vessel of size k, given Arctic 
warming scenario j, in year t, are presented for an NSR 
and an SCR vessel in equation 2.8 and 2.9 respectively 
 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑡,𝑘,𝑖
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑄𝑡
𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝐶𝑡,𝑘,𝑖
𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝐹𝐶𝑡,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 +  𝐴(𝑡|𝑠,𝑘)
𝑆𝐶𝑅                 (2.8) 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑡,𝑘,𝑖
𝑆𝐶𝑅
= 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑖𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝐴(𝑡|𝑠,𝑘)
𝑆𝐶𝑅
= 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑆𝐶𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑘 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑠 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝑄𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) ∙ 𝐶𝑡,𝑗
𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝑄𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅 ∙ 𝐶𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅 + 𝐹𝐶𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅
+ 𝐴(𝑡|𝑠)
𝑁𝑆𝑅            (2.9) 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑁𝑆𝑅 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 𝑗 
𝐴(𝑡|𝑠)
𝑁𝑆𝑅 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑠 
 
Figure 5.8 and 5.9 (next page) illustrate the annual total 
cost component breakdown for the investment for the 
ordinary and ice-strengthened 8000 TEU vessel 
respectively in year 2015. As previously stated, the 
investment runs for 26 years where the first year is used 
for building the vessel and the subsequent twenty-five 
years used for the transport of goods. 
From the figures, it is evident that the fuel cost is by far the 
largest cost component ranging between forty and sixty 
percent of the total annual cost during the years operating 
the ships. For the ship solely operating the SCR the fuel 
cost accounts for a slightly larger share of the total costs. 
The higher capital costs and icebreaker assistance costs 
encountered by the ice reinforced vessel explain this 
difference. Over time the cost allocated by the Suez Canal 
toll relative to the NSRA icebreaker fee is reduced due to 
the increasing amount of annual voyages along the NSR. 
The other major cost variable components are those of the 
container handling charges and the berthing costs. They 
comprise between 15 and 25 percent of the total costs, 
taking up a larger share of the costs for the open water 
vessel due to the increased number of port visits and load 
factor of the SCR. Lastly, the berthing fee and the yearly 
fixed costs contribute marginally to the overall costs of 
operating the vessels although the insurance premium for 
the ice reinforced vessel is significantly higher than that of 
the open water vessel.  
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Figure 5.8:  Total cost component breakdown for the 8000 TEU open water vessel 
The costs are based on the investment in an ordinary 8000 TEU vessel in 2015 and 25 years of service given the 
reference case oil price scenario.  
Source: Own Calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9:  Total cost component breakdown for the 8000 TEU ice reinforced vessel 
The costs are based on the investment in an ordinary 8000 TEU vessel in 2015 and 25 years of service. The costs are 
calculated in the high Arctic warming scenario and the reference case oil price scenario.  
Source: Own Calculations  
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 RESULTS 5.3
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the year where 
the investment in an ice strengthened vessel becomes 
favorable to the investment in a normal open water vessel. 
The ice strengthened vessel will operate on the NSR when 
open for traffic and on the SCR when not, while the open 
water vessel will operate solely on the SCR. The point at 
which the investment is advantageous is determined by 
estimating the ratio of the total cost per TEU between the 
two alternative investment decisions. The total cost per 
TEU is calculated by dividing the total discounted costs 
with the total amount of transported TEUs. This is 
illustrated in the equations below, where the investment 
initiated in year s, with fuel price scenario i, Arctic 
warming scenario j and an open water vessel of size k. 
Equitation 3.1 illustrates the total discounted costs per 
TEU for the open water vessel while equation 3.2 
illustrates the same for the ice strengthened vessel. 
 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑠,𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅 =
∑
𝑄𝑆𝐶𝑅∙𝐶𝑡,𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅+𝐹𝐶𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅+𝐴(𝑡|𝑠,𝑘)
𝑆𝐶𝑅
(1+𝛿)𝑡
𝑠+25
𝑡=𝑠
∑ 𝑄𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝜖𝑡
𝑆𝐶𝑅 ∙ 𝐿𝑘
𝑠+25
𝑡=𝑠
          (3.1) 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑠,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅
=
∑
𝑄𝑡,𝑗
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅)
∙𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑆𝐶𝑅+𝑄𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅∙𝐶𝑡,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅+𝐹𝐶𝑁𝑆𝑅+𝐴(𝑡|𝑠)
𝑁𝑆𝑅
(1+𝛿)𝑡
𝑠+25
𝑡=𝑠
∑ (𝑄𝑡,𝑗
(𝑆𝐶𝑅|𝑁𝑆𝑅) ∙ 𝜖𝑡
𝑆𝐶𝑅 + 𝑄𝑡,𝑗
𝑁𝑆𝑅 ∙ 𝜖𝑡
𝑁𝑆𝑅)𝑠+25𝑡=𝑠 ∙ 𝐿
𝑁𝑆𝑅
     (3.2) 
 
𝐿 = 𝑉𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝜖𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝛿 = 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
𝑠 = 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 
 
Dividing the discounted costs per TEU of the investment 
in an open water vessel, with that of the investment in an 
ice reinforced vessel yields the ratio of the total discounted 
costs per TEU. If the ratio takes a value of above one, the 
investment of a NSR vessel has a lower cost per TEU than 
the investment in an ordinary SCR vessel. If the value is 
between zero and one, the SCR vessel is still the most 
lucrative investment. It is important to note, that when 
comparing the investment in an ice strengthened vessel 
compared to that of an open water vessel, both investments 
must be initiated in the same year. For a comparison 
between the two investment types, the costs also need to 
be discounted to the same year (all cash flows in this 
analysis are discounted to 2014 USD). The discounted cost 
ratio for vessels of size k, oil price scenario i, and Arctic  
 
 
warming scenario j, given an investment start in year s, is 
calculated using equation 3.3 below.  
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 =
𝐷𝐶𝑠,𝑖,𝑘
𝑆𝐶𝑅
𝐷𝐶𝑠,𝑗,𝑖
𝑁𝑆𝑅                  (3.3) 
 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑠,𝑗,𝑖,𝑘 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝐸𝑈 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
 
The discounted total costs per TEU ratios for the ice-
strengthened and open water vessels of the same size, are 
illustrated in figure 5.10 and 5.11 for the low and high 
navigation scenario, respectively.  
From both these figures it is evident that the investment in 
an ice reinforced vessel will not become advantageous to 
the investment in a similar sized open water vessel during 
the span of this analysis. Investing in an ice reinforced 
vessel by 2035, the projected cost per TEU for the ice 
reinforced vessel exceeds those of the open water vessel 
by a large margin in both Arctic warming scenarios. Not 
surprisingly, the high warming scenario yields the largest 
cost ratio, with the total cost per TEU for the ice reinforced 
vessel being approximately 10 percent higher than that of 
an open water vessel in the high oil price scenario given an 
investment year of 2035. 
Both figures show an increasing trend in the cost ratio, as a 
function of investment year. This is explained by the 
gradual reduction return of the cost per TEU of the NSR 
vessel, as the Arctic sea ice is receding. This clearly 
illustrates the effect of the increasing number of navigation 
days on the NSR have on the economic feasibility, as an 
alternative to the SCR. Further, the results reveal the 
impact of the oil price on the viability of the NSR. A low 
oil price reduces the fuel savings potential of utilizing the 
shorter NSR, as the larger capital and transit costs of the 
ice reinforced vessel causes the SCR to remain highly 
favorable. A high oil price scenario causes a reduction in 
the extra costs of the ice reinforced vessels relative to that 
of a normal vessel. 
This implies that the NSR will may become competitive to 
an open water vessel of the same size in the near future, 
given a continued decrease in the ice cover. The positive 
economics of scale achieved by the larger open water 
vessels results in cost ratios much lower than observed in 
figures 5.10 and 5.11. Consequently, the graphs illustrating 
the cost ratios between the ice-strengthened vessel and the 
larger 10,000 and 15,000 TEU vessels are located in 
appendix A.   
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Figure 5.10: Cost per TEU ratio in the low navigation scenario 
The total cost per TEU ratio of the investment of an ice strengthened vessel to an open water vessel, as a function of the 
investment year. The ratio is calculated in the low Arctic warming scenario with a discount factor of 7 percent and both 
vessels having a container capacity of 8000 TEU. A ratio above one indicates that the investment in the ice reinforced 
vessel is favorable.  
Source: Own Calculations 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Cost per TEU ratio in the high navigation scenario 
The total cost per TEU ratio of the investment of an ice strengthened vessel to an open water vessel, as a function of the 
investment year. The ratio is calculated in the high Arctic warming scenario with a discount factor of 7 percent and both 
vessels having a container capacity of 8000 TEU. A ratio above one indicates that the investment in the ice reinforced 
vessel is favorable.  
Source: Own Calculations 
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5.3.1 The viability of super slow steaming 
One of the advantages of following a route with a reduced 
distance is the possibility of operating at lower speeds 
compared to the alternative route, while still maintaining 
the annual amount of completed voyages. Such a strategy 
may be attractive in a scenario where the demand is low, 
and an increase in annual voyages therefore will only 
result in a lower profitability per voyage. From the results 
posted in the previous section it is evident that the 
investment in an ice reinforced container ship would not 
be advantageous to that of an ordinary vessel within the 
next decades. This was in large part due to the significant 
fuel consumption stemming from the hull alterations of 
vessels operating in ice filled waters. It is therefore worth 
investigating whether a reduction in the voyage speed, 
when operating along the NSR, will increase the cost ratios 
for an ice reinforced vessel.  
By reducing the average speed when navigating in the 
open water sections of the NSR to 15 and 12 knots, the 
voyage time is increased to approximately 35 and 40 days, 
respectively. This lowers the voyage fuel costs, due to the 
exponential nature of fuel consumption as a function of 
speed. Figure 5.12 illustrates the costs per trip in 2016, 
when the ice reinforced vessel uses super slow-steaming at 
a speed of 12 knots during operations along the NSR. 
From the figure it is clear that the costs for a trip using the 
NSR has been drastically reduced, compared to the costs 
voyage costs when operating at 18 knots, illustrated 
previously in figure 5.7 (page 46).. The costs of a NSR 
voyage are now reduced by approximately 20 percent, 
making the NSR voyages significantly more attractive. 
However, operating at lower speeds also reduces the 
annual number of possible voyages and consequently; a 
reduction in the number of TEU’s transported. Thus the ice 
strengthened vessel will have fewer NSR trips to offset the 
higher fuel cost along the SCR as compared to ordinary 
open water vessels. 
Figure 5.13 and 5.14 illustrates the total cost per TEU 
ratios for the NSR when traveling between North-western 
Europe and East Asia using the NSR when operating at a 
speed of 15 and 12 knots, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.12:  Voyage cost component breakdown when super slow steaming on the NSR 
The Costs are based on a one voyage in 2016 in the reference case oil price scenario with a voyage speed of 12 knots on 
the open water sections of the NSR. NSR / SCR denotes the route used while mid – and end season denotes the amount of 
zones where icebreaker assistance are required.  
Source: Own Calculations 
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Figure 5.13:  Cost per TEU ratio with a voyage speed of 15 knots along the NSR 
The total cost per TEU ratio of the investment of an ice strengthened vessel to an open water vessel, as a function of the 
investment year given a voyage speed of 15 knots along the open water section of the NSR between Europe and Asia. The 
ratio is calculated in the high Arctic warming scenario with a discount factor of 7 percent and both vessels having a 
container capacity of 8000 TEU.  A ratio above one indicates that the investment in the ice reinforced vessel is favorable.  
Source: Own Calculations 
 
 
Figure 5.14:  Cost per TEU ratio with a voyage speed of 12 knots along the NSR 
The total cost per TEU ratio of the investment of an ice strengthened vessel to an open water vessel, as a function of the 
investment year given a voyage speed of 12 knots along the open water section of the NSR between Europe and Asia. The 
ratio is calculated in the high Arctic warming scenario with a discount factor of 7 percent and both vessels having a 
container capacity of 8000 TEU.  A ratio above one indicates that the investment in the ice reinforced vessel is favorable. 
Source: Own Calculations 
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From figure 5.13 and 5.14 it is clear that super slow 
steaming operations along the NSR moves forward the 
point at which the investment in an ice reinforced vessel 
becomes favourable, relative to an ordinary container ship 
of the same size using the SCR. Recalling the results from 
the previous section, it was evident that the investment 
ratio was not favourable in the time span of this analysis. 
By altering the NSR speed to 12 and 15 knots, the 
investment in an ice reinforced vessel becomes more 
attractive; although only at a small margin. At both speeds 
the total cost per TEU is approximately 6 percent higher 
for the ice strengthened vessel compared to the open water 
vessel if the investment is initiated in 2035 under the high 
oil price scenario. Interestingly, the total cost per TEU is 
slightly lower when the vessel operates at 15 knots on the 
NSR compared to the lower speed of 12 knots. This 
indicates that operating at the lowest speed possible does 
not necessarily reduce the total costs per TEU, and that an 
optimal speed along the NSR is situated at approximately 
15 knots.    
 
5.3.2 Case Study discussion and conclusion 
The Arctic Sea ice-cover is continuously disappearing, 
creating the opportunities of using the NSR as an 
alternative maritime shipping lane to the SCR. 
Transporting goods via the NSR reduces the travel 
distance by up to 35 percent, resulting in significant 
reductions in voyage time and fuel costs. In this case 
study, a cost analysis was performed on the feasibility of 
transporting containerized goods between North Western 
Europe and East Asia using the NSR as an alternative to 
the SCR. Throughout the case study, the total costs per 
TEU of operating an 8000 TEU vessel using the NSR was 
compared to three ordinary open water vessels; all 
investigated under two different sea-ice projections and 
three fuel price projections. By performing a discounted 
cost analysis, this case study finds that the investment in 
an 8000 TEU ice reinforced containership using the NSR 
will not be preferable to an investment in an ordinary 8000 
TEU (or larger) open water vessel in the near future. This 
is considering all the global warming and fuel price 
scenarios. The greatest potential for the ice reinforced 
container ship was found in the high global warming 
scenario and fuel price scenario. Here a total cost per TEU 
was identified as only being approximately 10 percent 
higher than the open water vessel of the same size 
operating along the SCR. This emphasizes that the 
feasibility of liner shipping is highly dependent on the 
annual number of navigation days along the NSR. The 
results also imply that the prospect of Arctic liner shipping 
may become feasible around 2040, with a rapidly 
expanding navigation season and a fuel price following the 
high price scenario.  
Further, this reveals that the vessel operating along the 
NSR is relatively less affected by increasing fuel prices 
compared to that only navigation the SCR. This is only the 
case if the navigation season is sufficiently long to offset 
the increased fuel consumption of the ice reinforced 
vessel. Lastly, it can be concluded that by navigating at 
reduced speed along the NSR, the total cost per TEU is 
reduced, thereby advancing the point at which an ice 
strengthened vessel becomes an advantageous investment 
to an ordinary vessel of the same size.  
The possibility of regular traffic along the NSR to become 
competitive to the SCR as soon as 2040 rests upon several 
crucial assumptions which are all subject to major 
uncertainties. These uncertainties include the topics of 
vessel sizes, icebreaker availability, entry deterrence, fuel 
prices port availability and the future decline in sea ice. 
Although the cost ratio difference between the ice-
reinforced and open water vessel was close to one, it is 
important to take into account the lower costs per TEU of 
the larger vessels operating along the SCR due to the 
economics of scale. In order for the NSR to be truly 
competitive to the SCR, the vessels operating in the Arctic 
therefore have to increase considerably in size to become 
competitive. This is impossible at present, due to the 
shallow Arctic waters and the limited size of the 
icebreakers. The Arctic Ocean spans a vast area and is 
subject to extreme weather and large floes of drift ice. In 
the analysis it was assumed that the yearly navigation 
period is continuous, and that icebreaker assistance is 
always available. In a real scenario however, a sudden 
change in the weather pattern may cause the NSR to close, 
severely increasing the voyage time and thus loss of 
revenue. Additionally, icebreaker assistance might not 
always be readily available, and the average waiting time 
on an NSR trip could easily exceed those adopted for this 
study.      
As mentioned in the previous section, multiple port visits 
along the voyage hedges the ship operator against local 
demand slumps. This has the potential to increase the 
amount of goods transported per trip, positively affecting 
the overall revenue. One of the assumptions throughout 
this paper was that a voyage along the NSR only included 
three port visits at each cluster, which is reasonable to 
assume given the sparsely populated Russian Arctic. In 
contrast to the NSR, numerous major port cities are 
situated along the SCR. This creates the potential for a 
much larger annual amount of TEUs than calculated in this 
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paper, and consequently it might overestimate the 
competitiveness of the NSR. These major population 
centers along the SCR also provide different challenges to 
the ships operating in these waters. Two examples of this 
are large scale piracy off the horn of Africa and the acute 
problem of large scale refugees crossing the Mediterranean 
Sea in need of rescue as mariners are compelled to bring 
the distressed humans to safety. 
In this paper, the developments of bunker fuel prices are 
projected using a forecasting model under the critical 
assumption of no major geopolitical shocks. Looking forty 
years into the past, it becomes clear that such dramatic 
events occur frequently. In recent years shale gas and oil 
extraction in the Dakotas, has changed the world oil price, 
which is currently lower than seen during the financial 
crisis of 2007. The assumption of no such global events 
occurring is in itself contrary to the background of this 
paper. The Arctic has the potential to change the transport 
infrastructure of the world, providing alternatives to the 
Suez Canal, which is currently the fastest shipping lane 
between Europe and East Asia. With a contemporary sharp 
decline in the number of pirate attacks in the bay of Aden 
(Stavridis, 2013), the Suez Canal is still one of the world’s 
most important transport routes. Unlike the Russian 
Federation, Egypt does not need to maintain a ready 
icebreaker fleet nor create a maritime infrastructure in a 
remote and sparsely populated part of the world. As the 
incumbent provider of the world’s most trafficked 
shipping lane, the Suez Canal authority has the potential to 
use policies of entry deterrence in order to postpone the 
prospect of Arctic shipping. By lowering the Suez Canal 
transit fee, the total costs per TEU calculated in this paper 
are lowered and thereby reduce the ship-owners’ 
incentives to use the NSR. Even the expectation of the 
Egyptian authorities lowering the future Suez Canal tariff 
may increase the projected opportunity costs of investing 
in a vessel designed for the NSR and thereby maintain its 
role as the most important route between Europe and Asia. 
Although the Suez Canal presently maintains its dominant 
bottleneck position, the retreating Arctic Sea ice-cover 
along the NSR is declining, making the NSR more 
attractive in the future. Transporting goods through the 
Artic, as an alternative to the SCR, results in a dramatic 
reduction in the travel distances, which is still a major 
determining factor in the cost of maritime shipping. As the 
ice-cover along the NSR diminishes, the Russian Arctic 
infrastructure will most certainly become more effective in 
the future, making the NSR more attractive. Further 
research is needed and should incorporate more advanced 
fuel price forecasts, shipping cycles and navigation day 
projections. This will certainly enhance the predicting 
power of a future case study, to create a better economic 
foundation for when to operate in the high Arctic. 
  
 
 
 
Source: Rosatomflot 
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The area north of the Arctic Circle hosts an abundance of 
oil, gas and minerals, which were previously deemed 
impossible or non-economically feasible to extract. The 
rapidly diminishing ice cover on the Arctic Ocean, 
combined with a major expansion of several large 
developing countries’ economies, has fueled a rise in 
demand for such commodities. The recent years have seen 
a surge in oil and gas extraction activities in the Arctic 
parts of the Eurasian continent. To meet this surge in 
demand, several resource extraction sites in the high Arctic 
are either in the construction or planning phase, creating 
major opportunities for the maritime industry. A large 
majority of the maritime activities in the Arctic are 
associated with resource extraction activities and several 
major projects requiring a significant expansion of bulk 
shipping capabilities are currently under way (see section 
6.2.1). Therefore the opportunities for Arctic shipping in 
these sectors will mainly be concerned with the transport 
of such commodities from extraction points in the Arctic 
and maritime support for the resource extraction facilities.  
Although bulk shipping linked to such resource extraction 
activities are faced with the biggest potential, it is worth 
mentioning the recent and successful trans-Arctic bulk 
voyages along both the NSR and NWP. These voyages 
indicate that the reductions in distance of the Arctic Sea 
Route also benefit the bulk sector, thus making Arctic bulk 
shipping sector with a wide range of opportunities.  
Trans-Arctic bulk voyages are being subject to the same 
limitations as those mentioned for the liner shipping 
sector, such as a short navigation season and the general 
risks of operating in the remote areas of the Arctic. 
However, bulk operations rarely operate under the strict 
time scheduling observed in the liner shipping sector, 
reducing the financial risks of such voyages (Schøyen & 
Bråthen, 2011).  
The following parts of this chapter include a more in depth 
review of the present and future activities important to the 
bulk sector in relation to the extraction of both 
petrochemicals and minerals in the Arctic. The first part 
will provide a brief introduction to the multiple roles of the 
shipping sector in Arctic resource extraction activities. 
Then the paper will then review the activities and describe 
the opportunities for the tanker sector, given the present 
and future extraction possibilities. In the third part, the 
focus shifts to the activities and opportunities for the dry 
bulk sector by reviewing the current and future Arctic 
mining activities with importance to the maritime sector. 
  
6.1.1 The role of Arctic Shipping for resource extraction 
A large fraction of the Arctic landmasses consists of 
islands or areas far away from existing infrastructure. 
Therefore, the maritime industry plays a decisive role in 
the prospect of extracting minerals and hydrocarbons from 
the Arctic. Sea transport is thus necessary both for 
transporting commodities away from extraction points, but 
also for providing supplies and machinery for the mining 
process. This includes all resources needed for the 
establishment of sufficient infrastructure on site, like fuel, 
water, food and general supplies. Additionally standby 
ships may also be needed for towing and support 
operations. In the case of off shore extractions specialized 
vessels might be required for SAR operations or oil spill 
containment. The seasonal ice cover and harsh 
environment in large parts of the Arctic further 
6 ARCTIC OFFSHORING AND BULK 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
AS BOOMING COMMODITY PRICES HAS EXPANDED THE EXTRACTION OF RESSOURCES TO 
THE ARCTIC A NEED FOR MARITIME TRANSPORT AND SERVICES HAS FOLLOWED. THIS HAS 
CREATED A WIDE RANGE OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE OFFSHORING AND BULK SECTOR 
WHICH ALREADY FORMS THE MAJORITY OF MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC. THE 
FOLLOWING CHAPTER AIMS TO MAP THE ONGOING AND FUTURE ARCTIC RESSOURCE 
EXTRACTION SITES OF RELEVANCE TO MARITIME ACTIVITIES IN ORDER TO GIVE AN 
OVERVIEW OF THE OPPORTUNITIES FACED BY THE SECTOR.   
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complicates maritime operations. Although large areas of 
water previously inaccessible to vessels have been 
exposed, the Arctic navigation season still provides a 
limited window of opportunity for the transport. This 
results in potential severe disruptions to the supply chain, 
which forces the companies to seasonally stockpile the 
products when the arctic waters are inaccessible to 
transport vessels.  
Mines and facilities for the extraction of hydrocarbons 
located north of the Arctic Circle are numerous, yet only a 
few of these are situated in areas solely dependent on 
maritime transport for in- and outbound logistics. A 
majority of the mining sites located in the Arctic parts of 
Scandinavia, Russia and North America are connected 
permanently to ice-free ports by railway. Most of the 
hydrocarbon extraction facilities use pipelines to transport 
oil and gas directly to ports and markets further south, 
which significantly reduces their dependence of Arctic 
shipping. If development of resource extraction in the 
Arctic continues to expand to more remote and isolated 
areas, the need for logistic maritime assets arises creating 
further opportunities for the sector. These developments 
could be in areas such as Greenland, the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago and Arctic Siberia, where pipeline 
transportation would be impossible. 
 
 PROSPECTS FOR LIQUID BULK AND 6.2
OFFSHORING 
Although the Arctic Circle only covers 6 percent of the 
Earth’s surface, the area may account for as much as 20 
percent of the world’s undiscovered recoverable oil and 
gas resources (Ernst & Young, 2013). The US Geological 
Survey estimates the total mean of undiscovered 
conventional oil and gas resources in the Arctic to be 90 
billion barrels of oil, 47 trillion cubic meters feet of natural 
gas and 44 billion barrels of natural liquid gas. Of these the 
largest amount of undiscovered oil, set at 29 billion barrels 
of oil, is expected to be located in Arctic Alaska. The 
largest gas fields are estimated to be located in the Western 
section of the Russian Arctic (USGS, 2008). To transfer 
these resources to economic growth centers further south, 
an extended infrastructure is required. Multiple types of 
infrastructure are needed, adapted to the conditions at each 
site, including: pipelines, oil terminals, gas terminals and 
bulk tankers. Although the maritime transport of 
hydrocarbons is a major industry on a global scale, a large 
fraction of the oil and gas produced north of the Arctic 
Circle is currently transported south by the use of 
pipelines, either directly to the costumers or to accessible 
ports located in more advantageous climate areas. 
Installing pipelines to extraction facilities are both 
technically difficult and expensive, resulting in the need 
for tankers and LNG carriers to transport the hydrocarbons 
(NIRAS, 2014). Consequently, the liquid bulk maritime 
sector has seen a recent surge in the number of transports 
along the vast expanses of the NSR. This increase in oil 
and gas maritime activity has not only been fueled by the 
need for inter-Arctic logistic transport, but also by 
numerous trans-arctic transits between Europe and Asia. 
The number of trans-Arctic tanker voyages along the entire 
distance of the NSR has amounted to 13, 18 and 19 in 
2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively (NSRA, 2015). 
Compared to the number of tanker vessels operating 
partially along the NSR, with 10 in 2012 and 20 in 2013, it 
is clear that tanker traffic is dominated by traffic between 
Europe and Asia. It is, however, important to note that 
several of the transits were carried out by smaller vessels 
departing or arriving in the port of Murmansk and Western 
Russia. They did therefore not travel directly to the large 
population centers of East Asia and Europe.      
The majority of the tanker vessels navigating the Arctic 
are owned and operated by Russian shipping companies, 
notably Sovcomflot and the Murmansk Shipping 
Company. Sovcomflot is Russia’s largest shipping 
company and one of the world’s leading tanker ship 
owners. The company is an active participant in the 
Russian oil and gas extraction activities in the Arctic, 
operating a large amount of ice classed LNG and 
petroleum carriers. Murmansk Shipping Company 
provides transport of dry bulk, general cargo and tanker 
shipping along the NSR and operates the Russian nuclear 
icebreakers, used for the escort of cargo ships along the 
NSR (MSCO, 2013). Both Sovcomflot and the Murmansk 
Shipping Company have a long history of operating in the 
Russian Arctic, but in recent years several non-Russian 
shipping companies have also navigated the NSR. Non-
Russian companies having used the NSR comprise of the 
Swedish Stena Line, Greek Dynagas and the German 
Reederei Group.  
Dynagas provides specializing in navigating in Arctic 
weather and ice conditions using its expanding fleet of ice 
reinforced LNG carriers (Dynagas, 2015) made history in 
2012 when the tanker “OB River”, chartered by Gazprom, 
was the first LNG tanker to successfully transport LNG via 
NSR from Hammerfest, Norway to Tobata, Japan. The 
voyage was carried out during November, outside of the 
navigation season, with the aid from Rostomflot 
icebreakers (Gazprom, 2012). Another Dynagas LNG 
carrier; the “Arctic Aurora” carrying 66.866 tons of LNG 
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completed a similar voyage in 2013
14
, while also 
backhauling through the NSR (NSRA, 2015). In the same 
year Stena Line, in cooperation with Hyundai Glovis, also 
traversed the NSR transporting 43000 tons of Naphtha 
from Ust-Luga, near Skt. Petersburg to South Korea 
(Stena, 2013). Between 2012 and 2013, the German 
Reederei Nord completed two transits carrying gas 
condensate from the port of Murmansk to Incheon, South 
Korea and Malacca, Malaysia. Several other non-Russian 
companies have navigated the waters of the NSR, 
transporting oil and gas between Europe and Asia. This 
indicates a broader interest in utilizing the Arctic as a 
viable transport route for liquid bulk. Additionally, several 
oil and gas companies operating in the Arctic without 
access to the pipeline network are acquiring their own 
vessels to transport goods.  
 
6.2.1 Arctic oil and gas extraction activities by region 
The reserves of the five Arctic nations are unevenly 
distributed. This part of the paper provides a brief review 
of extraction operations relevant to the maritime industry. 
It will provide an oversight of current and planned 
extraction sites in: Norway, Russia, US and Canada 
    
Norway: Norway maintains the largest reserves of oil and 
gas in Western Europe, standing at 2.1 trillion cubic 
meters of gas and 7.5 billion barrels of oil (BP, 2015). The 
country is currently the third largest exporter of gas in the 
world after Russia and Qatar (EIA, 2014). A majority of 
the Norwegian production occurs outside of the Arctic in 
the North Sea, but extraction occurs in the Barents Sea 
north of the Arctic Circle. The gas and oil pipeline 
network in the North Sea is extensive, connected to the 
European central network. However, northern Norwegian 
oil and gas fields are only connected to the mainland, thus 
requiring transport south to reach other markets by rail or 
ship. The Norwegian part of the Barents Sea is ice free 
throughout the winter, and can therefore use normal open 
water tankers to markets in Europe and Asia. Snøvit is the 
first Norwegian gas field developed in the Barents Sea, 
where gas is transported to land using a 143 kilometer 
pipeline to the on-shore LNG terminal at Melkoya near 
Hammerfest for liquefaction (Statoil, 2014). Melkoya is 
the most northern LNG facility in the world, and is used as 
an export terminal to transport the LNG to consumers. In 
2012, 65 percent of the LNG produced in Norway was 
exported to European and Eurasian countries, but 
shipments of LNG from Norway also have Asian markets 
                                                          
14
 On the voyage in 2013 the destination port was Futtsu, 
Japan. 
as a destination (EIA, 2014). The two LNG carriers “Ob 
River” and the “Arctic Aurora” mentioned above, departed 
from the Melkoya terminal to deliver gas to the Japanese 
market.  
The Goliat oil field in the Norwegian part of the Barents 
Sea is scheduled to begin production in 2015. It is 
expected to hold oil reserves of up to 174 million barrels 
of oil and close to 8 billion cubic meters of natural gas 
(ENI, 2015). Located far offshore, where pipelines are 
non-feasible, oil from the field will be transported to the 
markets using two newly acquired 123 thousand dead 
weight tons (DWT) shuttle tankers. They are owned and 
operated by Knudsen NYK Offshore Tankers, having 
acquired the vessels specifically to work in Arctic waters 
(WMN, 2011). Future development in the Norwegian 
Arctic may include the newly discovered Johan Castberg 
field, situated north of the Snøvit field, which is estimated 
to hold between 400 and 600 million barrels of oil. 
According to Statoil the field is too small for the 
development of land based facilities near the Castberg 
field (BO, 2014b) and the oil will therefore need to be 
transferred by ships. Although the future of the project 
seemed bright since the discovery in 2011, recent declines 
in the oil price has forced Statoil to postpone the decision 
phase at Castberg until 2016. This is due to estimations of 
a breakeven point of a 100 USD per barrel in the field, 
non-feasible at the current world price (Stangeland, 2015). 
 
Russia: Of the 61 large oil and gas fields that have been 
discovered within the Arctic Circle, two thirds are located 
in the Russian part of the Arctic (Ernst & Young, 2013). 
Almost a quarter of the world’s proven gas reserves are 
located in Russia, with close to 90 percent of these 
reserves located in the Northwestern part of the Russian 
Arctic. Gas fields located in the Barents and Kara Sea 
region currently supply almost 70 percent of the Russian 
gas production (Østreng, et al., 2013). The gas and oil 
pipeline infrastructure is well developed in the Western 
part of the Russian Arctic, with under 20 percent of the 
produced oil being transported using by ships, railways or 
roads. Several oil export terminals are located in the 
Russian part of the Arctic, with a majority of these located 
in the ice free waters of the Barents Sea. Of these 
Murmansk is the largest terminal, serving as a hub for the 
transport of oil to markets around the world.  
Oil produced at the Timan-Pechora field, is transported to 
Archangelsk, and then shipped to the Belokamenka 
floating storage unit in Kola Bay. From the Belokamenka 
unit, the oil is further shipped to customers in Europe and 
the US, amounting to as much as 11.2 million barrels of oil  
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in 2008 (Rosneft, 2015). The Russian company Lukoil 
owns and operates the Varandey terminal in the Pechora 
Sea, currently the northernmost continuously operating oil 
terminal in the world. Varandey is a fixed-offshore ice 
resistance off-loading terminal located 22.6 kilometers 
from the coast, where oil produced at the nearby Timan-
Pechora oil field is loaded on to oil tankers for further 
transport (Lukoil, 2015a). Lukoil exports all its oil from 
Russia by sea, which amounted to 4.2 million tons of crude 
oil in 2012, of which the 3.2 million was through the 
Varandey terminal (Lukoil, 2015b).  
Located 60 kilometers north of Varandey, in the Pechora 
Sea, lies the ice reinforced drilling platform Prirazlomnoye 
capable of operating year-around in the harsh Arctic 
climate. It is the world’s first stationary platform 
extracting oil in the Arctic shelf. The Prirazlomnoye oil 
field is estimated to hold 72 million tons of oil and 
Gazprom, the operator of the platform, expects the annual 
production to reach 6.6 million tons after production from 
the field was initiated in December 2013 (Gazprom, 2015). 
Located far from shore the drilling platform is not 
connected to land by pipelines and the oil extracted is 
therefore transported by sea and on May 1
st
 2014 the first 
shipment consisting of 67 thousand barrels of oil arrived at 
the port of Rotterdam by the Sovcomflot ice strengthened 
oil carrier “Mikhail Ulyanov”. Since then several transits 
has been completed and Gazprom plans to increase annual 
production to 5 million tons by 2020 (BO, 2015a).  
 
Unlike the transport of oil, Russia only exports natural gas 
extracted in the Arctic by pipeline and the only liquidation 
plant located on the Sakhalin Island in the Russian Far 
East far well away from the Arctic Ocean (EIA, 2014). A 
major LNG terminal is currently underway on the Yamal 
Peninsula near the Kara Sea by Novatek, Total AG and 
CNPC (Novatek, 2014). Here gas will be extracted from 
the large South-Tambeyskoye gas field, transferred to the 
Sabetta seaport. It is estimated the port will export up to 
16.5 million tons of LNG annually by 2021, making it the 
busiest port in the Arctic. The contracting companies have 
signed a slot reservation agreement with Daewoo 
Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Company for the 
construction of up to 16 Arc-7, 172,000 m
3
 LNG carriers. 
These ships are ordered to ship LNG to international 
markets through the Barents Sea to Europe in the winter 
and by the NSR to Asia during the summer. Nine of the 16 
 
 
 
The Belokamenka floating oil platform  
Source: Scanpix / Iris 
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LNG carriers have already been ordered by two joint 
ventures. The first 6 of these have been ordered by a joint 
collaboration between Teekay and China LNG, while the 
last 3 have been ordered by a joint venture between OSK 
Lines and China Shipping (SW, 2015).  
Another major project in the development phase is the 
Shtokman Field in the Barents Sea, estimated to hold up to 
3.9 billion m
3
 of natural gas. From the planned deep sea 
rig, the gas is planned to be transported to the port of 
Teriberka on the Kola Peninsula to a planned liquefaction 
terminal for the maritime transport of LNG to costumers 
(Gazprom, 2015). A combination of the American shale 
gas boom and high production costs has, however, resulted 
in uncertainty for the Shtokman field. According to 
Andrey Kruglov, Gazprom Deputy Chairman, further 
development of the project may be postponed “for future 
generations” (Novosti, 2013). 
 
USA and Canada: While the North American Arctic is 
projected to hold vast reserves of conventional oil and gas 
resources, liquid extraction has been limited due to 
missing production facilities and pipeline network. The 
Alaskan North Slope has proved reserves of 4.2 billion 
barrels of oil, but is estimated to contain at least 27 billion 
barrels of oil and 1 trillion cubic meters of gas (Østreng, et 
al., 2013). Alaskan oil is mainly produced at the Greater 
Prudhoe Bay area and is transported by pipelines to the 
ice-free port of Valdez, in the subarctic region of Alaska. 
From here oil is shipped to refineries along the western 
coast of America (EIA, 2014). Due to the road 
connectivity, the Alaskan oil and gas sector is therefore of 
negligible significance to the Arctic tanker sector.  
Canada is already amongst the world’s largest oil and gas 
producers but production mainly comes from the Alberta 
oil sands, the Western Sedimentary Basin and offshore oil 
fields in the Atlantic Ocean. All these extraction points are 
all well away from the Canadian Arctic (EIA, 2014). With 
the US importing close to all of Canadian oil and gas 
exports, these products are transferred using a well-
developed pipeline network. Shipping prospects for 
Canadian fossil fuels is therefore also insignificant, unless 
major development of the remote Arctic reserves is 
initiated. Arctic Canada is estimated to hold vast reserves 
of fossil fuels, with the unexplored Ameriasian Basin north 
of the Canadian mainland is estimated to hold close to 10 
billion barrels of oil and 56 trillion m
3 
of gas (USGS, 
2008). There are no currently active projects in the area, 
but the vast number of reserves makes future extraction 
activities likely if the oil price rises to previously high 
levels. 
6.2.2 Opportunities for the Danish Maritime Sector: 
The greatest opportunities in the Arctic for the maritime 
industry, and its sub suppliers, are found in the offshoring 
sector with the transport of oil and gas. This section 
presents the opportunities for the maritime industry in the 
Kingdom of Denmark as reported by NIRAS (2014). 
Danish companies in the offshoring and tanker sector 
already maintain a sizable fleet and have obtained 
knowledge through offshoring operations in both the 
Danish and Norwegian parts of the North Sea. Test 
drillings have also been carried out in the waters of 
Greenland. The opportunities for companies to provide 
transport the oil or gas away from the platform are 
greatest. However, several other types of vessels and 
equipment are needed to operate a drilling platform, which 
changes depending on the operational phase of the project.  
In the investigation phase there is a need for maritime 
assets to collect seismic data, oil resource sampling and 
perform observations of the environmental state of the 
ocean. This employs several different vessel types, such as 
drill ships and support vessels. The production phase 
presents the greatest opportunity for the Danish industry, 
as they already maintains a fleet of transport of oil and gas 
as mentioned above. During the production phase there is 
an additional need for specialized vessels to assist both the 
drilling platform and the transport vessels. The operational 
phase further presents opportunities for suppliers of 
specialized equipment and materials to keep the platform 
operational in the harsh Arctic climate. Lastly, in the 
shutdown phase the platform is terminated and the well is 
sealed. This creates the need for materials and equipment 
to be transported away. In the sensitive Arctic 
environment, there may be need for continuous surveying 
vessels to perform environmental investigations, to 
monitor the environmental impact of the platform. 
 
In addition to the above mentioned maritime activities, the 
extraction and transport of oil and gas creates opportunities 
for sub suppliers not directly involved with drilling. This 
includes the need for emergency response equipment in 
case of both human injuries and environmental accidents, 
such as minor oil spills where “stand-by” vessels 
specialized allow for quick response in the case of 
accidents. The offshore industry also creates opportunities 
for suppliers of general equipment for the cleaning of oil 
spills such as booms and pumps. Ship yards in Denmark 
have the capacities to produce such “stand-by vessels” as 
well as retrofit existing vessels with ice reinforcement and 
general anti-winterization measures.  
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Larger vessels are mostly produced in Asia; however 
several Danish companies are offering designs for ice 
strengthened transport vessels and are providing parts for 
these specialized vessels. Additionally, there are 
opportunities for the Danish sub-suppliers for servicing 
vessels that will be operating around the platform. Finally, 
the risk of drifting ice damaging the drilling platform 
creates a market for support activities such as ice 
surveillance, ice management and icebreaking. 
Experiences from the waters of Greenland has caused the 
Danish suppliers are well equipped to support such 
operations. 
The majority of the off-shoring and tanker potential for the 
Danish maritime industry lies in Norway, Russia and 
Canada. Especially Norway, as several Danish companies 
are already supplying and working closely with the 
Norwegian offshore industry. In both Canada and Russia, 
however, the Danish industry is struggling to get on the 
supply lists of companies planning to extract 
petrochemicals in the Arctic. This is especially apparent 
with the Russian offshore companies where transparency 
is limited and subject to both technical and national 
barriers. 
 
6.2.3 Long term potential 
The major expansion in oil and gas extraction facilities in 
the Arctic has primarily been fueled by the major spike in 
oil prices observed during the last decade. The long term 
development of the Arctic oil and gas fields is therefore 
highly dependent on oil price levels reaching such high 
levels in order to be feasible
15
. The recent reductions in the 
oil price has caused the industry to postpone several of the 
planned projects, as a breakeven oil barrel price of close to 
a hundred USD is required for these projects to operate at 
a profit. Although such a fall in the price of fossil fuels 
severely challenges the development of oil and gas 
reserves due to high production costs, industry officials 
and policy makers expect the oil prices to return to at least 
reach 80 USD per barrel in the decade to come. This is due 
to the rising demand for energy being forecasted to 
continue to increase in the decades to come (Telegraph, 
2015); (Oil Price, 2015); (WSJ, 2015). A rebound of the 
gas price faces more uncertainty, as the introduction of the 
fracking technology has sparked an energy revolution in 
America. A proliferation of the technology or increased 
                                                          
15
 Being substitutable goods, the European prices of oil 
and gas are generally correlated and a reduction in the oil 
price therefore also negatively affects that of price. See 
(Erdös, 2012)  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Projected sources of gas supply by region in 2035 
Source: BP (2015) 
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export may easily lead to lower prices outside of North 
America.   
Regardless of the short term price fluctuations, the 
increased economic activity of the world’s large emerging 
economies has created an ever increasing demand for 
energy. Long term projections by British Petroleum expect 
such a demand to increase by as much as 41 percent 
between 2012 and 2035 with especially gas taking up a  
large amount of the total energy consumption in 2035. 
Figure 6.1 shows the projected sources of gas supply 
measured in billion cubic feet per day, to, Europe and 
China until year 2035. While a majority of gas supplies 
will continue to come from conventional gas sources and 
net pipeline import, a significant increase in projected net 
LNG imports provide opportunities for LNG transport and 
perhaps Arctic shipping as well. By 2035, both Europe and 
China is projected to supply close to 25 percent of their 
gas sources from net LNG import. However, not only 
China, but the East Asia-Pacific markets in general are 
projected experience a large increase in demand for LNG 
in the next two decades. Figure 6.2 illustrates the projected 
global and regional demand for LNG in 2035, clearly 
illustrating a large increase in especially Asian demand. 
With several unstable regimes and areas with armed 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Projected global LNG demand by region 
Source: BP (2015) 
 
 
  
64 
AR
CT
IC
 S
HI
PP
IN
G 
– C
OM
M
ER
CI
AL
 O
PP
OR
TU
NI
TIE
S 
AN
D 
CH
AL
LE
NG
ES
 
 
conflict in the Middle East, potentially causing disruptions 
in the energy supply lines, the Arctic has the potential to 
serve as an important source of oil. This could perhaps be 
of significance to the Arctic liquid bulk industry. 
Especially the Russian Arctic is expected to become a 
major source of oil in the future with the Asian countries 
being well placed to exploit these major gas reserves 
(WSJ, 2014b). 
 
 MINING OPERATIONS AND DRY BULK 6.3
Dry bulk has been operating in the Russian part of the 
Arctic for several decades, and the recent increase in the 
accessibility of the Arctic Ocean has expanded the areas 
where bulk vessels operate. In contrast to the majority of 
the petrochemicals produced in the Arctic being 
transported using an extensive network of pipeline 
systems, the heavy and voluminous minerals mined in the 
Arctic Circle requires transport using either ships or 
railway. Although such mining activities in the Arctic are 
limited, several major mines extracting iron, nickel, zinc 
and copper are present in the vicinity of the either the 
Arctic Ocean or the surrounding seas and rivers. Some of 
these mines are the largest in the world, extracting vast 
amount of ore to be shipped to the global markets. 
Additionally, such mining operations require supplies to 
accommodate the work force and machinery, which is 
often provided using maritime general cargo vessels. 
While most of the Arctic Bulk traffic has been limited to 
transport from mining operations in the Arctic to larger 
ports located in ice free waters such as Murmansk, several 
successful transits over the NSR has been reported in 
recent years. Similar to the bulk sector, close to all of the 
Arctic bulk shipping activities are located north of Russia.   
 They are also primarily executed by Russian shipping 
companies like Sovcomflot, the Murmansk Shipping 
Company and Norilsk Nickel. One of the non-Russian 
companies having completed several bulk transits using is 
the pioneering Danish company Nordic Bulk Carriers. 
They specialize in transporting of dry bulk cargo in the 
Arctic, operating an expanding fleet of ice classed bulk 
carriers. They have successfully completed several 
voyages along the NSR, and were the first company in 
history to successfully transit the NWP for commercial 
means in 2012. From 2012 to 2013 Nordic Bulk completed 
12 transits along the NSR, transporting iron ore from 
Murmansk to the Chinese cities of Qingdao and Huangua. 
They have also transported coal between Vancouver and 
Hamburg, while also backhauling through the Arctic 
(NSRA, 2015). Further the Nordic Bulk ore carrier 
“Nordic Oshima” measuring 76,180 DWT was the single 
largest vessel to transit the NSR during the 2014 
navigation season (ibid.). 
 
6.3.1 Present and future Arctic mining operations 
While companies such as Nordic Bulk have mostly been 
transferring cargo through the Arctic, several large scale 
mining projects are currently in operation or in the 
planning phase creating commercial opportunities for the 
maritime sector. This part introduces some of the present 
and future mining operations, with opportunities for Arctic 
bulk shipping.     
 
Russia: Mining operations have been active in the Russian 
part of the Arctic for decades, with the vast area in 
northern Russia holding an abundance of mineral 
resources. At present approximately 25 mines are in 
operation in the Russian part of the Arctic. Several of these 
mines are extracting precious mineral mines, thus 
requiring none or very few shipments (Emmerson & Lahn, 
2012). The two major clusters of mining operations in the 
Russian Arctic are located on the Kola Peninsula and the 
central Siberian Plain near the Yenisei River. Murmansk 
serves as the regional hub for the maritime shipments of 
Bulk cargos from both these clusters. Most of the cargo 
leaving the port of Murmansk is shipped west through the 
ice free waters of the Barents Sea, but several shipments 
have also been transported to East Asia along the NSR. 
The Norilsk Nickel Company operates several mining 
facilities on the remote Central Siberian Plain and the 
Taimyr Peninsula both located near the Yenisei River. 
This river provides access to the NSR, as it runs into the 
Kara Sea allowing direct transit. The yearly nickel and 
copper output from the Central Siberian mines, is close to 
500 thousand tons. The material extracted is shipped 
directly from the port of Dudinka at the Yenisei River to 
the port of Rotterdam, Hamburg and Shanghai during the 
NSR navigation season. When the navigation season is 
closed, a fleet owned by the Norilsk Nickel Company 
transfers material between Dudinka and Murmansk. These 
vessels are classified as ice reinforced Artic Class 7, with a 
potential to break through ice up to 1.5 meters thickness. 
This allows the vessels to operate even when the 
navigation season is closed, without requiring icebreaker 
assistance (Telegraph, 2012).  
 
Scandinavia: Further west, in Arctic Scandinavia, several 
large scale iron ore mines relevant for bulk shipping are 
currently in operation. Reopened in 2009, the Sydvaranger 
mine in the extreme northeast of Norway is connected to 
the port at Kirkenes, allowing iron ore to be shipped to the 
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worlds markets via the Barents Sea. Two of the largest 
iron ore mines in the world are located in Northern 
Sweden, Malmbjerget and Kiruna. They are connected to 
the sea by rail to the Norwegian port of Narvik, which has 
the capacity to export close to 20 million tons of ore 
annually to the European and Asian markets (LKAB, 
2015). Although a large quantity of ore is being shipped 
from Scandinavia each year, the waters around these ports 
are primarily ice free throughout the year. Therefore 
opportunities for Arctic shipping are mainly conceived 
with shipments traversing the NSR. 
 
Greenland: There are currently no active mining 
operations in Greenland, but large mineral deposits have 
been discovered recently. The government has thus 
actively been promoting mining operations, resulting in 
several planned mining projects. Several of these mineral 
deposits are projected to hold large reserves of the highly 
value rare earth minerals, which are currently produced 
under a Chinese monopoly. The Kvanefjeld project in the 
southern part of Greenland is estimated to host an 
abundance of rare earth minerals and uranium deposits. 
Greenland Minerals and Mining LTD expect to start 
construction of the mine as soon as the last permits have 
been granted. Being situated relatively south in Greenland, 
ice conditions are generally mild and the company plans to 
use the deep fjords around the area to ship the minerals 
directly to processing plants during the entire year 
(GMEE, 2014). The same favorable transport conditions 
apply to the TANBREEZ rare earth mineral mine, 
currently in the planning phase, situated near the port of 
Qaqortoq in sourthern Greenland. TANBREEZ, the 
company behind the project, is currently engaging in 
negotiations with the Greenlandic government and projects 
to mine 500 thousand tons of ore per annum initially, 
increasing to 1.5 million tons later (TANBREEZ, 2015). 
Further, the Chinese company General Nice has recently 
bought the rights the extract iron ore from the Isua field, 
which is expected to hold 1.1 billion tons of iron ore. The 
mine will be located just north of the Greenlandic capital 
of Nuuk and 110 km away from a proposed deep water 
harbor, from where the ore will be exported to foreign 
customers. Other projects where feasibility studies are 
currently being performed include the large scale mining 
projects in Northern Greenland by the company Iron Bark 
Zinc Ltd. These project proposals include mines at 
Citronen Fjord and Washington Land, both locations rich 
in reserves of zinc and lead. They are located in the 
northern remote part of Greenland, in the vicinity of the 
Arctic Ocean (Ironbark, 2013). The near permanent ice 
conditions in the waters of northern Greenland poses large 
challenges for further development of these mines and a 
reduction in the ice cover is therefore required for the 
projects to become economically feasible.  
 
Canada and the US: Underneath the North American 
Arctic projections show an abundance of various mineral 
resources, with both Canada and the US already being 
amongst the largest mining nations in the world. Canada 
hosts approximately 800 active mining operations, 
although few of these mines are located in the Arctic. 
Several of these mining activities are related to the 
extraction of gold, diamonds and uranium. These resources 
require a limited need for shipping activities due to their 
attributes, and most of the resources extracted in the North 
American Artic generally serve domestic needs (Østreng, 
et al., 2013). The largest mine currently operating in the 
American Arctic is the Red Dog mine located in 
Northwestern Alaska near the Chukchi Sea. This mine is 
amongst the world’s largest zinc mines, and due to its 
remote location, requires ships to transport the ore away 
from the mine. The mine hosts its own port facilities, 
where the zinc is stored during the winter while ice 
conditions are severe (NANA, 2009). After the closure of 
several mines in Nunavut and the Northwest territories, 
there are no active mining activities in the Canadian Arctic 
involving shipping. Only the Raglan Nickel mine in the 
low Arctic part of Quebec has a modest seaborne 
transportation need. The ore is shipped south to Quebec 
City, via Deception bay, using in only 4-5 trips per season 
(CASA, 2007). Future development in the North American 
Arctic include the massive Mary River iron ore project on 
Baffin Island, currently under development and expected 
to be operational by 2020. Baffinland, the company behind 
the project, expects the annual production to be 3.5 million 
tons increasing to 21.5 million tons annually by 2020. 
They are currently developing port facilities at Milne Inlet 
north of the mine (Baffinland, 2015). From the Milne Port, 
Baffinland plans to use bulk carriers to transport between 
70 and 90 thousand tons of ore per transit, expecting to use 
more than 50 ships during the summer navigation season. 
This will drastically increase the traffic in the waters of the 
NWP (CBC, 2014).  
The company MMG minerals, a subsidiary of the Chinese 
Minmetals Resources Ltd., have proposed a major mining 
project in the IZOK corridor in northern part of Nunavut 
Canada. The project will consist of several mines being 
connected by road to a planned port on the southern coast 
of Coronation bay, located along the NWP (MMG, 2015). 
An estimated 650,000 dry metric tons of mineral 
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concentrates will be shipped out each year through the 
port. Minerals will be shipped Europe through the Behring 
Strait using the NWP, and conditions will allow passage to 
East Asia during the summer navigation season. MMG 
estimates that the amount of bulk carriers needed to 
service the mine at peak production must fulfill 16 round 
trips during the 100 – 120 days window of navigation 
(MMG, 2012). As of 2015, MMG is seeking partnerships 
to share the costs of developing port and road 
infrastructure, but it is doubtful if the project will be 
further developed given the current glut in global 
commodity prices.   
 
6.3.2 Opportunities for the Danish Maritime sector 
While destination voyages have the biggest potential for 
mining operations, there is a significant potential for the 
shipping industry in the establishment and termination 
phase of the mine through the transport of equipment and 
supplies to the mining site. The need for transport is 
largest in the operational phase, but specialized transport is 
also required in the phase of establishment and termination 
that can easily be transported over water. This section 
presents the opportunities for the maritime industry in the 
Kingdom of Denmark based on the findings by NIRAS 
(2014). By having a strong presence in the transport of 
bulk destination cargo, several Danish companies have 
established themselves as first movers in the Arctic bulk 
sector. They therefore have an advantage in the form of 
knowledge and equipment, including ice reinforced 
vessels. Especially decades of maritime experiences in 
Greenland navigating ice filled waters, as well as an  
insight into the political processes of the Greenlandic 
mining sector and understanding local challenges. In 
addition to the maritime activities related to the transport 
of bulk cargo and supplies, Arctic mining operations also 
creates possibilities for suppliers to service and repair 
maritime related equipment. Generally, Danish companies 
have a strong position in the areas of ice management, 
yielding opportunities for the mining and bulk industry in 
the Arctic. Ice management include icebreakers and ice 
surveillance, in order to secure ice free passages and 
escorting of transiting vessels. Further there is a need for 
specialized vessels for towing away icebergs, and an 
overall need for experienced ice pilots to man the ships 
operating in Arctic waters. The new-building or retrofitting 
of the ice reinforced bulk fleet may also present 
opportunities for the Danish industry. Specialized vessels 
may be needed to service the mine, and although built in 
Asia, the designing, classifying and certifying of large 
vessels create opportunities for the maritime sector in 
Denmark in their development phase and equipment. Both 
technical barriers and protectionism are seen as major 
challenges for the best utilization of Danish industry 
competencies in the Arctic. The technical barriers consist 
of local design and industrial standards, with several of the 
Arctic states having implemented some form of 
protectionism to support local suppliers. In Canada for 
example, equipment aboard vessels operating in the Arctic 
must have been produced domestically, providing a 
technical hindrance for Danish sub-suppliers. The 
American Jones Act states that all cargo between 
American ports must be transported by US owned vessels, 
with American employees, making it difficult for Danish 
bulk ships to operate in Alaska. Due to the ongoing 
presence in Greenland, Danish companies may leverage 
benefit from the Greenland commodity law. It states that 
companies must be located in Greenland and use 
Greenlandic employees, unless no Greenlandic 
competitive companies exists or no qualified work force is 
available to hire. In similarity with the offshore sector, 
several companies report difficulties in getting on to the 
list of suppliers, at international offerings of international 
companies. Becoming a part of international companies 
supply list is essential for getting a larger presence in the 
sector. This is further exacerbated for mining projects in 
the Russian Arctic, where the industry is worrying that all 
transport will be made by domestic companies, as 
observed in the Russian oil and gas industry. Challenges 
such as these hinder the possibilities for the Danish 
maritime sector and its sub-suppliers. This challenge is 
especially apparent for the smaller companies, which are 
heavily reliant on a fair level of competition. 
 
6.3.3 Long term opportunities 
In the area of Arctic mining operations and dry bulk, the 
long term opportunity is largely dependent on the 
accessibility of mineral deposits and the price of these 
commodities. This is similar to the offshore and liquid 
bulk sector. With the low commodity prices observed 
during the last few years, the development of new mines in 
the Arctic rests on the assumption of an increase in 
demand, and consequently an increase in price. The 
continued melting of the Arctic ice cover may, however, 
increase the number of trans-Arctic dry bulk transports 
using the NSR. This will possibly provide an alternative to 
the contemporary southern routes. The recently established 
Mary River iron ore mine will result in a dramatic increase 
of maritime activity along the waters of the NWP, which 
may also contribute to increased Danish involvement in 
the long term.        
  
67 
AR
CT
IC
 O
FF
SH
OR
IN
G 
AN
D 
BU
LK
 O
PP
OR
TU
NI
TIE
S 
AN
D 
CH
AL
LE
NG
ES
   
 
 
  
68 
AR
CT
IC
 S
HI
PP
IN
G 
– C
OM
M
ER
CI
AL
 O
PP
OR
TU
NI
TIE
S 
AN
D 
CH
AL
LE
NG
ES
 
 
While global warming’s effect on polar ice caps has 
sparked a huge interest in the prospect of using the Arctic 
shipping lanes as international transport corridors, little 
focus has been placed on the Arctic cruise industry. As the 
Arctic ice cover has been receding during the last few 
decades, a significant increase in the number of passengers 
aboard Arctic cruise ships has occurred. This was 
especially apparent between 2003 and 2007, where the 
annual number of passengers traveling to the Arctic aboard 
cruise ships more than doubled (AMSA, 2009), although 
the number of passengers has stabilized during recent 
years (see figures 7.1 to 7.3). The Arctic cruise ships are 
generally small in comparison to the super large luxury 
liners operating on the lower latitudes, carrying between 
50 and 400 passengers on each cruise (ibid.). A majority of 
the Arctic cruises ships navigate the less remote and 
generally ice free waters of Svalbard, the Northern Coast 
of Norway and the west coast of Greenland. However 
some smaller cruise ships have sailed as far as the North 
Pole and the North West Passage (Østreng, et al., 2013). 
Further, most cruise ships do not follow direct routes, but 
often seek more remote locations for wildlife and nature 
viewing purposes, regularly taking them through uncharted 
waters, (Johnston, et al., 2014). 
 
7.1.1 Past cruise shipping activities by area 
The ice free waters of Svalbard and Greenland are the 
primary destination for a majority of the cruise ships.  
Cruise shipping tourist numbers to Svalbard has seen a 
steady increase the last 20 years and peaked in 2012, 
reaching over 40 thousand persons, after a slight decrease 
the previous few years (see figure 7.1). While the number 
of passengers has increased, the total numbers of cruise 
visits have been falling from above 50 tours in 2007 to 38 
tours in 2013. This indicates an increase in the size of the 
visiting cruise ships, with 11 visits of vessels with over 
one thousand passengers in 2012 alone.  
The amount of cruise shipping tourists visiting Greenland 
increased dramatically during the last decade; reaching a  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Number of passengers, crew and visits by 
cruise ships in Svalbard (1997 – 2012)  
Source: Sysselmannen.no 
 
peak of over 30 thousand persons in 2010 (see figure 7.2). 
Especially the west coast of Greenland has seen a surge in 
cruise ship activities. Between 2006 and 2008, the number 
of cruise ship port calls in western Greenland more than 
doubles increasing from 157 to 375 (AMSA, 2009). 
During the three consecutive years however, a reduction in  
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7 THE ARCTIC CRUISE INDUSTRY – 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
LARGE PASSENGER SHIPS ARE INCREASINGLY NAVIGATING THE COASTAL AREAS OF THE 
ARCTIC OCEAN CREATING POSSIBILITIES FOR THE MARTIME CRUISE SECTOR. ICE 
CONDITIONS AND POOR CHARTING POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO TRANSITING VESSELS 
AND THE REMOTENESS OF THE AREA PREVENTS LARGE SCALE RESCUE OPERATIONS IN 
CASE OF ACCIDENTS. THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER AIMS TO DESCRIPE THE POSSIBILITIES AND 
CHALLENGES FOR THE MARITIME CRUISE INDUSTRY IN THE ARCTIC. 
 
   
 
  
69 
TH
E 
AR
CT
IC
 C
RU
IS
E 
IN
DU
ST
RY
 – 
OP
PO
RT
UN
ITI
ES
 A
ND
 C
HA
LL
EN
GE
S 
  
 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Number of
Passengers
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Voyages
Vessels
Figure 7.2: Cruise shipping passengers visiting 
Greenland (2003 – 2013)  
Source: Statistics Greenland 
 
the number of passenger was observed, dropping to 
approximately 21 thousand in 2013. This indicates a 
dampening in the demand for cruise tourism seen in the 
previous years. Since 1990, regularly cruise expeditions to 
the Franz Josef Islands and the North Pole were offered 
with the aid of the nuclear icebreaker “50 let Pobedy” and 
a number of voyages have been made to the Novaya 
Zemlya Islands in the west and Wrangel Island in the East 
(Pashkevich & Stjernström, 2014). Recently, however, the 
Russian provider of icebreaker service, Rosatomflot, 
announced that the “50 Let Pobedy” would be redirected to 
the Northern Sea Route to aid the increasing number of 
transiting merchant vessels after 2015, although this was 
later reversed when the icebreaker “Sovetskiy Soyuz” 
returned from repairs earlier than expected and therefore 
continuing the North Pole cruises until 2018 (BO, 2014a). 
The continuation of the icebreaker escort service to the 
North Pole after 2016 remains unclear but the redirection 
of the icebreaker to the Northern Sea Route will 
effectively ending the prospect of Arctic cruise shipping to 
the ice filled waters of the North Pole.  
Cargo shipping along the North West Passage has been 
limited to community resupply with a few transits; 
however the cruise shipping industry has maintained 
significant presence in the Area. 23 commercial cruise 
ships have navigated the waters of the Canadian Arctic 
between 1984 and 2004 (AMSA, 2009)  At the start of the 
millennia, the number of voyages in the Canadian Arctic 
saw a drastic increase, with 22 planned voyages in 2006 
alone. From 2006 the yearly number of voyages stabilized 
between 23 and 26 annual voyages (Johnston, et al., 2014) 
before falling to 16 voyages in 2011 and 2012 (see figure 
7.3).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Annual number of voyages and vessels 
operating in the Canadian Arctic  
Source: Association of Arctic Cruise Shipping Operators 
 
7.1.2 Arctic cruise shipping challenges 
Although the Arctic cruise-shipping sector has seen an 
increase in recent years, the sector faces a multitude of 
challenges – especially regarding the safety of passengers. 
The Arctic seas and coasts form a hazardous environment, 
and the increase in vessels operating in the Arctic has 
consequently increased the risk of major incidents. The 
nature of these potential incidents faced by cruise ships is 
similar to those of normal cargo vessels, including the risk 
of sinking, groundings pollutions, disabling by collision, 
fire and loss of propulsion (AMSA, 2009). With the 
amount of passengers aboard a cruise ship, however, the 
potential for human casualties from such an incident are 
much greater compared to ordinary merchant vessels. 
Additionally, cruise ships often navigate close to the coast 
and ice edges in order to provide the passengers with 
wildlife viewing opportunities, thereby further increasing 
the risk of groundings and collisions with the ice. So far, 
the Arctic cruise shipping industry has avoided major 
incidents and kept a good human safety profile.  
However several incidents have been reported in recent 
years. In 1996 the cruise ship “Hanseatic” ran aground in 
the Simpson Strait in the Canadian Arctic, severely 
damaging the vessels fuel reservoirs, which lead to all 153 
passengers being evacuated by emergency helicopter. In 
2007, the Canadian cruise ship “MS Explorer” sank 
approximately 20 hours after striking an underwater ice 
formation near the South Shetland Islands in Antarctica. 
All of the 145 passengers and crew were evacuated into 
life boats, being rescued, after several hours in sub-zero 
temperatures, by the Norwegian Cruise ship “Nordnorge” 
also operating in the area (NBC, 2007). Recently, in 2010, 
the vessel Clipper Adventurer ran aground in the 
Coronation Gulf in the North West Passage with 118 
passengers and 69 crew members aboard. It suffered 
serious hull damage, and was rescued by the Canadian 
Coast Guard icebreaker the “Amundsen” which by change 
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was within 500 kilometers of the distressed vessel (Stewart 
& Dawson, 2011). In recent years the cruise ship vessels 
have been reported to travel increasingly further away 
from developed areas. This includes destinations like the 
city of Qaanaaq in northern Greenland and remote areas 
along the waters of the Canadian Arctic – both far away 
from sufficient emergency infrastructure (AMSA, 2009). 
For example, the Canadian Coast Guard estimates a 
response time of 11 hours for ocean going vessels in 
distress in the waters of the Canadian Arctic which may 
easily be too late to prevent human death tolls (Johnston, 
et al., 2014). Further, even if an incident should occur 
within range of such facilities, the sizable amount of 
passengers aboard cruise vessels would strain the already 
limited amount of SAR assets. In addition to the 
limitations in the current infrastructure, international 
regulations governing the Arctic cruise industry are 
lacking, yet improving. In 2014, the IMO agreed to adopt 
the Polar Code, which creates specific requirements in 
terms of construction & design, operations and manning, 
and equipment, for vessels operating in the two Polar 
areas. Set to enter force in 2017, the Polar Code will be 
mandatory under the SOLAS and MARPOL conventions.  
Cruise shipping in the Arctic share many of the challenges 
also faced by bulk and tanker shipping, however important 
differences do exist, resulting in the need for a focused and 
more appropriate management regime in the future 
(Johnston, et al., 2014). The significant gaps in the 
regulation of the Arctic cruise industry has resulted in 
several of the cruise ships lacking sufficient ice 
classification, making them even more vulnerable to 
collisions with floating ice. Of the 88 cruise ships 
introduced on the world market between 2000 and 2008, 
only a small fraction is constructed to operate in Arctic 
conditions. With further growth of the industry, some of 
these vessels may be relocated to Arctic waters (AMSA, 
2009). As a result of the limited international regulation of 
the sector, several cruise shipping operators have sought to 
reduce the risk of human casualties, in case of incidents 
through networks of industry self – regulations and official 
guidelines such as the IMO’s “Guidance for passenger 
ships operating in areas remote from SAR facilities” 
(OECD, 2008). An example of an industry self-governing 
initiatives is the Association of Arctic Expeditions Cruise 
Shipping Operators (AECO) for cruise operators 
navigating the waters of Svalbard, Jan Mayen and 
Greenland. They aim to provide guidelines “to ensure that 
cruise tourism in the Arctic is carried out with the utmost 
consideration of natural environment, local cultures, as 
well as challenging safety hazards at sea and on land” 
(AECO, 2014). Additionally some cruise operators 
incorporate a policy of sailing in pairs when venturing 
deep into remote Arctic territories. It was a result of this 
“twinning” policy that the vessel “Nordnorge” was able to 
safely rescue the crew and passengers from the MS 
explorer in a remote Antarctic region (Johnston, et al., 
2014). Although such official guidelines and self-
regulatory measures have been established, the guidelines 
are not compulsory and opportunistic cruise ship operators 
are still able to provide voyages, with an unnecessary high 
degree of risk. 
 
7.1.3 Possibilities for the Danish maritime industry 
While a further expansion in Arctic cruise shipping will 
create opportunities for the maritime sector in general, the 
Kingdom of Denmark has no cruise shipping industry and 
the main beneficiaries are therefore likely to be the 
countries with such an industry (NIRAS, 2014). An 
increase in the number of Arctic cruise tourists may, 
however, create opportunities for the Danish industry not 
directly related to cruise shipping – especially around 
Greenland. These include the development of a service and 
experience industry for passengers aboard the numerous 
cruise ships arriving at Greenland, such as whale safari, 
sea fishing and trips to smaller fjords. Further, the large 
number of passengers aboard cruise vessels results in a 
high potential for producers of safety equipment as well as 
specialized stand-by ships in case of emergency (ibid.).     
The current infrastructure to support cruise tourism is 
insufficient and the ports are generally too small to support 
the large vessels. Therefore significant investments are 
required for the Arctic cruise shipping industry to compete 
with contemporary destinations. Due to the inadequate 
experience of the industry to support cruise tourism within 
the Kingdom of Denmark, developing such experience and 
infrastructure capabilities may not prove feasible for the 
industry, given the limited size of the Arctic cruise 
shipping sector (ibid.). 
 
7.1.4 Arctic cruise tourism: Overrated? 
A further expansion of the number of companies offering 
cruises to the Arctic primarily depends on the demand for 
this form of adventure, as well as the future of 
development of the Arctic sea ice. The future level of 
regulations concerning Arctic shipping and passenger 
ships in particular, however, also play a role for the 
development of the industry. With the limited set of 
regulations currently active, cruise ship owners are able to 
easily divert open water vessels to arctic routes, allowing 
the industry easily to expand the number of voyages 
during the navigation season. However, a tightening of 
these regulations may easily result in some of the cruise 
ships being ineligible to operate in ice filled waters. The 
Arctic cruise industry has seen an increase in the number 
of passengers during the last decade, but has recently 
stagnated. A significant drop in the number of passengers 
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visiting Greenland has especially been observed. During 
the dramatic increase in the amount of Arctic cruises in the 
middle of the last decade, the industry was optimistic and 
projected further expansions in both the number of 
passengers and vessels visiting the Arctic. According to 
AMSA (2009) the cruise ship industry considers the Arctic 
voyages to be an important and profitable service. In 2008 
the prices for an Arctic voyage was priced between 2,900 
and up to 55,000 USD per ticket. The cruise shipping 
industry has indicated that it intends to expand its activities 
in the Arctic, by increasing the amount of destinations, 
passengers and the season of operation (AMSA, 2009). 
Additionally, Wergeland (2013) argues that the Arctic 
cruise shipping tourism has great potential, but notes that 
the market for Arctic cruises still is a niche market 
compared to the large tourist destinations such as the 
Caribbean and the Mediterranean. The same conclusion 
was reached at a recent conference held in Ottawa, 
Canada, linked to the Arctic Council, where it was 
established that the Arctic cruise industry did not have the 
same potential as the Caribbean and Mediterranean  
(Shipping Watch, 2014c).  
Based on the statistics presented by AECO at the 
conference, it was further established that the growth 
presented by the medias and analysts was highly 
exaggerated compared to reality (ibid.). Although different 
scholars project both positive and negative future scenarios 
for the Arctic cruise industry, a further reduction in the 
Arctic ice cover will allow higher accessibility for the 
industry, potentially increasing the number of annual 
voyages and destinations possible. The activity seen in the 
past years indicate that the industry maintains an Arctic 
presence although passenger numbers are still insignificant 
compared to non-Arctic cruise shipping and it remains to 
be seen if the industry will expand beyond the level 
observed during the last decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris 
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The increasing accessibility of the Arctic Ocean, and the 
corresponding increase in maritime activities, has created a 
market for several companies in the maritime sector within 
the Kingdom of Denmark. Several of these companies are 
in a good position to benefit from the increased 
development, as the Danish fleet has a significant global 
and arctic regional presence, some already operating 
around Greenland providing a unique base of experience. 
A majority of the maritime companies of the Kingdom of 
Denmark are not engaged in activities related to the Arctic 
at present. Companies engaged in the Arctic, only see a 
modest contribution to the total company production, 
around ten percent. For a few companies Arctic activities 
provide the bulk of the operations, especially in the waters 
around Greenland. This chapter will introduce the 
possibilities and challenges for the different sectors and 
subsectors of the Danish maritime industry, mainly 
reviewing the findings of NIRAS (2014). The subsectors 
are those of the sea transport, the area of alertness, towing, 
salvage, maritime service, communication, surveillance, 
emergency equipment and finally maritime design.  
 
8.1.1 Sea Transport 
Of the five different sectors formulated by NIRAS (2014), 
sea transport holds the greatest potential for the Danish 
maritime industry. The opportunities for sea transport are 
linked to the transit and destination voyages with oil, gas, 
minerals and even container logistics – if the Arctic sea ice 
continues to decline at the current rate. Additionally, 
opportunities are linked to supply activities to resource 
extraction sites. Shipping companies based in Denmark 
operate a large and world spanning fleet, with several of 
these being ice reinforced and active in the Arctic.  
Sea transport companies located in the Kingdom of 
Denmark already operating in the Arctic are Norden A/S, 
Royal Arctic Line and Nordic Bulk. 
  
 DS Norden is currently transporting coal from the 
Svea Nord mine located in Svalbard. 
 Nordic Bulk uses a model of sailing through the 
Arctic shipping routes during summer while 
operating in other ice infested waters when the 
navigation season ends in the high Arctic.  
 Royal Arctic Lines transport cargo between the 
settlements in Greenland but also has operation 
near Antarctica during the winter on the northern 
hemisphere.   
Further, companies currently operating logistics and 
supply services in the Arctic include Royal Arctic Line, 
arctic Base Supply, Martek and Blue Water Shipping.  
However, a majority of the companies in the sector of 
maritime traffic located in the Kingdom of Denmark are 
currently not actively engaged in Arctic activities. These 
include most of the major shipping firms such as Maersk, 
Torm, J. Lauritzen A/S and DFDS. 
   
8.1.2 Alertness, towing and salvage 
In the areas of alertness, towing and salvage, companies 
within the Kingdom of Denmark are experienced in all of 
these services. The area of ice-management provides a lot 
of possibilities around resource extraction sites, such as 
general ice surveillance, icebreaker assistance and towing 
away drifting icebergs. Viking supply ships are a 
significant actor within this industry, currently active in 
Russia, Canada and the Baltic Sea. Smaller companies are 
also able to leverage their experience, like Greenland 
Maritime Solutions, offering consulting in areas of ice-
management.  
Towing boat assistance, support vessels and ice-
management activities have a large arctic potential as a 
consequence of an increase in mining, offshoring and an 
increase in seaborne traffic. Towing boats are currently 
operated by Svitzer and Viking Supply Ships. Esvagt is 
another example of a Danish company delivering support 
vessels and stand by vessels to offshore activities around 
Greenland.  
The environmental challenges derived by the offshoring 
and mining sectors in the sensitive Arctic environment 
have increased the need for environmental alertness. 
Growth in the environmental focus has meant that 
emergency response assets have been relocated to the 
Arctic, especially Greenland. Greenland Oil Response is a 
company owned by the Greenlandic government, while 
Esvagt also offers oil spill response services. 
 
8 THE POTENTIAL FOR SUPPLIERS 
AND SUB-INDUSTRIES 
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8.1.3 Maritime Service 
The growing maritime activities in the Arctic can cause an 
increase in demand for the maritime sector in the areas of 
vessel servicing, supervision and maintenance. On 
Greenland and on the Faroe Islands lies the Nuuk Værft 
and MEST shipyard are able to provide services. While in 
Denmark lays Karstensens shipyard, Vestergaard maritime 
service and Orskov Group - all yards capable of servicing 
and repairing vessels operating in the Arctic. Additionally 
maritime servicing includes the approval and classification 
of ships, arctic classification focusing on ice 
reinforcement, equipment, safety and crew. DNV GL is a 
major company performing classifications on ships and 
currently holds a large share of classifications for vessels 
operating in the Arctic.    
 
8.1.4 Communication, surveillance and safety equipment 
In order to ensure the safe operations in the Arctic, 
sufficient communication, surveillance and emergency 
equipment must be ensured for vessels and platforms 
operating in the arctic waters. This creates opportunities 
for suppliers to provide companies operating in the Arctic 
with specialized safety equipment adapted to the 
environment. Viking Lifesaving Equipment and Harding 
are presently amongst the largest companies in supplying 
maritime safety products, both offering special products 
for ice filled waters. Cobham Satcom and Lyngsø Marine 
are both Danish suppliers of navigation and 
communication equipment.  
 
8.1.5 Maritime Design 
Arctic conditions require specialized ships and platforms, 
able to withstand the sea ice and sub-zero temperatures. 
This creates significant possibilities for shipyards and 
engineer design companies within the Kingdom of 
Denmark. Although the building of ships have moved to 
Asia in the last decades, a niche for building, retrofitting 
and designing specialized vessels, is still present. This is 
noticeable with standby vessels to the offshore industry 
and smaller ice reinforced bulk and freight ships. 
Karstensens Shipyard is an example of a yard producing 
such specialized vessels. Both OSK-Shiptech and Odense 
Maritime Technology are two firms designing ice 
reinforcement retrofits and special purpose vessels with ice 
reinforcement, produced on a licence throughout the 
world.  
Further there is a considerable potential for suppliers of 
equipment and knowledge to shipyards retrofitting and 
building new vessels capable of operating in the Arctic. 
Amongst these is Hempel, which produces specialized 
paint for operations in the icy waters. Odense Maritime 
Technology has developed and designed propellers for 
ships navigating the Arctic, where efficiency and strength 
are optimized for the conditions. Further, DESMI produces 
pump and cooling systems for the off-shore industry. 
These systems are as also relevant for environmental 
accidental equipment, such as containment booms for the 
management of oil-spills.  
 
8.1.6 Challenges 
Suppliers and companies in the Kingdom of Denmark also 
face numerous challenges in entering the Arctic Maritime 
industry – especially in relation to activities such as 
resource extraction operations. The suppliers and shipping 
companies in the maritime sector have a severe lack of 
competent experience in the Arctic environment. These 
competences range from navigation in ice filled waters, to 
how material and supplies are affected by Arctic weather 
conditions and how to properly adapt to the safety 
standards of the Polar Code. This lack of knowledge and 
expertise translates into difficulties in establishing a 
presence in the Arctic maritime sector. Companies may 
face difficulties defining what factors need to be taking 
into consideration, and where to obtain such information. 
Further, the costs derived from entering the Arctic market 
are often significant, due to vessels requiring ice 
reinforcement and specialized equipment such as anti-
winterization measures, facilities for securing sufficient 
communication and lifesaving equipment. Lastly, entering 
non-European Union markets may provide a challenge for 
companies of a limited size. Such challenges can be a 
product of both national requirements of local production 
or employment or technical barriers. These barriers are 
especially apparent in the sectors of oil, mining and gas 
extraction, where Danish companies have difficulties 
being considered as sub suppliers by the major foreign 
resource extraction companies. 
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Historically, the world seas have been difficult to regulate, 
with a basic tension between regulation and freedom 
presiding in all arguments of how to operationalize the sea. 
The first global maritime regimes were based on the notion 
of “Freedom of the seas” from the 17th century. Defined by 
the Dutch jurist and philosopher Hugo Grotius, it argues 
that the sea is international territory and should allow free 
seafaring trade without any restrictions. The counter 
argument, as presented by the Portuguese Serafim de 
Freitas, claimed that the sea should be controlled by states 
in 1625. This notion was a Portuguese claim to the sole 
rights for all trade with the East Indies (Vieira, 2003). 
 
Understanding the basics of the international historic 
tensions in regulation is important to understand the 
relevant governance structures in the Arctic. Arctic 
governance is created by each of the Arctic regimes 
operating within their own sphere of legitimacy, due to the 
differences in scope and mandates (Stokke, 2013). The 
first ratified global maritime regulation was the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Convention (LOS Convention, 
also known as UNCLOS). This treaty defines the territorial 
boundaries of states and as a build in mechanism for 
settling territorial disputes. This function is highly 
important for resource extraction industries, as it defines 
the jurisdiction of the Arctic states. The other global 
mandated organization relevant for this case is the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), which in 2014 
ratified the Polar Code. This code prescribes minimum 
operational principles for vessels in the polar waters, given 
the challenges of drift ice and waters being mostly 
uncharted. On the regional basis, the Arctic Council 
maintains a privileged position as the coordinating forum 
for Arctic states. It advises on different regional issues 
with a vast range of stakeholders involved in the process. 
Work by the Arctic Council will be presented to illustrate 
the future trajectory of Arctic governance, considering the 
environmental impact and optimal utilization.  
 
 UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA 9.1
In 1702, territorial waters were defined as a three nautical 
mile belt around the states coastline. The range of cannons 
defined this limit, as states could protect their claimed 
territory (Vieira, 2003). Many maritime nations claimed 
that the three-mile belt was insufficient due to concerns of 
pollution, exhaustion of fish livestock and protection of 
other seabed resources. The first international challenge of 
“freedom of the seas” was presented in 1945 by the US, 
claiming jurisdiction over their continental shelf to protect 
their natural resources. Many nations made territorial 
claims following this, creating international tension 
between many neighboring countries (United Nations, 
2012). 
 
As a result of the rising tensions, UNCLOS was created in 
1958 as a convention to clearly define states territorial 
boundaries. UNCLOS lead to four conventions concerning 
issues of territorial disputes: Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 
and finally the Continental Shelf. However, this version of 
UNCLOS was not able to handle the swift technological 
advances in resource collection of the 20
th
 century or the 
political tensions between Eastern and Western 
Superpowers. A re-negotiation of UNCLOS was done in 
1960, which failed to achieve majority support (United 
Nations, 2012). 
 
In 1967, Malta’s Ambassador to the United Nations again 
raised concerns of the tensions of super-powers rivalry, 
9 ARCTIC GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
POLITICAL STRUCTURES ARE EMERGING ALONGSIDE THE INCREASING ECONOMIC INTEREST 
IN THE HIGH ARCTIC. TO NAVIGATE THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE, STAKEHOLDERS ACTIVE 
IN THE ARCTIC MUST UNDERSTAND HOW THE DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
CREATE THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK. THIS SECTION SEEKS TO PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE PROCESS LEADING TO INSTITUTIONS CREATION, CURRENT INTERNATIOANL 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIER. 
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pollution and the instability created by seabed disputes. He 
called for "an effective international regime over the 
seabed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly defined 
national jurisdiction. (…) It is the only alternative by 
which we can hope to avoid the escalating tension that will 
be inevitable if the present situation is allowed to 
continue" (United Nations, 1967). 
 
The issue of seabed regulation resulted in a re-negotiation 
of UNCLOS, creating a stable international process and a 
dispute settlement mechanism. The third UNCLOS 
convention was adopted in 1982 after nine years of 
negotiation, revision and consolidation of earlier 
conventions. Described by the then UN Secretary General 
as possibly the most significant legal instrument of the 
century, UNCLOS III came into force in 1994. The 
convention became the first real basis for creating stable 
governance of the sea, containing characteristics of 
maritime operations and definition of states boundaries  
(United Nations, 2012). 
 
LOS is at this moment the only accepted international 
convention to define sovereign rights of coastal states, 
defined by Part II of LOS. It defines different zones off the 
coast, each with different rights for national states over the 
waters. Article 3 in the Convention defines the territorial 
sea to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of the countries 
coastline, which gives the state full utilization of all 
resources and the right to regulate any matters deemed 
necessary. Article 33 on contiguous zones, allows states to 
extend customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulation 
to a reach of 24 nautical miles (UNCLOS, part II). 
 
Due to major gas and oil reserves, the legal debate in the 
Arctic is concerned with the right to extract resources 
further than the 24 nm offshore. LOS convention provides 
provisions of to define the Exclusive Economic Zone. 
These zones allow costal states to claim the sovereign right 
to explore and exploit natural resources. The Exclusive 
Economic Zone can range up to 200 nautical miles from 
the baseline (UNCLOS, Article 57). 
 
Coastal states around the Arctic can claim an extended 
sovereignty of the underwater continental shelfs that are 
seen as a natural prolongation of their territory. The claim 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline is possible if 
the shelf can be defined as a natural prolongation of the 
land territory (UNCLOS, part VI).  
 
9.1.1 Arctic Territorial Disputes  
The Danish territorial claims are a potent topic in the arctic 
due to the wide scope of the claim. Denmark has claimed 
the territory around the Lomonosov ridge, as it is 
determined to be a natural prolongation of Greenland. The 
claim overlaps with large parts of the Russian claim, as 
Russia also considers the Lomonosov ridge as a 
prolongation originating from the Russian coast. The 
Danish claim also challenges some parts of the Canadian 
claim. Major overlaps are primarily observed between 
these three countries, leading to a lengthy process to assess 
sovereign rights (Durham University, 2015). 
 
In 2008, the five Artic coastal states signed the Ilulissat 
Declaration of Arctic Commitment, agreeing to use the 
existing multilateral bodies in the Arctic. The declaration 
established that the states would follow the legal 
framework of UNCLOS to settle overlapping territorial 
claims (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). The Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) will provide 
their recommendation on claims in the Arctic, as mandated 
in section 5 of UNCLOS. The verdict is to be used as 
foundation for future bilateral negotiations between the 
coastal states (Nyeng, 2015). 
 
Jørgen Staun from the Danish Defense Academy asserts 
that Arctic states will continue to have a cooperative 
approach to the maritime disputes, due to overall long-
term interest in the geopolitical arena. The Russian 
motivation for Arctic development is the economic fortune 
of resources in the Arctic, which they cannot extract 
without Western know-how. Staun points out that 
especially Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov has been 
important for Russian Arctic policy, being a proponent of 
multilateralism and a supporter of the Arctic Council. This 
allows for a peaceful rhetoric to achieve results in the 
Arctic (Nyeng, 2015). The revenue related to Arctic 
activities have a large financial potential for all Arctic 
states, as territorial boundaries will determine countries 
rights for extraction of resources. For firms, the territorial 
dispute thus defines the legal framework the corporations 
act within.  
 
 GLOBAL VESSEL MANDATE: THE 9.2
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION  
The LOS convention defines borders of states in the sea, 
and in the creation of this it was acknowledged that sea 
borders should have a minimal discriminatory effect on 
ships. This is important due to strategic waterways, where 
some states alter the right of innocent passage. To provide 
uniform standards for shipping, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) is the only global institution with a 
mandate to create minimum standards for sea operations. 
With the declining ice coverage, new water ways are being 
opened up to allow vessels to transit the risky Arctic 
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waters. The IMO is therefore an important institution in 
establishing how vessels should operate in these waters, 
using its ability of knowledge-building and norm-
development around shipping (Stokke, 2013). 
 
IMO was founded as the competent UN agency in 1948. 
Article 1 of the IMO gives the organization legitimacy to 
provide cooperation among governments, regarding the 
regulation and technical matters affecting international 
maritime activities. This covers safety issues, navigation, 
and the prevention of maritime pollution from vessels. On 
top of this, the organization is also a framework for legal 
and administrative matters relating to this (IMO, 2015). 
The three important global conventions being: The 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), the International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers 
(STCW) and the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) (IMO, 
2015). 
 
Building on their global expertise and mandate, the IMO 
has developed the Polar code, codifying aspects of polar 
vessel operations to reduce crew and environmental risk. It 
provides specific requirements to vessels, such as design, 
construction, equipment, operations and crew training. The 
polar code has been amended into SOLAS in November 
2014, and environmental amendments to MARPOL were 
adopted in May 2015 (IMO, 2015). 
 
Equipment requirements include protective clothing for all 
persons on board, ice removal kits, and a list of devices 
adapted for the harsh climate. This spills over into the 
design and construction, classifying ships into three 
categories of ice class: medium fist-year ice, thin first-year 
ice and open-water conditions less severe. This sets 
requirements to the materials used, as they must be 
suitable for Arctic operations, and the overall design to 
efficiently navigate through ice. Lastly, the operations and 
manning section sets requirements in the navigational 
information ships must obtain and what crew training is 
required for operations. The date of entry for the Polar 
Code is expected to be 1 January 2017, where ships 
constructed before date of entry will be forced to comply 
at first investigation after 1 January 2018 (IMO, 2015). 
 
The implication of the Polar Code for Arctic vessels is a 
wave of retrofitting and upgrading, necessary to comply 
with the new requirements. The cruise industry will be 
impacted by these rules, due to the extension of the 
clothing requirements for all persons on board. Ice class 
strengthening retrofitting will also rise, as there is now one 
regional code for all operators to follow. Indirectly it will 
therefore impact resource extraction operations, potentially 
increasing operational costs (IMO, 2015). 
 
The current conditions for Arctic operations vary slightly 
with the Canadian and Russian icebreaker classifications. 
Article 234 in UNCLOS allows states to adopt non-
discriminatory laws and regulation for vessel navigation in 
ice-covered areas. Thus, the question arises for Arctic 
shipping: Should the new waterways be considered to be 
under costal sovereignty (suggested by Canada and 
Russia) or as international navigation waterways? The 
Polar code provides a minimum standard, and the question 
remains how it will be implemented. 
  
 REGIONAL FORUM: ARCTIC COUNCIL 9.3
The first article in the founding declaration of the Arctic 
Council defines the role as supporting sustainable 
development of the Arctic by focusing on environmental 
impact, economic development and social well-being of 
native inhabitants (Artic Council , 1996). Established in 
1996, the Arctic Council was the first multilateral forum 
for Arctic states established by Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the 
United States of America. 
 
The Arctic Council was founded as a knowledge-building 
institution for publishing results and recommendations 
related to the multiple challenges of the region. A more 
elaborate commitment to the Arctic Council could not be 
agreed upon due to the differences observed between states 
in the area of military security. As Stokke observes, the 
Arctic Council was founded to rebuild trust between Cold-
war enemies in the High Arctic. As a knowledge-building 
institution, the results produced are purely scientific, 
which provides the institution with a high degree of 
legitimacy and credibility. Over time the Arctic Council 
has become the dominant forum for Arctic 
recommendations (Stokke, 2013). 
 
The primary stakeholders in the Arctic Council are Arctic 
countries, followed by the permanent participants and 
observers. States and participants are active stakeholders 
providing in the council, providing inputs when topics are 
within their domain. A series of specialized working 
groups support the process of the council, producing inputs 
between the state-level meetings. 
 
The Arctic states have a permanent membership and every 
two years the chairmanship rotates between the seven 
states. The responsibility of the chairmanship is hosting 
high-level meetings between Senior Arctic officials, and 
determining the goal for their respective chairmanship. 
This allows the different Arctic countries to direct the 
  
77 
AR
CT
IC
 G
OV
ER
NA
NC
E 
ST
RU
CT
UR
ES
   
 
focus of the Arctic Council over time, like the current US 
chairmanship being very explicit on reducing the impact of 
black carbon particles (Rosen, 2015). To include all 
stakeholders, the Arctic indigenous groups have a 
privileged position as a permanent participant, allowing for 
consultation with these representatives in matters that are 
relevant (Artic Council , 1996). 
 
Article Three in the declaration provides the right for 
external parties to contribute to the Arctic Councils work, 
given their expertise and knowledge relevant for the 
council’s work. This includes non-Arctic states, inter-
governmental or non-governmental organizations (Artic 
Council , 1996). Currently the twelve non-Arctic states 
with observer status are diverse, but can be classified into 
an Asian and European cluster. Intergovernmental 
organizations include: United Nation programs, 
environmental focus commissions, and other ministerial  
institutions. Notably the European Union is applying to 
obtain observer status, however they have not been 
approved by all permanent members yet. The last grouping 
of NGO observers consists of three segments: scientific, 
environmental and social focus areas (Arctic council, 
2011). 
 
9.3.1 Structure and Agreements of the Arctic Council 
The Arctic states meet in regular intervals to provide 
inputs to the topics worked with, allocating responsibilities 
to six working groups. The permanent participants and 
observers are also presented in this process, allowed to 
monitor the process. Each of the working groups has a 
specific operational mandate, each with their own 
chairman and management board. They include a 
multitude of stakeholders, but primarily representatives 
from relevant government agencies of Arctic Council 
member states and permanent participants. If deemed an 
asset observer, states and organizations are also allowed to 
attend, and working groups might invite external experts. 
The mandates of the respective working groups can be 
found in the ministerial declaration, a product of the 
ministerial meetings. The six working groups are: Arctic 
Contaminants Action Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Program (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic 
Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR), Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) and Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG) (Arctic Council , 
2015). 
 
The Arctic Council working groups have produced several 
papers and recommendations since its establishment, like  
the AMSA shipping report. Currently, the Arctic Council’s 
working groups have developed two binding treaties, 
ratified by the Arctic states. The first agreement was the 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue agreement, 
which clearly defines SAR responsibilities for the Arctic 
states. This provides more stability for stakeholder 
operations within the Arctic, as these responsibilities have 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Structure of the Arctic Council  
(Arctic Council , 2015) 
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been allocated to the different states. It was created in 
2009, by a task force under “Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response” (EPPR), as a result of the 
ministerial meeting declaration in Tromsø (Farré, et al., 
2014). 
 
The second agreement was signed in 2011, dealing with 
Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic. Like the SAR agreement, this 
agreement mandates areas for Arctic states related to 
solving potential oil pollution incidents. It clearly 
mandates monitoring of waters, notification of oil spills 
and the financial implications of oil spill cleanups. Due to 
the very delicate environment of the Arctic, this 
convention is crucial for the future protection of Arctic 
wildlife (Arctic Council, 2015). 
  FUTURE ARTIC COOPERATION 9.4
Multiple considerations have to be made when evaluating 
how Arctic states will cooperate in the future. In 2007, 
PAME was tasked with identifying future uncertainties in 
the Arctic future operations. Using scenario planning, they 
produced a report covering Scenarios on the Future of 
Arctic Marine Navigation in 2050. Inherent to scenario 
planning, a multitude of stakeholders were included to 
create the report, to capture the complexity of the Arctic 
environment (PAME, 2007). 
 
The projected resulted in four narratives of the future, 
around a binary combination of the two uncertainties. 
These uncertainties are hard to predict and have a high 
impact on the future for Arctic operations. These 
uncertainties are then combined with what the literature 
defines as predetermineds, i.e. elements that are 
 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
(Arctic Council, 2009) 
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predictable, common to all narratives, and with a high 
impact on the future. Scenario planning is useful due to the 
articulation of four plausible scenarios, brainstorming and 
defining aspects that might not be obvious to the 
participants in the start (Hitt, et al., 1998 ). 
 
The first uncertainty defined was governance stability in 
the Arctic (PAME, 2007). This aspect covers the aspect of 
how governance is created in the Arctic, either as an 
unstable or stable structure. For the unstable rules, all 
Arctic countries will provide limited coherence between 
their respective national legislations. In a future scenario 
of stable rule-based governance, countries will cooperate 
in development of rules, creating a level playing field for 
stakeholders in the north. The other uncertainty chosen 
was Resources and Trade, a representation for the demand 
for Arctic resources in the global market place (PAME, 
2007). Linked to the resource extraction industry, the focus 
is on how the developing trends in the world economy, 
focusing on the demand for oil and other rare earth 
minerals. If there is a high demand then firms will start a 
“race-to-the-bottom”, given the governance framework 
created by the Arctic Countries. 
 
The report concludes that multilateral stable rules-based 
governance is important for best Arctic preservation and 
utilization. Governing trans-nationally allows for the best 
preservation of the ecosystem as the legitimacy of the 
boundaries are established by a wider group of 
stakeholders. Likewise by using multilateral governance, 
countries are able to provide stable unified operating terms 
for private companies in the Arctic. This allows for higher 
mobility of assets and equal standards. The first move 
towards this can be seen in the adaptation of the Polar 
Code by Arctic countries. Having homogenous 
benchmarks preserves the environment, which is 
independent of the demand for Arctic resources (PAME, 
2007).  
 
 SUM-UP FOR STAKEHOLDERS 9.5
This mapping of political actors should provide readers an 
understanding of the global and regional governance 
structures active in the Arctic. UNCLOS influences states 
by allocating maritime rights and defining territorial 
boundaries within the Arctic. The IMO has a legitimate 
mandate to regulate vessel operations, allowing them to 
create the Polar code. Exceptions to this best practice 
might still be present due to Article 234 in UNCLOS. 
However, Arctic operators can hope for a better 
harmonization of standards as a result of the Polar Code. 
The Arctic Council has a regional focus and knowledge 
building approach, providing recommendation for its 
members in seeking to secure corporative governance 
between states. The AMSA scenario planning analysis 
exposes the multiple potential futures, where stable 
governance in the region is optimal for all parties involved. 
The biggest issues challenging stability are the territorial 
disputes and how resources should be extracted safely in 
the very sensitive environment of the Arctic frontier. 
 
For the different business stakeholders, the future 
framework will define the rules they operate within. Given 
the current development of operational standards, business 
should get involved in the process of developing standards 
that are feasible and protective of the environment. 
Stability and commitment to the governance regimes by 
industry and states will allow a uniform framework for 
stakeholders to operate under and for the Arctic to flourish.  
This section does not seek to provide answers on how to 
operationalize in the Arctic, but for stakeholders to 
understand that political structures will affect them in the 
long run. Our mapping of stakeholders does not seek to 
understand the interplay between the Arctic governance 
structures, and future research should therefore target this.  
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10 APPENDIX A: RESULTS FROM 
LINER SHIPPING CASE STUDY 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1:  Cost per TEU ratio for the 10000 TEU vessel in the low warming scenario 
The total cost per TEU ratio of the investment of a 10000 TEU open water vessel to an 8000 TEU ice strengthened vessel, 
as a function of the investment year. The ratio is calculated in the low Arctic warming scenario with a discount factor of 7 
percent. A ratio above one indicates that the investment in the ice reinforced vessel is favorable.    
Source: Own Calculations 
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Figure 10.2:  Cost per TEU ratio for the 10000 TEU vessel ratio in the high warming scenario 
The total cost per TEU ratio of the investment of a 10000 TEU open water vessel to an 8000 TEU ice strengthened vessel, 
as a function of the investment year. The ratio is calculated in the high Arctic warming scenario with a discount factor of 
7 percent. A ratio above one indicates that the investment in the ice reinforced vessel is favorable.    
Source: Own Calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.3:  Cost per TEU ratio for the 15000 TEU vessel in the low warming scenario 
The total cost per TEU ratio of the investment of a 10000 TEU open water vessel to an 8000 TEU ice strengthened vessel, 
as a function of the investment year. The ratio is calculated in the low Arctic warming scenario with a discount factor of 7 
percent. A ratio above one indicates that the investment in the ice reinforced vessel is favorable. 
Source: Own Calculations 
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Figure 10.4:  Cost per TEU ratio for the 15000 TEU vessel in the high warming scenario 
The total cost per TEU ratio of the investment of a 15000 TEU open water vessel to an 8000 TEU ice strengthened vessel, 
as a function of the investment year. The ratio is calculated in the high Arctic warming scenario with a discount factor of 
7 percent. A ratio above one indicates that the investment in the ice reinforced vessel is favorable. 
Source: Own Calculations 
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Figure 11.1: Calculation tool front page 
 
The calculations presented in the liner shipping case study of chapter 4, are based on a calculation tool specifically 
designed to support the conclusions of the case study. This calculation tool allows researchers and industry professionals 
to insert the specifications of a given vessel, along with environmental and economic parameters in order to obtain 
information on the feasibility of transporting containerized cargo along the NSR. Specifically, the model allows the user 
to determine the year when the investment in an ice reinforced containership operating along the NSR during the 
navigation (and the SCR at other times), will become favorable compared to an ordinary container ship solely operating 
on the SCR. This is done by calculating the total and annual costs per TEU of each vessel. These values are compared 
resulting in a ratio, which allows for the estimation of the critical point at which the costs per TEU of the ice reinforced 
vessel becomes advantageous compared to the open water vessel that solely operates on the SCR. Based on this, the 
creation of detailed scenarios can help to understand how different factors influence the feasibility of transport using the 
NSR. Integrated into the calculation tool is the ship calculation tool made by Hans Otto Kristensen which allows for the 
determination of vessel fuel consumption given user determined values of speed, vessel engine size, engine type, capacity 
utilization and hull specifications. This gives the calculation tool a high degree of prediction power while still 
maintaining significant customization options. The calculation tool is available for download free of charge on the CBS 
Maritime homepage (http://www.cbs.dk/viden-samfundet/business-in-society/cbs-maritime/downloads). 
 
The following is a guide on how to successfully utilize the program. It includes a detailed explanation of the results, 
layout and cells in which data can be entered. The user interface is divided into three sheets with the first being the front 
page, the second page containing the major input as well as illustrating the results, and the third allowing for the 
alterations of specific cost and time variables.  
 
 FRONT PAGE 11.1
The front page serves as a brief introduction 
to the calculation tool and lists the economic 
and environmental assumptions creating the 
framework of the calculations behind the 
model, along with a short description of the 
incorporated fuel price projections.  
 
The user initiates the calculation by clicking 
on the picture located in the left side 
columns. 
The program will automatically redirect the 
user to the input and result section after 
clicking on the picture. 
11 APPENDIX B: GUIDE TO ONLINE                          
CALCULATION TOOL 
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 RESULTS PAGE 11.2
The “Results” page allows the user to insert the primary variables and presents the results of the calculations. The left side 
column labelled “Input” contains the input cells where the user can specify the primary inputs of the vessels and routes, 
as well as financial valuations. 
 
The results in the middle columns are divided into two sections. The top section of the middle columns are the “Total cost 
per TEU”, listing the first year where the investment in the ice reinforced containership will become advantageous to that 
of an ordinary open water vessel, measured in total costs per TEU. The lower section labelled “Annual costs per TEU” 
lists the first year where the annual operation costs per TEU of the ordinary containership exceeds those of the ice 
reinforced vessel. The third section labelled “Illustration” on the right side columns graphically depicts the results 
achieved from the middle section by listing both the ratios of the total and annual costs per TEU depending on the year, 
of the two containerships examined. 
 
Finally, this page features two buttons; the orange button takes the user back to the Front-page, allowing for the selection 
of a ship in another segment. The green button titled “Advanced Parameters” redirects the user to the advanced settings 
page where the user can change the values of different cost components for each of the vessels examined.  
 
 
Figure 11.2: Calculation tool results page 
 
11.2.1 Input section 
The input section lists the values of the most vital primary and secondary variables required to calculate the optimal fuel 
strategies. The cells in which the user is encouraged to enter specific values are marked by the colour yellow.  
The input cells require the following input: 
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NSR vessel variables: 
 
 C10: Enter the maximum TEU capacity of the ice reinforced vessel, measured in number of TEU. 
 C11: Enter the new building price of the ice reinforced vessel, measured in $USD. 
 C12: Enter the average sailing speed in the open water sections of the NSR measured in knots. 
 C13: Enter the average sailing speed of the ice reinforced vessel when voyaging the SCR, measured in knots. 
 C14: Enter the average sailing speed in the ice water section of the NSR, measured in knots. 
 
SCR vessel variables: 
 
 C17: Enter the maximum TEU capacity of the ordinary (i.e. non-ice reinforced) vessel, measured in TEU. 
 C18: Enter the new building price of the ordinary vessel, measured in $USD. 
 C19: Enter the average sailing speed of the ordinary vessel, measured in knots. 
 
NSR Route Variables: 
 
 C22: Enter the average distance of the NSR, measured in nautical miles per voyage. 
 C23: Enter the average distance of ice covered waters16 along the NSR, measured in nautical miles per voyage. 
 C24: Enter the amount of navigation days along the NSR in year 2016, measured in days. 
 C25: Enter the annual increase in navigation days along the NSR after year 2016, measured in days (example: 
entering the value “3” will result in an annual increase in navigation days of 3).  
 C26: Enter the amount of port visits of a round trip when navigating the NSR. 
 C27: Enter the average capacity utilization of the ice reinforced vessel when navigating the NSR, indicated by a 
number from 0 to 100, where 100 indicates full utilization.  
 
SCR Route variables: 
 
 C30: Enter the average distance of the SCR, measured in nautical miles per voyage. 
 C31: Enter the amount of port visits of a round trip when navigating the SCR regardless of the vessel type.  
 C32: Enter the average capacity utilization when navigating the SCR regardless of the vessel type (see C27). 
 
Valuation: 
 
 C35: Enter the annual discount factor used for the calculations of the total cost per TEU as a function of 
investment year, measured in percentages (example: for 8 percent insert the value “8”). 
 C36: Enter the annual interest rate used for determining the annual debt payments of the investment in each of 
the two vessels, measured in percentages (example: for 10 percent insert the value “10”). 
 C37: Enter the number of years over which the vessel investment costs are amortized, measured in years.   
                                                          
16
 Ice covered waters means, in this case, parts of the NSR where the vessels has reduced speed due to ice, whether it is 
fast ice, pack ice, or small floes. 
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11.2.2 Results Section: Total Cost per TEU 
The upper middle section in the range E9:H22 calculates the point in time when the total costs per TEU of the investment 
in the ice strengthened vessel is favorable to the total costs per TEU of the investment in an open water vessel that solely 
navigates the SCR. The earliest year where such an investment is advantageous is presented in column F, given the three 
different fuel price scenarios, while the corresponding total costs per TEU for the ordinary and ice reinforced vessels are 
listed in columns G and H, respectively. If the investment does not become feasible prior to year 2036, the calculation 
tool will report so and list the total costs per TEU for each vessel given an investment year of 2035; the latest investment 
year possible given the timespan of this study.    
 
A colour code is attached to each strategy in order to easily recognize how different input variables may change the 
strategy rankings. The colour codes are as follows:  
 
 Investment is favourable before 2036 (green). 
 Investment will not be favourable prior to 2036 (red). 
 Total investment costs per TEU for the open water vessel (orange).  
 Total investment costs per TEU for the ice reinforced vessel (blue). 
 
11.2.3 Results Section: Annual Cost per TEU  
The lower middle section in the range E25:H39 calculates when the annual costs per TEU of the ice strengthened vessel 
will become favorable to those of the open water vessel that solely navigates the SCR. The earliest year where the annual 
costs per TEU if the ordinary vessel exceeds those of the ice reinforced vessel is presented in column F, given the three 
different fuel price scenarios, while the corresponding annual costs per TEU for the two vessels are presented in the 
columns G and H, respectively. If the annual costs per TEU of the ice reinforced vessel will not be lower than those of the 
ordinary vessel prior to year 2060, the calculation tool will report so and list the total costs per TEU for each vessel in the 
year of 2060; the latest operational year given the timespan of this study.   
 
A colour code is attached to each of the cells in the middle columns, in order to easily recognize how different input 
variables may change the feasibility of operating the ice reinforced vessel. These colour codes are as follows:   
 
 Annual cost per TEU is favourable before 2060 (green). 
 Annual cost per TEU will not be favourable before 2060 (red). 
 Annual cost per TEU for the open water vessel (orange). 
 Annual costs per TEU for the ice reinforced vessel (blue). 
 
11.2.4 Graphical Illustrations 
The results presented in the middle section are derived from the two graphs on the right side columns which illustrates the 
total and annual costs per TEU of the ice reinforced vessel relative to the open water vessel. More specifically, the upper 
and lower graphs illustrate the ratios of the cost per TEU comparisons (vertical axis) as a function of vessel investment 
year and annual operational costs, respectively (horizontal axis), given the three different oil price scenarios incorporated 
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into the analysis. These ratios are calculated by dividing the costs per TEU of the ordinary open water vessel with the 
costs per TEU of the ice reinforced vessel. A ratio above one therefore indicates that the costs per TEU of the ice 
reinforced vessel are lower than those of the ordinary vessel and vice versa. Consequently, the point where the value of 
the curves exceeds values of one determines the first year where the investment or operation of the ice reinforced vessel 
results in a lower cost per TEU. 
           
 ADVANCED SETTINGS 11.3
The “Advanced Settings” page allows for the customization of the values of different fixed and variable cost components 
of the two vessels examined. Additionally, the advanced settings allow for the alteration of values determining the 
average wait time when transiting the Suez Canal and the NSR. The input cells are all marked with yellow and located in 
the left side column which is divided into three subsections labelled “Speed Variables”, “Ordinary Vessel Costs” and “Ice 
reinforced Vessel Costs”. 
 
Finally, this page features two buttons; the green button labelled “Return to results” takes the user back to the results page 
and will include the user defined alterations to the variables. The orange button labelled “Reset to Defaults” resets all the 
variables on the sheet to their default values and formulas (this may be useful if the results show inconsistent results).  
Several of the input cells include standard formulas for the calculation of the cost components that automatically 
approximate realistic values based on the vessel sizes. The user is encouraged to overwrite these formulas by entering 
predetermined values of the different cost components.   
   
11.3.1 Speed Variables:  
This section contains variables 
influencing the transit speed of 
the two routes examined by 
allowing the user to approximate 
the average waiting times 
encountered by the vessels when 
transiting the Suez Canal and the 
ice covered waters of the NSR. 
The changeable input cells 
require the following input: 
 
 
 
 C9: Enter the average waiting time encountered when transiting the Suez Canal, measured in days. 
 C10: Enter the average waiting time encountered when waiting for icebreaker assistance on the ice-covered part 
of the NSR, measured in days. 
 C11: Enter the annual decrease in the average waiting time encountered when waiting for icebreaker assistance 
on the ice-covered part of the NSR, measured in days. 
 
Figure 11.3: Calculation tool advanced settings page 
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11.3.2 Ordinary Vessel Cost Components: 
This section contains the default values of the variable and fixed cost components of the ordinary open water vessel, 
allowing the user to change these into predetermined cost estimations. The changeable input cells require the following 
input:  
 
 C14: The total cost of handling one TEU (loading and discharging), measured in $USD.  
 C15: Enter the costs incurred when calling at a port (berthing and towage), measured in USD per port call. 
 C16: Enter the annual maintenance and repair costs, measured in USD. 
 C17: Enter the annual insurance costs, measured in USD. 
 C18: Enter the annual crew costs, measured in USD. 
 C19: Enter the Suez Canal toll of the ordinary vessel, measured in USD. 
 
11.3.3 Ice Reinforced Vessel Cost Components: 
This section contains the default values of the variable and fixed cost components of the ice reinforced vessel, allowing 
the user to change these into predetermined cost estimations. The changeable input cells require the following input:  
 
 C22: Enter the cost of handling one TEU (loading and discharging), measured in USD.  
 C23: Enter the costs incurred when calling at a port (berthing and towage), measured in USD per port call. 
 C24: Enter the annual maintenance and repair costs of the ice reinforced vessel, measured in USD. 
 C25: Enter the annual insurance costs for the ice reinforced vessel, measured in USD. 
 C26: Enter the annual crew costs of the ice reinforced vessel, measured in USD. 
 C27: Enter the Suez Canal toll of the ice reinforced vessel, measured in USD. 
 C28: Enter the icebreaker assistance fee during the first and last NSR transit, where additional icebreaker service 
is needed, measured in USD.  
 C29: Enter the icebreaker assistance fee during normal transits, where the vessel only required two zones of 
icebreaker escort, measured in USD per gross tonnage. 
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